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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION IN THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT'
INTRODUCTION
To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")2' the plaintiff "must show that
(1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reason-
able accommodation, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment deci-
sion because of ... her disability. 3 This survey examines the Tenth Cir-
cuit's consideration of what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation"
as addressed in element two of a prima facie discrimination claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act.4
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit published thirteen cases
that address the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable accom-
modation.6 Other circuits heard a comparable number of similar cases.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA
was enacted on July 26, 1990.
2. See generally Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Prologue, Promise,
Product and Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 205 (1999). Senator Craig was a member of Congress
during the debate and enactment of the ADA, and thus provides an authentic view of the ADA
provisions. Title I relates to employment and is the focus of this survey.
3. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998).
4. The survey period runs September 1, 1998 through August 31, 1999.
5. This survey does not discuss at least seventeen unpublished cases dealing with
unreasonable accommodation during the same survey period.
6. Some of the cases dealt only with "reasonable accommodation" as an ancillary issue. The
thirteen cases are Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussed in Part
IV); Butler v. Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to ADA cases without direct
evidence of discrimination and the applicability of the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th
Cir. 1999) (relating to the burden that a plaintiff must carry); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th
Cir. 1999) (relating to accommodation in an arrest situation); Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas and the
ability of an employer to defend by showing a nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action);
J.B. ex rel Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999) (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction
over a proposed class action suit by handicapped children in the custody of the state in order to avoid
undue interference with the state's conduct of its own affairs); Marcus v. Kansas, 170 F.3d 1305
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This would indicate that the courts are giving considerable attention to
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
Part II of this survey examines the background of the ADA and re-
views the ADA's pertinent parts. Part III examines Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc.,' a case in which the Tenth Circuit reconsidered and ex-
panded the reasonable accommodation concept. Part IV analyzes the
reasoning of other Tenth Circuit reasonable accommodation cases, and
Part V compares the Tenth Circuit's reasoning to the reasoning of the
two circuits in disagreement with the Tenth Circuit.
Finally, Part VI of this survey concludes that the Tenth Circuit's rea-
soning is not only in harmony with the majority of the other circuits, but
that the Tenth Circuit might have established itself as a leader in this
important ADA adjudication area.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
A. History and Development of the ADA
The National Council on the Handicapped in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (the "National Council") compiled the
studies and prepared the report that led to the development of the ADA. 9
Congress' findings' ° and the ADA's purpose as stated in its preamble"
(10th Cir. 1999) (considering a suit brought by disabled citizens protesting the imposition of a fee
for parking placards); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 1999) (joining the Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ADA, in requiring states not only to avoid
discrimination but to require reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of employees,
does not run afoul of the "congruent and proportional requirement" of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)); McGuinness v. University of N.M. School of Med., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussed in Part IV); Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming that the
Company President's unsatisfactory conduct due to addiction to prescription pain-killing drugs did
not warrant protection under ADA); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating
to sleeping being a major life activity); Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168
F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to an HIV infection imposing significant limitations on major
life activities and whether a major life activity is a legal issue); Roberts v. Progressive Independence,
Inc., 183 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to the employer failing to provide reasonable
accommodation for an employee with cerebral palsy going on a business trip).
7. The number of the other circuits' "reasonable accommodation" cases, published within
this survey period, are as follows: First Circuit-seven; Second Circuit-twelve; Third Circuit-
eight; Fourth Circuit-eleven; Fifth Circuit-fifteen; Sixth Circuit-thirty-five; Seventh Circuit-
sixteen; Eighth Circuit-twenty-seven; Ninth Circuit-seventeen; and Eleventh Circuit--eight. Part
IV, infra, further considers these cases.
8. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
9. See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 389 (1991) (revealing former Senator Weicker's perspective, as an original
Senate sponsor of the ADA, on the history and background leading to the introduction of the ADA).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
11. The ADA states its purpose as:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
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are the direct result of the National Council's report. 2 Congress enacted
the ADA to provide a "clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 3 To
accomplish this, the ADA expanded the basic principles of the Rehabili-
14tation Act of 1973, which pertained only to federal government em-
ployees, recipients of federal financial assistance, and federal contrac-
tors.'5 The ADA strives both to eliminate discrimination against people
with disabilities and to create a cause of action for qualified16 people who
have faced discrimination. Courts rely on cases involving the Rehabilita-
tion Act to interpret the more recently enacted ADA, 7 each having the
common purpose "to prevent old-fashioned and unfounded prejudices
against disabled persons from interfering with those individuals' rights to





B. Pertinent Provisions of the ADA
The ADA states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."'
9
Although the ADA contains several important concepts and defini-
tions,' ° this Tenth Circuit survey focuses only on the concept of "reason-able accommodation," which may include:
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-4).
12. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 390. The National Council issued its report in February
1986. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 390.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
14. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1994).
15. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 387-88.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "a qualified individual with a disability").
17. See, e.g., Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F.Supp. 1360, 1367 (D.Neb. 1993).
18. Galloway v. Superior Ct., 816 F.Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
20. See generally Louis C. Rabaut, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Duty of
Reasonable Accommodation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721 (1993).
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making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommoda-
tions for individuals with disabilities.2'
Whereas Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encouraged em-
ployers to hire people based on their job qualifications, rather than based
on race, sex, or other factors unrelated to the position, 22 the Rehabilita-
tion Act provided protection from discrimination to disabled persons."
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") prohibited certain acts of discrimination against older indi-
viduals.24 Thus, the ADA requires consideration of a person with a dis-
ability while Title VII does not permit consideration of a personal char-
acteristic such as sex or race in making employment decisions. Further,
the ADA draws a number of its terms and definitions both from the Re-
habilitation Act and from Title VII.25 Thus, the "employment decisions
covered by this nondiscrimination mandate [are] to be construed in a
manner consistent with the regulations implementing section 504 of the
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
22. Title VI makes the following unlawful:
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ...or ...to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
23. The Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as de-
fined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his dis-
ability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Ex-
ecutive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that it is unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age.") (emphasis added).
25. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1999).
[Vol. 77:3
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "26 Further, the ADA expressly provides that
Title VIl's "powers, remedies, and procedures" apply."
C. Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA
1. ADA's Definition of Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an indi-
vidual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires .... .""
The ADA requires employers to provide some "reasonable accom-
modation" to applicants or employees with known physical or mental
disabilities who are "otherwise qualified individuals" unless doing so
will create an "undue hardship" for employers. 29 Rather than defining
exactly what an employer must do to comply, the ADA gives examples
of what a reasonable accommodation might include." The result is that
an employer might recognize a requirement to provide a reasonable ac-
commodation, but the ADA does not clearly define the required extent of
the employer's involvement.
2. Congress' Requirement of the EEOC
Congress requires the EEOC to issue regulations to carry out the
ADA's goals." Regarding reasonable accommodations, the EEOC regu-
lations, like the ADA, discuss only potential accommodations and what
the accommodations might include.
32
26. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.4.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
28. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8).
29. See generally Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 877
(1997). A reasonable accommodation is a "modification or adjustment to a workplace process or
environment that makes it possible for a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job
functions, such as physical modifications to a work space, flexible scheduling of duties, or provision
of assistive technologies to aid in job performance." Id. at 892.
30. According to the ADA, the term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
[M]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modi-
fied work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifi-
cation of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with dis-
abilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (stating that the EEOC "shall issue regulations ... to carry
out this subchapter ....").
32. See 29 C.F.R. pt § 1630.2(o)(2), (3).
2000] 429
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To further clarify its regulations, the EEOC has issued an "interpretive
guidance" appendix.33 According to the appendix, an employer has a duty
to make reasonable efforts to determine an appropriate accommodation
once an employee has requested such accommodation.34 However, the
interpretive guidance specifically states that employers need only ac-
commodate "known" disabilities." The guidance also notes the impor-
tance of communication between the employer and employee in order to
36
determine a reasonable accommodation. To further assist employers to
determine what constitutes a proper reasonable accommodation, the in-
terpretive guidance suggests a four-step process: (1) the employer ascer-
tains a job's essential functions; (2) the employer consults with the dis-
abled individual to determine the individual's limitations and possible
ways to accommodate those limitations; (3) the employer further con-
sults with the disabled employee to weigh the potential effectiveness of
the possible accommodations; and (4) the employer selects a reasonable
accommodation that does not create an undue hardship for the
employer.37
3. Summary of the Interpretation of Reasonable Accommodation
Because the concept of "reasonable accommodation" originated in
regulations issued by the EEOC in implementation of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, courts look to the decisions interpreting the EEOC regula-
tions for clues to the meaning of the same terms in the ADA.
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner explained that the term "ac-
commodation" plainly means that the "employer must be willing to con-
sider making changes in ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and con-
ditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work," but that the term
"reasonable" is more difficult. 38 The judge interpreted the modifier "rea-
sonable" as qualifying or weakening the word "accommodation,, 39 add-
ing that the court must also consider costs to decide what is reasonable.
4
0





38. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (stating that "in just the same way that if one requires a
,reasonable effort' of someone this means less than the maximum possible effort, or in law that the
duty of 'reasonable care,' the cornerstone of the law of negligence, requires something less than the
maximum possible care").
40. See id. (suggesting Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) be used to "flesh out the meaning of the word
'reasonable' in the term 'reasonable accommodations."'). Judge Posner further explains the
economic aspects:
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to en-
able a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, or even
[Vol. 77:3
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In the absence of statutory guidance, courts differ on the need for an
employer to participate in an interactive process. Courts not deferring to
the EEOC regulations apply the traditional Title VII burden-shifting
formula41 to ADA cases, requiring the disabled individual to show that
actual accommodations exist. Under the burden-shifting formula, an em-
42
ployee first must prove that a reasonable accommodation is possible.
The burden then shifts to the employer to show that providing such an
43
accommodation would create an undue hardship. Ultimately, the em-
ployee must show both an ability to perform the job and that the em-
ployer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation."
II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION-SMITH V. MIDLAND BRAKE, INC.
["MIDLAND BRAKE lI"]
41
The Tenth Circuit, in Midland Brake II, reconsidered what constitutes
• ,,46
a "reasonable accommodation. Section A of this Part recites the facts
of both Midland Brake cases. Section B discusses the findings of Mid-
that an accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost ex-
ceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not
be disproportionate to the benefit. Even if an employer is so large or wealthy .
• .that it may not be able to plead "undue hardship," it would not be required
to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the
life of a disabled employee.
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43. Judge Posner justifies this conclusion by analyzing the wording of
the ADA, reasoning:
If the nation's employers have potentially unlimited financial obligations to 43 million
disabled persons, the Americans with Disabilities Act will have imposed an indirect
tax potentially greater than the national debt. We do not find an intention to bring
about such a radical result in either the language of the Act or its history. The preamble
actually "markets" the Act as a cost saver, pointing to "billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity." § 12101(a)(9).
The savings will be illusory if employers are required to expend many more billions in
accommodation than will be saved by enabling disabled people to work.
Id. at 543.
41. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (defining the three-
step process of ordering and allocating burdens of proof. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Third, the plaintiff again has the
burden to prove that the employer's reason was mere pretext.).
42. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff
must produce "evidence sufficient to make a facial showing that accommodation is possible").
43. See id.
44. See id. (stating that the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the employee/plaintiff).
45. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter "Midland Brake 11").
46. See id.
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land Brake 1.47 Section C discusses the findings in Midland Brake H1.48
Finally, Section D analyzes the holdings of both Midland Brake cases.
A. Facts of Midland Brake t9
Plaintiff Smith encountered various chemicals on a daily basis during
seven years of employment at Midland Brake in the light assembly de-
partment.0 Eventually, Smith developed a chronic dermatitis on his
hands so severe that Smith's physicians considered him'permanently
disabled' and unfit to work in the light assembly department."5' Because
of the inability to accommodate his medical problem in the light assem-
bly department, Midland Brake fired Smith.52
The district court granted Midland Brake's summary judgment mo-
tion on Smith's claims alleging violations of the ADA, the ADEA, and
the Kansas Retaliatory Discharge Law.53
B. Decision of Midland Brake 154
In Midland Brake I, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. The court held that Smith was not a "qualified individual with
a disability" 55 because no amount of accommodation would allow Smith
to perform his existing job.
C. Decision of Midland Brake H 57
One year later, in Midland Brake II, the Tenth Circuit, en banc, con-
sidered two ADA questions.
47. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter "Midland
Brake I").
48. Midland Brake I1, 180 F.3d 1154.
49. Midland Brake !, 138 F.3d 1304.
50. See id. at 1307. Smith's employment began in 1987, three years before enactment of the
ADA. See id.
51. Id. at 1308.
52. See id. at 1307.
53. See id. at 1306. Smith's wife substituted herself as the Plaintiff/Appellant, because Smith
died while awaiting appeal. See Midland Brake I1, 180 F.3d at 1160 n.2.
54. Midland Brake 1, 138 F.3d 1304.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) ("The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.").
56. See Midland Brake 1, 138 F.3d at 1312.
57. Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d 1154.
[Vol. 77:3
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1. First Question of Midland Brake 11 58
First, the court considered "whether an employee can be a 'qualified
individual with a disability,' when that employee is unable to perform the
essential functions of his or her present job, regardless of the level of
accommodation offered, but could perform the essential functions of
other available jobs within the company with or without a reasonable
accommodation." 9
The court relied on the ADA's statutory framework to decide the first
question.60 Here, the court focused on the last two words-"or desires"-
of the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability. '6' The court
reasoned that the ADA's plain language meant that Midland Brake
should not have limited the job search to a job within Smith's division,
otherwise the words "or desires" would be superfluous.62 Consequently,
63the court held that Smith was a qualified individual with a disability.
2. Second Question of Midland Brake Il
Second, the court considered the scope of the employer's obligation
to offer a qualified individual with a disability a different job if an em-
ployee cannot perform an existing job.64 The court carefully examined
the language of other circuit decisions, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance,
65the ADA, and the ADA's legislative history, which states:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a
vacant position. If an employee, because of disability, can no
longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he has
held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is quali-
fied may prevent the employee from being out of work and [the]
employer from losing a valuable worker. 66
Then, the court focused on the "re" in the word reassignment.67 The
court reasoned that the statute's plain language implied that the employee
already had an assignment in the company, and thus would be an existing
employee. 68 Further, stating "reassignment" rather than "consideration of
a reassignment" means "something more than the mere opportunity to
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1159.
60. See id. at 1160.
61. See id.; see also supra note 55.
62. See Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d at 1160.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1161-70.
65. See id. at 1162.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1163-64.
68. See id. at 1164 (rejecting Midland Brake's assertion that the phrases only. apply to
applicants and not to present employees).
2000]
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apply for a job with the rest of the world."'69 Therefore, the court con-
cluded both that the company must reassign the disabled employee to the
position and that the disabled employee need not compete with other
70employees or job applicants. Consequently, the court held that Midland
71
Brake must offer Smith another job within the company.
D. Analysis of the Midland Brake Decisions.
In Midland Brake I, the court came to a harsh conclusion by deciding
that Smith was not a qualified individual with a disability, because Smith
could not work in the chemical-laden light assembly department, re-
gardless of the amount of accommodation offered.72 Thus, the court ex-
cluded Smith, undeniably a person with a disability, from the class of
"qualified person with a disability." Midland Brake I did not logically
flow from the ADA in two ways. First, the decision did not "provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities," as mandated by the ADA's state-
ment of purpose. Second, the decision did not consider the statute's plain
language because the decision ignored the phrase "or desires. 74
On the other hand, Midland Brake II appears to be a "fair" ruling that
gave a favorable outcome to a clearly disabled employee consistent with
the ADA's purpose.75 The decision logically flowed from both the textual
interpretation of the ADA and from the legislative intent. Specifically,
the court carefully explained the wording of both the ADA and its legis-
lative intent to arrive at a conclusion that is difficult to fault when con-
sidering the clear language upon which the conclusion relies.
76
III. OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CASES
This part of the survey analyzes three other "reasonable accommoda-
tion" cases considered by the Tenth Circuit, showing how the court de-
termined whether the accommodation was reasonable.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1166-67 (pointing out that there is some consideration involved-the "process of
consideration is necessarily a component of the act of reassignment itself").
71. See id. at 1167.
72. See id. at 1308.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
74. See id.§ 12111(8).
75. See id. § 12101(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities... ").
76. For a complete list of published cases on "reasonable accommodation" during this survey
period, as. well as a brief description of each case see supra note 9. The author chose these three
cases as especially illustrative of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning.
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A. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.
7
1. Facts:
Coors hired Anderson, who suffered from Multiple Sclerosis (MS),
78
"as a temporary production operator (TPO). '79 Coors used TPO's in a
variety of positions throughout the plant, on an "as needed" basis. ° An-
derson worked in several capacities, one being "above the ovens" on a
ladder, catching cans from a conveyor belt.8' Working in this capacity,
Anderson became ill and requested accommodations upon returning to
work.82 After examining the requested accommodations, Coors deter-
mined that Anderson could not perform the requisite functions of a TPO
and terminated Anderson's employment." Anderson sued under the
ADA, but the district court granted Coors' summary judgment motion,
which argued that Anderson, even with reasonable accommodations, was
not qualified for the TPO position.84
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
order. The court declared that the TPO position had a legitimate business85
purpose. Limiting Anderson's job to conform to the accommodations
would defeat the business purpose of the TPO, essentially creating a new
86
position for Anderson. Because Anderson could not perform the TPO
job requirements, with or without accommodation, Anderson "failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA." 87
On first inspection, Anderson appears to conflict with Midland Brake
H, because Anderson did not require the employer to find another suit-
able job within the company. However, in Anderson, Coors had a legiti-
88mate business purpose for the TPO, by definition a temporary position.
Granting Anderson's requested accommodations would have essentially
rewritten the job description, creating a new job within Coors and de-
77. 181 F.3d 1171 (1OthCir. 1999).
78. See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1174-75 (explaining that Multiple Sclerosis limited Anderson
from, among other things, working in hot environments, standing for long periods of time, lifting
heavy objects and (because of dizziness) working on ladders or at heights).





84. See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1175 (finding also that Anderson failed to demonstrate that the
reason for termination was pretextual).
85. See id. at 1177.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1177-78.
88. See id. at 1177.
2000]
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feating the business purpose of the TPO.s9 This result was fair to the em-
ployee, whom Coors hired on a temporary basis to perform a specific
business purpose.
C. McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine9O
1. Facts:
Former medical student McGuinness suffered from an anxiety disor-91
der that manifested during math or chemistry exams. Rather than accept
the Medical School's offer to repeat the first year, McGuinness chose to
file suit under the ADA.9' The district court granted summary judgment
to the medical school because McGuinness did not have a disability un-
der the ADA. The court did not reach the reasonable accommodation
issue.9'
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that McGuiness did not have a disability
under the ADA and then considered the reasonable accommodation is-
sue.94 The court held that McGuinness's request for advancement to the
medical school's next level was a substantial, rather than a reasonable,
accommodation. 5
Here, as in Midland Brake II, the court examined the ADA's plain
language. While being fair, the court showed that it would not accept just
any accommodation. The accommodation must be truly reasonable, in
96the plain meaning of the word, and not substantial.
D. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
97
1. Facts:
Because a hearing-impaired employee left a mandatory training ses-
sion, Wal-Mart first demoted and then terminated the employee. 9s The
89. See id.
90. 170 F.3d. 974 (10th Cir. 1998).
91. See McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 976 (explaining that McGuinness had previously earned
Bachelor of Science degrees in chemistry and biology; a degree in physiological psychology; and a
doctorate in psychology by developing study habits to overcome the "anxiety disorder" disability).
92. See id. at 977 (stating that another basis of McGuinness's claim was on the "association
discrimination" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 121112(B)(4) (1994) because McGuinness has a disabled son
with cerebral palsy).
93. See id. (noting also that McGuinness had failed to distinguish between Title I and Title II
of the ADA. The district court did not allow McGuinness's attempt to amend in response to the
motion for summary judgment.)
94. See id.
95. See id. at 979.
96. See id.
97. 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
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employee could not understand the videotaped session because Wal-Mart
provided neither closed captioning nor an interpreter. 99
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of punitive
damages against Wal-Mart.'00 The court held that Wal-Mart's managers
"engaged in recklessly indifferent intentional discrimination" against the
employee because Wal-Mart had not provided an interpreter as a reason-
able accommodation. 0'
This result sent the same message to the employer that the
McGuiness court sent to the employee. Implicitly, the court showed that
fairness must prevail. Just as the court denied former medical student
McGuiness relief because McGuiness requested a substantial rather than
a reasonable accommodation, the court affirmed the punitive damage
award because Wal-Mart was "recklessly indifferent" to the disabled
employee's need for accommodation. 2
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS
The other circuits generally parallel the Tenth Circuit in interpreting
reasonable accommodation under the ADA."' This Part of the survey
examines the two circuits that differ.
A. Fourth Circuit: Myers v. Hose104
1. Facts:
When bus driver Myers developed medical problems and failed a
required biannual physical exam, supervisor Hose offered Myers termi-
nation under one of three circumstances. '°5 Myers declined and asked for
additional time to control the medical problems. '°6 When Hose refused,
Myers retired and sued, alleging discrimination based on a handicap.""
The district court granted summary judgment to Hose on all counts. '°8
98. See EEOC, 187 F.3d at 1243-44.
99. See id. at 1243.
100. See id. at 1248.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d at 1162-63 (discussing the status of the support of the
other circuits).
104. 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
105. See Myers, 50 F.3d at 280-81.
106. See id.
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2. Decision:
The Fourth Circuit interpreted provisions in the ADA as containing
"no reference to an individual's future ability to perform the essential
functions of his position .... [T]hey are formulated entirely in the pres-
ent tense, framing the precise issue as whether an individual 'can' (not
'will be able to') perform the job .... ."'09 Thus, the Fourth Circuit stated,
"[T]he duty of reasonable accommodation does not encompass a respon-
sibility to provide a disabled employee with alternative employment
when the employee is unable to meet the demands of his present posi-
tion.""0
3. Analysis
By interpreting the ADA as applying only to the disabled individual's
ability to perform the demands of the present position, the Fourth Circuit
differs from the interpretation of the Tenth Circuit by giving more cre-
dence to the present tense of the wording than to the ADA's plain lan-
guage. The Fourth Circuit completely ignored the phrase "or desires.""'
B. Fifth Circuit: Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.
112
1. Facts:
Welder Foreman needed a pacemaker and could no longer work in
the welding area."' Employer Babcock & Wilcox ("B&W") denied
Foreman's request for an alternative job with equivalent seniority and
pay and offered Foreman a janitorial position instead.' "4 Foreman sued
under the ADA for B&W's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabil-
ity."15 The district court directed a verdict for B&W because Foreman
could no longer work at the present welding job, either with or without• 16
an accommodation.
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
11. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (1994) ("A 'qualified
individual with a disability' [means] an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.").
112. 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir.1997).
113. See Foreman, 117 F.3d at 803 (indicating possible hazard from electromagnetic
interference with a pacemaker).
114. See id.
115. See id.




The Fifth Circuit held that Foreman's heart condition was not a dis-
ability under the ADA.'"7 Further, the court commented that even if the
heart condition were a disability, Foreman would not be a qualified indi-
vidual because Foreman was not medically qualified to perform his cur-
rent job."8 Going even further, the court noted that even if Foreman were
both "disabled" and "qualified," Foreman's requested accommodation
for a reassignment would be unreasonable as the reassignment violated a
collective bargaining agreement." 9 In any event, Foreman had offered no
evidence that the requested reassignment position had been available., 2°
3. Analysis
The Fifth Circuit differs in two fundamental ways from the Tenth
Circuit. First, the Fifth Circuit did not clearly base Foreman upon the
ADA's plain language. Consequently, Foreman does not lend itself to
consistent interpretation by lower courts.
Second, the Fifth Circuit lacks fairness by requiring the disabled em-
ployee to bear the burdens of proving both that an alternate job exists
within the company and that the disabled employee can perform that job,
rather than following the EEOC's recommended process.121
CONCLUSION
Without specifically defining "reasonable accommodation," the ADA
suggests broad-ranged possibilities to impart clarity. ' EEOC regulations
provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation,
indicating methods to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
exists. 1 3 Because "reasonable" for one employer might not mean "rea-
117. See id. at 806-07.
118. See id. at 809.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 807-10.
121. See 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.9 (1999) (stating the first step is for the employer to
"[alnalyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential functions... .
122. The term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appro-
priate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or poli-
cies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters and other similar ac-
commodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990).
123. The EEOC provides:
200]
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sonable" for another, guidelines as to what constitutes "reasonable"
might prevent an employer from being subject to review. This under-
scores the need for the courts to provide a clear and consistent interpre-
tation of "reasonable."
Adding the thirty-some "reasonable accommodation" cases (thirteen
published) heard by the Tenth Circuit during this survey period and con-
sidering that each of the other circuits heard a similar number of like
cases indicates the importance the Tenth Circuit's position on ADA in-
terpretation. All but two of the circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of "reasonable accommodation."
This shows how closely aligned the Tenth Circuit is with the other cir-
cuits on ADA interpretation. The Tenth Circuit, due to clear and consis-
tent reasoning, has established itself as a leader in ADA interpretation.
David William Becker, Jr. M.D.*
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary
for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This pro-
cess should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations.that could overcome those limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999).
David William Becker, Jr., M.D. is a student at Denver University College of Law, with graduation
projected for December 2001. The author graciously acknowledges the assistance, advice, and en-
couragement of Denver University Law Review Tenth Circuit Editor Florence Burstein, Top Editor
Tony Schwartz, General Editor Nikki Arenholtz, and former Research-and-Technical Editor (subse-
quently Editor-in-Chief) Sumaya Vanderhorst, whose combined perserverence through numerous
revisions made this article more nearly clear and certainly more focused.
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COMMUNICATIONS LAW: U.S. WEST, INC. V. FCC
INTERPRETS THE FIRST AMENDMENT RAMIFICATIONS OF
"CUSTOMER PROPRIETARY NETWORK INFORMATION"
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most broad-sweeping piece of legislation of the last dec-
ade, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996' ("Telecom Act"),
radically altered the competitive landscape of the telecommunications
market. Essentially, the Telecom Act attempts to level the playing field
long held by government-sanctioned monopolist telephone companies.
The Act requires infrastructure sharing among competitors, restrains
certain markets for Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs")3 , and limits the
4
role of state and local governments. At the same time, the Telecom Act
balances the interests of consumers who need affordable telecommuni-
cations service provided on a "universal" basis.'
As the decade ends, however, courts struggle to interpret the Telecom
Act in ways consistent with the intent of Congress, while being fair to the
parties before them.6 Perhaps further complicating this mix of issues is
the broad scope of power given the Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") to interpret and enforce the Telecom Act.7
The FCC's regulations concerning the use of "Customer Proprietary
Network Information" ("CPNI")8 promulgated pursuant to section 222 of
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 100 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (Supp. I1 1997)).
2. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, 259 (Supp. III 1997).
3. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276. BOCs are those local telephone companies formerly part of the
Bell Company monopoly. U.S. West Communications Company, for example, is a BOC. See id. §
153(4).
4. See id. § 253.
5. See id. § 254 (discussing quality, rates, and access); see also § 255 (discussing disability
access).
6. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999).
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 401(c) (granting the FCC discretionary forbearance of any regulation
compelled under the Telecom Act).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2003(c) (1998).
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the Telecom Act 9 recently came within the purview of the Tenth Circuit
in U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC.'0 This comment discusses the Tenth Circuit's
decision in U.S. West. First, this comment provides some background
information on CPNI and its relationship to the telecommunications in-
dustry. This comment then examines the First Amendment issues ad-
dressed in U.S. West. By way of reference, this comment also explores
recent First Amendment cases in other circuits. Finally, this comment
attempts to draw a distinction between those cases and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's First Amendment analysis in U.S. West.
I. CUSTOMER PROPRIETARY NETWORK INFORMATION
A. Background
Generally stated, "CPNI is information about a telephone customer's
use of the telephone network, such as the number of lines ordered, serv-
ice location, type and class of services purchased, usage levels, and call-
ing patterns."" The Telecom Act defines CPNI as:
(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configu-
ration, type, destination, and amount of use of a telecommuni-
cations service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommu-
nications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the
customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship;
and
(B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone
exchange service or telephone toll service received by a cus-
tomer of a carrier .... 12
Telecommunications carriers use CPNI for a variety of reasons. Most
importantly, however, CPNI is a valuable marketing tool. CPNI assists
telecommunications carriers in "identifying potential customers, design-
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 222; 47 C.F.R. § 2001.
10. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919,930 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 222(0(1). Subscriber lists are defined as any information:
(A) identifying the listed names of subscribers of a carrier and such subscrib-
ers' telephone numbers, addresses, or primary advertising classifications (as
such classifications are assigned at the time of the establishment of such
service), or any combination of such listed names, numbers, addresses, or
classifications; and
(B) that the carrier or an affiliate has published, caused to be published, or ac-
cepted for publication in any directory format.
id. § 222(f)(3). Mere lists of subscribers are specifically excluded from CPNI, and the reader is
cautioned not to confuse the two. See id. § 222(f)(1). Indeed, disclosure of subscriber lists, such




ing more efficient services, and better meeting customer needs." BOCs
and competitor service providers use CPNI in their development and'4
marketing of services. Put simply, CPNI can be manipulated into cre-
ating a very accurate and highly detailed direct marketing list."
By way of an example, suppose U.S. West knows through aggregate
demographics that local telephone service customers who call Philadel-
phia generally also call Trenton. If U.S. West develops a new Trenton
market, it can use CPNI to tailor its pricing, service plan, and marketing
campaign particularly to an individual local telephone service customer.1'
Moreover, as an incumbent local exchange carrier, U.S. West possesses a
broad customer base and detailed CPNI. Absent regulation to the con-
trary, U.S. West can use its CPNI to market to individual customers any
advance in service or technology in a more effective and less expensive
manner than its competitors.
CPNI creates privacy issues in addition to the competitive advantages
garnered through its use.' Absent regulation to the contrary, U.S. West
can sell CPNI at monopoly prices to its competitors without regard to the
wishes of its customers. This means that all the potentially private infor-
mation appearing on a customer bill - whom she called, when, and how
often - could be freely disseminated to any carrier willing to pay the
price.' 8 In other words, CPNI would no longer be proprietary informa-
tion.
Because of the implications to customer privacy, the federal govern-
ment has long regulated CPNI. '9 To protect the proprietary and privacy
interests of consumers, the FCC permitted the BOCs unrestricted access
to CPNI by any of BOC's telephone customer unless the customer spe-• 20
cifically opted-out and requested confidentiality. However, competitive
21
carriers had to obtain customer authorization to gain access to CPNI.
This opt-out regulation proved ineffective. The customer could pre-
vent her telephone company from disclosing her CPNI to the other car-
13. California, 39 F.3d at 930. Telecommunications services are divided into two very general
categories. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1227, 1223 n.3 ( 9th Cir. 1990). "Basic service" is local
exchange service. California, 905 F.2d at 1223 n.3. "Enhanced services" include everything else
such as long distance service, voice mail, and call forwarding. Id. at 1226.
14. See California, 39 F.3d at 930.
15. See id.
16. See generally U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
how carriers can utilize CPNI information to market products to customers).
17. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (Supp. 111. 1997).
18. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1229 n.I.
19. See id. at 1229 (discussing past government restrictions on CPNI disclosures).
20. See California, 39 F.3d at 930.
21. See id.
20001 443
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rier only by specifically requesting confidentiality.22 Many customers
were not notified of their option to request confidentiality,23 did not un-
derstand their rights to opt-out or failed to opt-out even if they wanted
their confidentiality preserved. 24
The prior CPNI regulation created a competitive disadvantage as
well. BOCs had unrestricted access to CPNI "by default" while other
carriers had to obtain customer authorization before the carriers were
permitted access to CPNI. Thus, consumer inertia had to be overcome
for other carriers to gain access to CPNI. The FCC amended these rules
before enactment of the Telecom Act by requiring competitive carriers to
26
receive authorization from customers only with 20 lines or less.
As indicated above, section 222 represents the Telecom Act's re-
sponse to CPNI. Like most of the Telecom Act, section 222 asserts the
interests of the government in creating a competitive environment by
placing restraints on carriers possessing another carrier's CPNI. 7  As
such, section 222 requires all carriers to keep confidential the CPNI of
28
other telecommunication carriers. If a carrier receives proprietary in-
formation from another carrier in the course of business, it is required to
use the information only for the intended purpose, not for its own mar-
29
keting purposes.
Following in the tradition of previous CPNI regulation, section 222
also provides safeguards for consumers who want private information
gained about them through their use of telecommunications to be kept
confidential. 3° Specifically, section 222 provides that:
[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval of the cus-
tomer, a telecommunications carrier . . . shall only use, dis-
close, or permit access to individually identifiable customer
proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the tele-
communications service from which such information is de-
rived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of
22. See id.
23. See id. This "customer notification" is essentially the same "opt-out" plan that so
captivates the Tenth Circuit majority in U.S. West. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 123-39.
24. See generally Computer III, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7606-07 (FCC 1991) (Order on Remand)
(acknowledging the failure of customers to understand or respond to notices discussing CPNI
disclosures).
25. California, 39 F.3d at 930.
26. See id.
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), (3) (Supp. III 1997).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a).
29. Id. § 222(b).
30. See id. § 222(c)(1).
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such telecommunications service, including the publishing of
directories.3
Upon an "affirmative written request by the customer" a telecommuni-
cations carrier must disclose customer proprietary network information
to any person so "designated by the customer.
3 2
Section 222 also recognizes the value of CPNI as a marketing tool
and as a sellable commodity. To this end, section 222 only restrains the
use of individual CPNI. All carriers are free to "use, disclose or permit
access to aggregate customer information."" Even incumbent local ex-
change carriers, who generally are prevented from using their market
advantages, may also "use, disclose, or permit access to aggregate cus-
tomer information" if they provide such aggregate information on a "rea-
34
sonable and nondiscriminatory" basis. CPNI in a demographic or com-
piled form is freely transferable.35 As a result, carriers may use aggregate
information to design marketing campaigns, tailor services, or compile
and sell the demographic information of its customer base. Of course,
carriers are also allowed to use CPNI to collect fees for services ren-
dered, "to protect the rights or property of the carrier," or to provide
36
customer services at the customer's request.
Section 222 is not the only constraint on the use of CPNI. In 1998,
the FCC released an order interpreting and promulgating regulations
pursuant to section 222. 37 Essentially, the FCC divided the affected tele-
communications services into three categories: local, interexchange (long
distance), and commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS"). Carriers
may use or disclose CPNI to market primary or ancillary services within
a category to customers who already subscribe within that category.39
Generally, carriers are not permitted to share CPNI among their affiliates
without customer approval. 4° However, if a customer subscribes to serv-
ices in more than one category from the same carrier, the carrier may
4'
share CPNI even if an affiliated company offers one of the services.
31. id.
32. Id. § 222(c)(2).
33. Id. § 222(c)(3). Aggregate customer information is defined as "collective data that relates
to a group or category of services or customers, from which individual customer identities and
characteristics have been removed." Id. § 222(0(2).
34. Id. § 222(c)(3).
35. See id. § 222(c).
36. Id. § 222(d).
37. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.2000-2009 (1998).
38. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(a); see HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DiCTIONARY 177
(15th ed. 1999) (noting that CMRS is an acronym for "commercial mobile radio service").
39. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(a).
40. See id. § 64.2005(b).
41. See id. § 64.2005(a)(1).
2001
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In addition, carriers may not use or disclose CPNI to track calls to com-
42 43
petitors, to regain customers who have switched providers, or to pro-
vide customer premises equipment ("CPE") or information services, such
as call answering, voice mail, and Internet access without customer ap-
proval. "However, carriers may, without customer approval, use or dis-41
close CPNI to provide hardware services, to research "health effects of
CMRS," 46 or to market closely-related ancillary services such as speed
dialing, directory assistance, call return, call waiting, and caller I.D.47
Customer approval may be acquired by any method convenient to the
carrier, including oral or electronic means.4 ' Before soliciting approval,
the carrier must provide the customer with a "one-time notification,"
49
containing, among other specific requirements, sufficient information to
make an "informed decision."50 In addition, the notification must inform
the customer of her right to confidentiality.5" Carriers must keep records52
of notification for at least one year, and the carrier bears the burden of53
demonstrating that approval was given. Once given, customer approvals
remain in effect until limited in scope or revoked. The FCC also re-
quires carriers to set in place procedural and technical safeguards to pro-
tect against the inadvertent dissemination of CPNI.5'
42. See id. § 64.2005(b)(2).
43. See id. § 64.2005(b)(3).
44. See id. § 64.2005(b)(1). CPE refers to telephone equipment such as "key systems, PBXs,
[and] answering machines," which reside on the customer's premises. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S
TELECOM DICTIONARY 204 (15th ed. 1999). As used here, '"premises' might be anything from an
office to a factory to a home." Id. CPE is also known as "customer provided equipment"; the two
terms are interchangeable. See id.
45. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(c)(1) (1998). Hardware services are "inside wiring installation,
maintenance, and repair services." Id.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(c)(2).
47. Id. § 64.2005(c)(3).
48. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(b).
49. Id. § 64.2007(f).
50. Id. § 64.2007(f)(2).
51. See id. § 64.2007(f)(2)(i).
52. See id. § 64.2007(e).
53. See id. § 64.2007(c).
54. See id. § 64.2007(d).
55. See id. § 64.2009(a)-(e) (including, among other things, developing and implementing
software, training personnel, establishing supervisory procedures and providing for annual officer
approval of compliance measures).
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B. U.S. West v. Federal Communications Commission
1. Facts
U.S. West challenged the FCC's regulations discussed above, claim-
ing that the regulations "violate[d] the First Amendment by restricting its
ability to engage in commercial speech with customers."" The FCC de-
fended its regulations by asserting that CPNI regulations did not impli-
cate any constitutional concerns, were reasonable, and thus were "enti-
tled to deference" under a Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc." analysis."'
2. Decision
Although courts usually employ Chevron when an agency's interpre-
tive regulations are challenged, the Tenth Circuit refused to apply Chev-
ron until it resolved the constitutional challenge.59 "[I]f we determine that
the FCC's customer approval rule presents a serious or grave constitu-
tional question, we will owe the FCC no deference, even if its CPNI
regulations are otherwise reasonable, and will apply the rule of constitu-
tional doubt."'
Having decided that the CPNI regulations raised a constitutional
question, the Tenth Circuit first turned to the question of whether the
CPNI regulations restricted protected speech.6' The FCC argued that the
CPNI regulations did not implicate speech at all." Instead, the FCC con-
tended, the regulations merely prohibit the manner in which a carrier
61
uses CPNI to target its marketing scheme.
The court rejected this argument, saying that a restriction on the abil-
ity of either component of speech - the speaker or the audience - was a
56. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). The First Amendment
states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
U.S. West also asserted a Fifth Amendment violation "because CPNI represents valuable property
that belongs to the carriers and the regulations greatly diminish its value." U.S. West, 182 F.3d at
1230. However, the Tenth Circuit's discussion in this case focused primarily on the impact on
commercial speech, and so the discussion in this Note shall be similarly limited in scope. See id. at
1239 n.14.
57. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231. The Chevron doctrine essentially states that when
Congress has expressly spoken to the precise question at issue, the court must give effect to the
express intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. However, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous," the
court must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. See id. As a result, Chevron
provides a nearly perfect defense for most federal agency regulation because the regulation must be
unreasonable or unrelated to the statute for the court to overturn it.
59. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1231.
60. id.
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restriction on free speech.64 "[A] restriction on speech tailored to a par-
ticular audience, 'targeted speech,' cannot be cured simply by the fact
that a speaker can speak to a larger indiscriminate audience. ,,6 The
court further observed that the mere fact that U.S. West had "alter-
native channels of communication" did not eradicate the restric-
66
tions on speech imposed by the CPNI regulations.
The Tenth Circuit next determined what type of speech the CPNI
67
regulations implicated. Because the speech targeted a carrier's custom-
ers for the purpose of soliciting those customers to purchase more or
different telecommunications services, the court reasoned that use of65
CPNI concerned a commercial transaction. As such, the CPNI regula-
69
tions targeted commercial speech.
Since non-misleading commercial speech is protected under the First
Amendment, the court applied a Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission0 analysis.7' In Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court set forth the test to determine whether a government restriction on72
commercial speech violates the First Amendment. First, it must be
73
determined if the expression is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Next, it must be determined if "the asserted governmental interest is
substantial ... whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
' 74
The FCC advanced two state interests, "protecting customer privacy
•. ,,71
and promoting competition. While the Tenth Circuit conceded that
these are legitimate and substantial interests "in the abstract," it none-
theless found that the FCC failed to build a record that adequately justi-
76




67. See id. at 1232-33.
68. See id. at 1232.
69. See id. at 1233.
70. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
71. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1233-39.
72. See Central Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
73. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. To be entitled to First Amendment protection,
commercial speech "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id.
74. Id.




77FCC failed to articulate the exact privacy interests served. The courtset forth the government's burden as follows:
In the context of a speech restriction imposed to protect privacy
by keeping certain information confidential, the government
must show that the dissemination of the information desired to
be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on
individuals, such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimi-
dation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal
information for the purposes of assuming another's identity.
78
A more "empirical explanation" was needed to justify the privacy79
interest. In addition, the court rebuffed any other privacy reasons as
being "[a] general level of discomfort from knowing that people can
readily access information about us" and that this discomfort "does not
necessarily rise to the level of a substantial state interest under Central
Hudson."' Notwithstanding these reservations, however, the court as-
sumed that the government's interest in preventing the dissemination of
"sensitive and potentially embarrassing personal information" was suffi-
cient to pass the first prong of Central Hudson."'
The Tenth Circuit expressed even more skepticism with the govern-82
ment's interest in promoting competition. "While the broad purpose of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to foster increased competition in
the telecommunications industry .... Congress did not intend for com-
petition to be a significant purpose of § 222."" The Tenth Circuit's
skepticism stemmed from three observations. First, the court noted that
"the plain language of the section deals almost exclusively with privacy.•. ,85
[and] contains no explicit mention of competition." Second, the
77. See id. at 1235. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit advances that privacy is not an "absolute
good" because of the "real costs" it imposes on society. Id. Indeed, the court notes that "privacy
'facilitates the dissemination of false information, . . . protects the withholding of relevant true
information, interferes with the collection, organization and storage of information' thus leading to
'reduced productivity and higher prices,' and even threatens physical safety by 'interfering with the
public's ability to access information needed to protect themselves."' Id. at 1235 n.7 (quoting FRED
H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28-29 (1997)). One supposes, then, under the Tenth
Circuit's ruminations, if everyone's life were splayed out for all to see, analyze, and capitalize upon,
we could avoid all those pesky problems caused by people's annoying insistence at requiring the
government to protect our privacy.
78. Id. at 1235.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1235-36.
82. See id. at 1236.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. The Tenth Circuit admits that "§ 222(c)(3) and § 222(e) impose nondiscrimination
requirements ... which could be construed as pro-competition measures" but incredibly finds "that
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Third, full CPNI use was allowed with customer approval.87 Neverthe-
less, the court decided that promoting competition, when combined with
the privacy interest, was sufficient to pass the first prong of Central Hud-
son even though increasing competition would not alone justify the CPNI
88
regulations.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the second prong of the Central
Hudson test to determine whether the CPNI regulations would address
the interests in any material way.89 The court was unconvinced that the
CPNI regulations would alleviate the government's concerns since any
harm to privacy or competition absent the regulations was mere specula-
tion.9° The court further noted that it had "no indication of how [an inva-
sion of privacy] may occur in reality with respect to CPNI" or "that the
disclosure might actually occur."9' Additionally, the court dismissed as
"speculation" and "conjecture" the FCC's assertion that use of CPNI
information would impede competition. 92 Thus, the court found that the
FCC failed to satisfy Central Hudson's second prong.93
Although stating that the FCC's position was too deficient for a full
Central Hudson analysis, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to the last prong of
Central Hudson to further criticize the CPNI regulations for not being
sufficiently narrowly tailored.94 The court made much of the fact that the
FCC chose the "opt-in" over the "opt-out" procedure for obtaining cus-
tomer approval. 9' "[O]n this record, the FCC's failure to adequately con-
sider an obvious and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out
strategy, indicates that it did not narrowly tailor the CPNI regulations
regarding customer approval." ' As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that at
the very least the CPNI regulations "raise a serious constitutional ques-
tion" and thus violated the First Amendment.9
these do not sufficiently indicate that increasing competition was a purpose of § 222." Id. at 1236-
37. See infra Part C for a discussion of the court's misplaced dismissal of the competition argument.
86. Id. at 1237.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1238.
93. See id. at 1237-38.
94. See id. at 1238.
95. Id. at 1238-39.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1240.
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Briscoe advanced the position that the
CPNI are a reasonable interpretation of section 222 and that "neither of
the constitutional challenges asserted by U.S. West [are] serious enough
to warrant abandoning the traditional deference we grant agency inter-
pretations under Chevron."" Judge Briscoe condemned the majority's
view as "frustratingly vague" and flawed by "stray[ing] from the narrow
scope of the CPNI Order and effectively tak[ing] into account the statu-
tory restrictions on CPNI usage." 99 In other words, the majority confused
the FCC's role in promulgating interpretive regulation with the statute's100
requirements. Had the majority properly narrowed the scope of its in-
quiry, it would have applied a Chevron inquiry and the regulations would
be upheld.'0 '
C. Other Circuits
The other circuits have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the
FCC's CPNI rules. However, the Tenth Circuit's holding in U.S. West is
analogous to the First Amendment analysis used by other circuits in con-
sidering commercial broadcasting decisions.
In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company v. United States,102
the Fourth Circuit considered 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) which prohibited a
local telephone company from offering cable television services to its
local telephone subscribers when the local telephone company retained
103
editorial control over the television services. Similar to the FCC's po-
sition in U.S. West, the governmental interest in Chesapeake was to re-
move the tempting incentive for local telephone companies to dominate
the cable television medium in their respective local markets.0
4
In considering section 533, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a
remedy "'need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means"' and
noted that the "requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the
... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' The Fourth Circuit,
however, found that section 533 was not sufficiently tailored because the
government failed to demonstrate why the Section did not "'burden sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary.'"' ° If there are alternative
methods of communication available, those methods must be "suffi-
98. Id. at 1243.
99. Id. at 1244.
100. See id. at 1246-47.
101. See id.
102. 42 F.3d 181(4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).
103. See Chesapeake, 42 F.3d at 185.
104. See id. at 198.
105. Id. at 199 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)).
106. Id. at 202 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
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ciently similar" to methods prohibited by the statute. As a result, sec-
tion 533 failed to pass constitutional muster since "[t]he statute bars ab-
solutely the telephone companies from entering with [the ability to edit
program content] the cable television market."' 8
The Fifth Circuit similarly scrutinized broadcasting regulations in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States."° Un-
der fire in that case was 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which prohibited television
stations from broadcasting advertisements for lotteries or gambling casi-
nos.110 Since the individual states could not effectively regulate the
broadcasts, the Unites States asserted that it had an interest in reducing
public participation in commercial lotteries and in protecting those states
that chose not to permit casino gambling within their borders."' The
Fifth Circuit struck the regulation outright and decided that "[l]ittle def-
erence can be accorded to the state's legislative determination that a
commercial speech restriction is no more onerous than necessary to serve
the government's interests."' 
12
The Ninth Circuit in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States"3 also
addressed the advertising restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § 1304.14 Unlike the
Fifth Circuit, the court found the government's articulated interests to be
"substantial"" 5 and that the limitation on advertising appeared to directly116
advance those interests. The court nonetheless struck the prohibition
because the numerous exceptions contained in the statute "'directly un-
dermine[d] and counteract[ed] its effects."' 
17
Not all advertising or marketing regulations fail the test for restric-
tions on commercial speech. The Ninth Circuit addressed automated
telemarketing regulations in Moser v. FCC. "' Many companies had be-
gun using automated telemarketing, which engaged a computer to call
numbers sequentially on a list and played a pre-recorded advertisement
upon answer."' Consumers would have to wait until the end of the taped
107. Id. at 203.
108. Id.
109. 149 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
110. See Greater New Orleans Broad., 149 F.3d at 336.
11 . See id. at 338.
112. Id.
113. 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997).
114. See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1997).
115. Valley Broad, 107 F.3d at 1332.
116. See id. at 1334.
117. Id. at 1335, 1336 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995)).
118. 46 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1995).
119. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 972.
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messages in order to remove their names from the calling lists."' Al-
though forty-one of the states had passed regulation limiting the use of
such automated telemarketing, the states asked for federal legislation
because they could not regulate interstate calls.' A provision of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 199122 banned prerecorded tele-
marketing calls because the volume of automated calls created a nuisance123
for consumers. The federal statute permitted the use of prerecorded
messages "only if a live operator introduce[d] the message or if the cus-
,124tomer consent[ed]."
The National Association of Telecomputer Operators ("NATO")
brought suit alleging that the law violated the First Amendment because
it was not "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government inter-
12 ,126
est.'"  Here, the government's interest was "residential privacy."
NATO asserted that the "ban on automated, commercial calls [was] un-
justified because there [was] no evidence that [commercial calls were]
more intrusive than either 'live' or noncommercial calls.'
127
128
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the statute. The court noted
that Congress made extensive findings based upon "'significant evi-
dence' before Congress of consumer concerns about telephone solicita-
tion[s] in general and about automated calls in particular." 29 Notably, the
court stated that
[t]he restrictions in the Act leave open many alternative chan-
nels of communication, including the use of taped messages
introduced by live speakers or taped messages to which con-
sumers have consented, as well as all live solicitation calls.
That some companies prefer the cost and efficiency of auto-
mated telemarketing does not prevent Congress from restricting
the practice.130
D. Analysis
As the broadcasting decisions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in-
dicate, the Tenth Circuit applied the proper First Amendment analysis
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
123. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 971-72.
124. Id. at 972.
125 Id. at 973.
126. Id. at 974.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 975.
129. Id. at 974.
130. Id. at 975.
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with the appropriate scrutiny. However, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
U.S. West is distinguishable from the other cases in several ways.
First, the Tenth Circuit appears to misapprehend CPNI. CPNI is not a
medium through which a speaker communicates to its audience like tele-
vision or radio'broadcasting. CPNI is not a means of communication or a
form of commercial speech and thus use of CPNI is distinguishable from
the broadcasting cases above.' 3' Seen in its simplest form, CPNI is a col-
lection of highly complicated and detailed data about telecommunica-
tions usage. Telecommunications carriers manipulate this data into
meaningful information in order to market services. In this respect, CPNI
is more like the automatic calling methods used in Moser, and thus not
deserving heightened scrutiny as commercial speech.13'
The Tenth Circuit also appears to misunderstand the competitive im-
port of CPNI as used by BOCs and other incumbent carriers. For a BOC,
CPNI represents a customer base and data collected through decades of
monopolistic power. A company like U.S. West need go no further than
its own local service database to market long distance services or other
ancillary services. As a result, U.S. West possesses a significant advan-
tage over competitive carriers.
In this respect, CPNI is perhaps best understood as infrastructure, like
poles or fiber optic cables. Carriers are required to share space on poles,
cables and other facilities with competing carriers since it would diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for another carrier to compete without this infra-
structure in place."'
Just like the poles or cables installed throughout its territory, U.S.
West's CPNI creates a market already in place for services it may offer
in addition to local service. A similar marketing effort would be ex-
tremely expensive for a carrier that lacked the same CPNI. If CPNI did
not involve individual customer data, the FCC could have required shar-
ing of CPNI just as it requires the sharing of facilities. For example, sub-
scriber lists or directory information must be shared among carriers.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not give proper weight to the
competitive value of CPNI nor did the court consider the particular tim-
ing of U.S. West's suit. Under the Telecom Act, BOCs are temporarily
restrained from offering long distance service until certain requirements
131. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 335-36 (5th Cir.
1998) (discussing advertising of gambling and lotteries); Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107
F.3d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing advertising of casino gambling); Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing a cable operating
system).
13 2 .See Moser, 46 F.3d at 972.
133. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252, 259 (Supp. 1111997).
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are met.14 On May 8, 1998, U.S. West became eligible under the Tele-
com Act to begin selling long distance services.' As a result of the
Tenth Circuit's ruling, U.S. West may use its CPNI to market its long
distance services to its broad, local service customer base. By striking
down the FCC's regulations, the court permits U.S. West to enjoy a sig-
nificant market advantage over its long distance rivals.
Additionally, in its Central Hudson analysis, the Tenth Circuit does
not properly appreciate the asserted government's interests. First, the
court misapprehends that the government's interest in promoting compe-
tition in telecommunications and its interest in protecting proprietary
customer information are competing interests. Similar to access to other
telecommunications facilities, unrestrained use of CPNI by all carriers
would promote competition. However, this would severely curtail the
government's ability to protect consumers. Once CPNI were in the
stream of commerce, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a
consumer to halt its use or dissemination. As a result, the FCC regula-
tions tried to strike a balance between these interests by restraining carri-
ers from using CPNI across categories while permitting its use without
approval for related services.
III. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in U.S. West struck the FCC's CPNI
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 222 of the Telecom Act.
However, the court improperly characterized CPNI as commercial
speech. Moreover, even if characterized as commercial speech, CPNI
regulations were constitutional because they were carefully crafted to
further the government's interest in protecting customer privacy and
promoting competition in the telecommunications industry.
Leah E. Capritta
134. See id. § 271.
135. See generally Leyla Kokmen, Telephone Alliance to Net 'U.S. Qwest'? Local Server
Strikes Long-distance Deal, DENVER POST, May 8, 1998, at Al.
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DAMAGES: PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS: ANNUAL EVOLUTION IN
RESPONSE TO KOLSTAD
INTRODUCTION
Courts had no authority to award punitive damages in federal em-
ployment actions' until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.2 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that courts may award punitive damages
if the defendant engaged in "a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual."3 Since passage of the act, the circuits
have been in conflict over what constitutes the "malice or reckless indif-
ference ' 4 required to allow punitive damages Compensatory and puni-
tive damages can only be recovered under Title VII and Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") in disparate treatment cases,6 which requires
showing of employer intent to discriminate. Some circuits hold that the
plaintiff must show evidence of the employer's egregious conduct re-
garding the plaintiff's legal rights Others circuits hold that nothing ad-
ditional is required to award punitive damages once the employer has
lost a disparate treatment case.8 The Tenth Circuit applies this standard.
Vicarious liability becomes an issue, as well, because if the employee is
suing the employer, rather than the discriminating manager, for instance,
he may have to show the employer's state of mind. Collecting punitive
damages is therefore more difficult. Part One of this survey will discuss
the standard applied in the Tenth Circuit for awarding punitive damages
in federal employment actions (Title VII, ADA, and section 1981) and
how this standard may change as a result of the recent Supreme Court
1. This survey specifically addresses federal employment actions under § 1981, Title
VII, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) only. While there are many other
avenues of action in federal employment law, these three provisions share similar remedial
interpretation, discussed below.
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
various sections of U.S.C.).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1).
4. Id.
5. See Michael Wise, Court Disregards Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act
and of 1991 and Bucks Current Trends Regarding Punitive Damages, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 643, 645 (1998); Judith Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 41, 60-61 (1999).
6. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 60.
7. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir.
1996); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997); Ngo v. Reno Hilton
Resort Corp., 140 F. 3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F. 3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999);
Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F. 3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997).
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decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Association.9 Part Two of this
survey will discuss vicarious liability with respect to punitive damage
awards. The standard established by Kolstad and used by the Tenth Cir-
cuit makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive dam-
ages in federal employment actions, contrary to congressional intent.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Background
1. Section 1981 and Title VII
Prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs could col-
lect punitive damages under section 1981, but not Title VII or ADA
claims. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, and
national origin.'0 Section 1981 only applies in cases of intentional dis-
crimination, or disparate treatment." Prior to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, a plaintiff could collect equitable, compensatory and punitive
damages from section 1981. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prevents an employer from hiring, firing, or otherwise discriminating
with regard to any term or condition of employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 Until recently, remedies under
Title VII were only equitable. 3 If a plaintiff wants to recover damages
for race, color, or national origin discrimination, he can sue under Title
VII and section 1981. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff can
now collect damages in situations not previously possible under section
198 1.4 A plaintiff suing for sex or religious discrimination may now sue
using Title VII and collect punitive damages.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is modeled after Title VII and contains the same types of
prohibition against discrimination in the workplace.' 5 Since the Civil
9. 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999). The Kolstad decision was completed near the end of the period of
this survey. Therefore, this survey will contain a discussion of the standard applied prior to and after
the decision.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 provides that "All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property that is to be enjoyed by
white citizens..." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
11. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000(e)(17) (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(g) (1988). Remedies also included backpay and
reinstatement.
14. Title VII provides relief for sex and religious discrimination in addition to race,
color, and national origin. 42 U.S.C § 1981(a)(b)(1).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12, 112(a) (1994). This statutory provision states that "no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
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Rights Act of 1991, Title VII and the ADA have a similar framework for
damages.' 6 The act only provides for punitive damages in cases of dispa-
rate treatment, which requires the showing of intent.'7 Since section 1981
and Title VII are often considered together, they have shared the same
remedial interpretation. Because the ADA is modeled after Title VII, it is
subject to the same interpretation as Title VII. Therefore, these three
laws'" now share the same standard for punitive damage awards.
3. Supreme Court Treatment
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court articulated
the proper standard for punitive damages under section 1981 to be
"reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights, as intentional
violations of federal law."' 9 In 1983 in Smith v. Wade,2° the Court de-
clined to establish a higher requirement for punitive damage awards than
compensatory awards.2' The language used by the Smith court is virtually
identical to the "reckless indifference" language used in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.22 Since this recent Supreme Court interpretation of the stan-
dard for punitive damages, the courts have struggled when deciding
when punitive damages may be awarded. This may be because the court
must distinguish between the intentional discrimination needed for li-
ability and the reckless indifference to the plaintiffs rights needed for
punitive damages. The defendant meets the requirement for punitive
damages when he is reckless, which is insufficient for liability. However,
without finding the defendant guilty of discrimination, there can be no
question of punitive damages. As a result, courts have varied in applica-
tion of the Smith v. Wade standard. Some courts made the standard for
punitive damages higher than "reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12, 112(a).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(a)(2).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(a)(2). Compensatory and punitive damages are allowed "in
an action brought by complaining parties under the powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in . . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . against a respondent who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact)..." Id. (emphasis added).
18. These three provisions are § 1981, Title VII, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).
19. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). The claim in Smith is based on a § 1983
claim, but courts have held the standard applied is applicable to § 1981. See Stallworth v.
Shuler, 777 F. 2d 1431, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1985); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co. 712 F.2d 1241,
1246 (8th Cir. 1983).
20. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
21. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 53.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1).
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rights"23 in application. Other courts required evidence of some addition-
ally aggravating employer behavior.24
4. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n
The confusion has most recently caught the eye of the Supreme Court
and resulted in the Court recently deciding Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n.25 In Kolstad, the plaintiff, Carole Kolstad applied for a promotion
within American Dental.26 Despite having worked with the previous su-
pervisor and received good performance ratings, a male coworker was
given the position. 7 Kolstad brought action alleging intentional discrimi-
nation under Title VII.2s She believed that "the entire selection process
was a sham. ' 29 The jury concluded that the defendant had discriminated
against Kolstad on the basis of sex and awarded backpay. ° The District
Court refused to give a jury instruction for punitive damages, a decision
that Kolstad appealed.3 A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court decision denying Kolstad's request for punitive damages.2
The defendant argued that legislative history showed that punitive dam-
ages were available only when the behavior was "extraordinarily egre-
gious."'' The plaintiff argued the legislative history suggested that Title
VII and § 1981 had the same standards, implying no egregious behavior
requirement.34 In reaching its decision, the panel relied on the Smith deci-
sion, recognizing that evidence sufficient to show liability is sufficient
for an award of punitive damages, as long as the jury "finds that the con-
duct merits a punitive award. 35 The court thus required no additional
evidence than that required for liability. The court noted that this did not
23. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 53. See, e.g., Beauford v. Sisters of Merc-Provine of
Detroit, Inc., 816 F. 2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (allowing punitive damages in cases where
there is showing of willfulness or malice or egregious conduct by the defendant).
24. See, e.g., Black v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989)
(although plaintiff was subject to verbal and physical racial abuse, there were insufficient
findings to award punitive damages).
25. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
26. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
27. See id.
28. See Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999).
29. Id. Kolstad asserted that the promotion decision had been made even prior to the
interview process and the reasons stated by the defendant for selecting the other candidate
were pretext for discrimination. Id. Additionally, there was evidence that the Executive
Director who made the final decision regarding the promotion changed the job description
to meet the male candidate's qualifications, and had made sexually offensive jokes and
used derogatory language toward women. Id.
30. See id. Kolstad was awarded $52,718 in backpay, the amount she would have
gained if promoted to the position. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
33. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.1431, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
34. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1437.
35. Id. at 1438.
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imply, however, that punitive damages will be awarded in every case of
liability.36
The Appeals Court reheard the case en banc.i The Appeals Court
concluded that in order for the instruction to be given, the "evidence of
the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed to show inten-
tional discrimination. 38 The court therefore required a showing of "egre-
gious conduct" by the employer.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to resolve the con-
flict as to when a jury may award punitive damages.40  The Supreme
Court agreed that the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires a
separate standard for recovery of punitive damages." The Court con-
cluded that Congress intended that the plaintiff must meet a higher stan-
dard than that required for compensatory damages. 2 When confronting
the question of what that standard should be, the Court felt that the terms
"malice or reckless indifference .... ultimately focused on the actor's
state of mind.4 3 The Court then stated that the proper standard is whether
the employer engaged in the conduct with the "knowledge that it may be
acting in violation of federal law. ' '" Thus, in order for an employer to be
liable for punitive damages, it must "discriminate in the face of a per-
ceived risk that its action will violate federal law.4 5 This may or may not
include a showing of "egregious conduct." 6
B. TenthCircuit
1. Prior to Kolstad
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of the
standard applied when awarding punitive damages in federal employ-
ment actions, specifically Title VII, ADA, and section 1981, in at least
three instances.47 Prior to Kolstad, the standard applied was vague, possi-
36. See id. The Court recognized that there are situations where there can be liability
without awarding punitive damages, such as a situation where the defendant is uses a
defense of bona fide occupational qualification or affirmative action. See id.
37. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
38. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 965.
39. Id.
40. See Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1998).
41. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124. The Court relied on the language of § 1981(a) to
determine that Congress intended punitive awards in a subset of cases in which
compensatory damages are awarded. See id. Therefore, the statute is often referred to as





46. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2124 (1999).
47. See Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 1998),
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1999), Baty v. Willamette Indus.,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
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bly as an attempt to avoid definition in the absence of a Supreme Court
decision.
a. Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc.
1. Facts
In Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc.,5 the plaintiff succeeded
on a Title VII discrimination action against her former employer. The
jury awarded lost wages and benefits, emotional damages, and punitive
damages.49 The defendant appealed on the basis that the instructions read
to the jury with regard to burden of proof for award of punitive damages
was incorrect." The defendant requested that the jury be told that in order
to receive punitive damages, Karnes would have to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice
or discriminatory practices with malice or reckless indifference to the
rights of Karnes to be free from such intentional discrimination in em-
ployment."5' The district court refused to give this instruction.52
2. Decision
The appeals court upheld the punitive award after concluding that the
federal law was not deficient in defining a burden of proof for awarding
punitive damages. 3 The court stated that the legislative purpose in en-
acting the Title VII provision was to end discrimination and make in-
jured plaintiffs whole.54 Another legislative goal was to expand relief
available to plaintiffs of employment discrimination, thereby encourag-
ing prevention of discrimination in the first place. 5 According to the
Karnes court, the act allows Title VII "the same kinds of monetary re-
lief' that are traditionally available to other civil rights plaintiffs, in-
cluding section 1981 plaintiffs. 6 The main issue to the Karnes court was
the burden of proof to be applied when instructing the jury whether to
consider punitive damages. " The court, however, did recognize the im-
portant policy behind the statute.
48. 162 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 1998).
49. See id. at 1079.
50. See id. at 1077.
51. Id. (quoting defendant's app. at 53).
52. See id. at 1079.
53. See id. at 1081.
54. See id. at 1080. The court stated specifically the legislation was enacted to
"further Title ViI's 'central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254, (1994)) (quoting Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
55. See Karnes, 164 F.3d at 1080.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1082.
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b. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.
1. Facts
In Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,5" the plaintiff succeeded in a Title
VII race discrimination retaliation action and was awarded punitive dam-
ages.59 Medlock worked for Ortho Biotech for two years prior to ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with his job, including his level of pay. 6° Med-
lock's complaints reached the ears of his supervisors and were discussed
within their meetings.6' Management conducted investigation and gave
Medlock opportunities to improve his "BAD attitude and his dislike for
Ortho Biotech and [it's] policies ... Once Medlock filed administra-
tive charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") stating that his pay was a result of racial discrimination, he
was eventually terminated.63 On appeal, the defendant claimed the evi-
dence was insufficient to award punitive damages.6
2. Decision
The court noted that it had not yet determined what burden the plain-
tiff must meet to show malice or reckless indifference, yet quickly con-
cluded it was met in this case.65 Medlock had produced sufficient evi-
dence to prove retaliation and had additionally produced a letter in which
his employer acknowledged his right to pursue a lawsuit without retalia-
tion.66 These factors contributed to the court's upholding the punitive
damage award.
c. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc.
1. Facts
In Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc, 67 decided in April of 1999, the
plaintiff succeeded under a Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation
claim against her employer in a jury trial.68 Ms. Baty worked as a tempo-
rary employee at Willamette's corrugated box plant. 69 A coworker of
58. 164 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1999).
59. See Medlock, 164 F.3d at 549.
60. See id. at 548. Medlock first confronted his manager after learning his scheduled
pay increase was going to be postponed for six months. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 549.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 551.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. 172 F. 3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
68. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1236.
69. See id.
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Baty's made various sexual comments to her.7° When she reported this to
her supervisor, he told her that he would take care of the problem.7'
Shortly after, Baty worked near another man who also made sexually
offensive comments toward her. 2 She reported this to another supervi-
sor, who said he would talk to her co-worker.73 During the same time,
Baty's other supervisor grabbed her waist and invited her to the local bar
for drinks. 4 Baty later heard the maintenance supervisor making sexual
comments about her.75 He then gave her "performance evaluations" con-
taining sexual content.76 Baty continued to complain, at which point one
supervisor was told to apologize] 7 She eventually called the company's
toll-free hotline, and an investigation ensued.78 Baty was terminated
shortly after the investigation. 79 The jury awarded her compensatory and
punitive damages, which the court reduced to meet the cap requirement.0
On appeal, Willamette argued that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant an award of punitive damages, among many other arguments.8 '
2. Decision
Like the analysis in Medlock, the court again recognized the fact that
it had not established the proof required of the plaintiff when awarding
punitive damages, yet concluded the plaintiff had met that burden. 82 Baty
was successful at proving that she was a victim of sexual harassment and
retaliation." Mentioning the lower court Kolstad decision, the court con-
cluded that Baty should receive punitive damages, "even assuming Ms.
Baty must show something more than merely intentional discrimination
under Title VII." 8 The court based its decision on the management's
70. See id. at 1237. Baty's coworker made comments that Baty "had his wife beat in
the boob department," that she "had a nice butt," and there was graffiti on the men's
bathroom wall suggesting they were having an affair. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id. The coworker commented on "what turned [her] on, what made[herl hot"
and "what her attitude toward oral sex was." Id.




77. See id. at 1238.
78. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1238-1239 (10th Cir. 1999).
The personnel staff interviewed Baty and every male about whom she had complained,
conducted sexual harassment training sessions, and concluded no sexual harassment had
occurred. See id. at 1239.
79. See id. Baty was told there was no longer a position for her, and that a worldwide
paper shortage was expected so that the plant would no longer be able to afford her salary.
Id. During that same period, prices and revenues increased and the budget created prior to
her termination predicted an increase in production. Id.
80. See id. at 1240. Compensatory and punitive damages are limited to a $300,000
cap. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
81. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1240.





response to her complaints: 5 management did not really respond to
Baty's complaints, conducted a sham investigation, and management
employees condoned the harassment.s6 With regard to the retaliation
claim, management showed resentment toward the plaintiff and gave the
plaintiff "what could be viewed as patently false reasons" for her termi-
nati6n. The court did not recognize, as it did in the Medlock case, any
direct evidence that the employer specifically acknowledged Baty's right
to sue.
2. Post Kolstad
a. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit most recently applied the decision in Kolstad in an
unpublished opinion. In EEOC v. Wal-Mart,9 the plaintiff sued under
the ADA. Wal-Mart hired Mr. Amaro knowing that he was hearing-
impaired and would require an interpreter at times.9° Two years after his
hiring, Amaro left a mandatory training meeting because there was nei-
ther closed captioning in the video or an interpreter.9' He was then trans-
ferred from the receiving department to a janitorial position. Amaro
viewed that transfer as a demotion and asked for an interpreter to explain
the change.93 Amaro threatened to contact the EEOC when Wal-Mart
refused to provide an interpreter, and he was suspended.94 A week later,
Amaro met with an interpreter and two managers, who again told Amaro
of his transfer.9 Amaro refused the transfer and was terminated.96 The
jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, Wal-Mart
argued that punitive damages were incorrectly awarded.
2. Decision
In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Kolstad,
interpreting that the Supreme Court intended to create a higher standard
85. See id. at 1244 -1245.
86. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir. 1999).
87. Id.
88. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *1 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
89. EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *1.
90. See id.
91. See id. Amaro's supervisor ordered him to return to the presentation, offering a
coworker who could fingerspell, but was not a certified interpreter. Id. at * 1-2.
92. See id.
93. See id. at *2.
94. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *2 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
95. See id.
96. See id. Amaro felt he was being transferred because he refused to attend the
training session. See id.
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than mere liability for punitive awards.97 The court stated that the analy-
sis should consist of the actor's state of mind, which may include a
showing of egregious misconduct.98 In this case, the evidence showed
that Wal-Mart was aware of the need for compliance under the ADA.99
Wal-Mart knew the plaintiff was hearing impaired and that he would
require aids for his training.'0° A qualified interpreter was not provided,
however, until the company informed him of his termination.' °' The
manager also testified that he was familiar with the ADA and its accom-
modation requirements, as well as its prohibition against discrimination
and retaliation.' 2 This evidence was appropriate to meet the Kolstad
analysis requirement according to the Tenth Circuit.' 3 The jury properly
concluded that "Wal-Mart intentionally discriminated against [the plain-
tiff] in the face of a perceived risk that its action would violate federal
law."""°
b. Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit also addressed punitive damages since the Kolstad
decision in Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc,'05 another unpublished de-
cision. Knowlton alleged that her supervisor had sexually harassed her.
6
Her supervisor's conduct included sexually explicit language and be-
havior. He even refused to 'approve her contracts with new clients unless
she would agree to perform oral sex.' 7 When she complained to man-
agement, the supervisor was transferred to another position within the
company.0 8 Knowlton then resigned because she feared any further con-
tact with her former supervisor. '°9 The plaintiff succeeded against the
defendant company with regard to her sexual harassment claim, yet the
97. See EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *3.
98. See id.
99. See id. at *2.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *4.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., No. 97-4154, 1999 WL 617662, at *1
(10th Cir. Aug 16, 1999).
106. See Knowlton, 1999 WL 617662, at *2. Knowlton's supervisor used vulgar
language, told sexually explicit jokes, talked about sexual activity of management, made
"sexually charged and insulting" comments, described details of his sex life, and pretended
to masturbate in front of her. Id. He also told Knowlton of his fantasies about her, asked






district court granted a motion for directed verdict against Knowlton on
her claim for punitive damages."'
2., Decision
The court held that the plaintiff "had failed to make a showing of ac-
tual malice or reckless indifference to her federally protected rights.""'
The court recognized the decision in Kolstad."2 According to this stan-
dard, the plaintiff only had to show that she was discriminated against
"in the face of a perceived risk that its actions violate federal law."" 3 The
Knowlton court recognized that prior Tenth Circuit decisions held con-
sistent with this standard, and specifically cited the Baty decision. "'
While the court did not reach a conclusion as to whether Knowlton
should be awarded punitive damages, it did discuss the factors that
should be considered upon remand.' These factors included evidence
that indicated awareness by Teltrust management that the working envi-
ronments contained foul language, sexual innuendo, and sexual ad-
vances."16 More importantly, the management reacted unresponsively as
it allowed continued contact between Knowlton and her harasser after
her complaint."7
C. Other Circuits
1. Prior to Kolstad
The circuit courts conflict as to what the standard for awarding puni-
tive damages should be. Some circuits hold contrary to the Tenth
Circuit."' For example, the Eleventh Circuit often requires that the plain-
tiff show some kind of reckless or egregious behavior by the employer," 9
while the Tenth Circuit considers egregious behavior an optional factor.
Examples of egregious behavior may include "(1) a pattern of discrimi-
nation, (2) spite or malevolence, or (3) a blatant disregard for civil obli-
gations.' 20 This requirement extends beyond the Tenth Circuit's recog-
nition of the need for some type of proof of the employer's knowledge of
the legal rights of the plaintiff.
110. See id.
111. See id. at *5.
112. See id. at *6.
113. See id.
114. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). In Baty, the
court analyzed factors such as management's response to her complaints, the
management's conducting of a sham investigation, and management's condoning of the
harassment. See id. at 1244.
115. See Knowlton, 1999 WL 617662, at *6-7.
116. See id.
117. See id. at *7.
118. See, generally, Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627 (7th
Cir. 1996); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 1999).
119. See Dudley, 166F.3dat1322.
120. Id. at 1323.
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The Fourth Circuit consistently requires a heightened standard above
that required for compensatory damages, yet is not clear in its applica-
tion."' For example in Cline v. Wal-Mart,2 the court quickly established
that there is a requirement of egregious conduct in order to award puni-
tive damages, yet did not require proof of knowledge of the plaintiffs
rights by the employer.12 Further, after finding evidence of egregious
conduct, the court reduced the amount of punitive damages awarded by
the jury, although the amount was not above the maximum cap allowed
under Title VII.' 4 However, in Harris v. L & L Wings,121 the court spe-
cifically recognized the need for proof that the employer acted with in-
difference to the employee's rights, 26 similar to the Tenth Circuit. The
Seventh Circuit reflects a similar pattern of inconsistency.'
While these circuits require a heightened standard, some circuits hold
that evidence of liability may be enough to award punitive damages. For
example, in the Second Circuit in Luciano v. Olsten Corp 28 examined the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and determined that nothing
indicated that a showing egregious conduct was required.'29 The statutory
language merely indicated the same requirement for any civil rights laws,
that the employer's behavior was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally pro-
tected rights of others.' 30 The Ninth Circuit has also held that the stan-
dard for liability and punitive damages may be the same. 3' This is sub-
ject to the jury's analysis of punishment and deterrence requirements.'32
2. Post Kolstad
Since the Kolstad decision, only two other circuits besides the Tenth
Circuit have addressed the issue of punitive damages.' 33 Both of the cases
involved section 1983 actions, so they are only partially relevant to the
121. See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F. 3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997), but see, Cline v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F. 3d 294 (4th Cir. 1997) (establishing heightened standard for
punitive damages, but not clear in application).
122. 144 F.3d at 294.
123. See id. at 306.
124. See id.
125. 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997).
126. See Harris, 132 F. 3d at 983 (4th Cir. 1997).
127. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F. 3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.
1996) (requiring the plaintiff to meet a heightened standard of showing egregious conduct
by the employer), but see, Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 103 F. 3d 576, 581
(7th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with the heightened standard requirement and holding proof of
liability is sufficient to award punitive damages).
128. 110 F. 3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. Luciano, 110 F.3d at 219-20.
130. Id. at 220.
131. See Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F. 3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998).
132. See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1302.
133. See lacobucci v. Boulter, Nos. 97-1485 & 97-1585, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622
(1st Cir. Oct. 4, 1999); Smith v. Pepersack, No. 98-1842, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 23223
(4th Cit. Sept. 24, 1999).
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foregoing analysis. Relying on Smith v. Wade,'- both courts recognized
that the analysis developed in Kolstad was applicable to section 1983
actions. Both circuits accepted the decision as explicitly rejecting the
heightened standard of egregious conduct for awarding punitive dam-
ages. According to the courts, defendants may be liable for punitive
damages upon a showing the of defendant's "knowledge that he may be
acting in violation of federal law, not his awareness that he is engaging in
discrimination."'35 In one case, Smith v. Pepersack136 the plaintiff filed
gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims under section 1983.
The court in Smith felt that there was no way the defendants could argue
they were unaware of a federal prohibition of sex discrimination. 37 Fur-
thermore, the defendants did not argue that they had denied her promo-
tions for a legitimate, work-related reason. 38 Under such circumstances,
the court found this evidence enough such that the jury could award pu-
nitive damages. 39
D. Analysis
Within the past year, Tenth Circuit decisions awarding punitive dam-
ages have evolved. Near the beginning of 1999, the courts addressed the
issue by recognizing that a standard needed to be established, and then
simply awarding or not awarding punitive damages on a seemingly ad
hoc basis. For instance, the courts in Karnes and Medlock each gave brief
analysis of what is required for punitive damages and recognized that the
circuit had not clearly defined the issue. Moreover, Medlock and Baty
quickly concluded that the standard had been met without much analysis.
Baty alluded to the Kolstad standard, yet seemed hesitant to really adopt
it as a standard for the circuit at the time.
Before the Kolstad decision in July of this year, the circuits had trou-
ble reaching any type of consistency as to when punitive damages may
be awarded to the plaintiff in federal employment actions. The troubling
vagueness of the statute caused problems even within the Tenth Circuit.
Now that the Supreme Court has established a standard, the circuits
should reach consistency. Most recent decisions like EEOC and Knowl-
ton reflect a trend toward reliance on the Kolstad decision as a standard.
The Tenth Circuit now seems to require a showing of knowledge on be-
134. See 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
135. lacobucci, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622, at *30; Smith, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
24622, at *13 (quoting Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124).
136. See Smith, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23223.
137. See id. at *15.
138. See id.
139. See id. The other post-Kolstad case, lacobucci v. Boulter, Nos. 97-1485 & 97-
1585, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622, (1st Cir. 1999), is not helpful to this analysis because
it involved false arrest and excessive force claims, rather than an action related to
employment which is the focus of this survey. Under §1983, an individual can sue
government employees for civil rights actions, which is of much broader scope than this
analysis. Also, §1983 actions involve complicated analysis of burdens and immunities,
which are beyond the scope of this survey.
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half of the employer of a risk of violating federal law, of which egregious
conduct may be a factor.'" The analysis will further include discussion
of management reaction, or lack of reaction, to any complaints.' 4 This is
consistent with the decision in Kolstad.
The standard to be applied for punitive damages is whether the em-
ployer acted with reckless indifference to the plaintiffs federally pro-
tected rights. 42 Egregious conduct may be a showing to aid in this analy-
sis, but is not required.'4 3 When an employer is found liable, he is not
automatically responsible for punitive damages, because award of puni-
tive damages requires a finding that the employer intended to discrimi-
nate, apart from his knowledge of the plaintiff's rights.
Arguably, the. standard applied is not the same intended by Congress.
Some commentators believe congressional intent behind the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to be different.' Looking to legislative history, it can be
argued that during the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the expressed
intention was to require a heightened standard for punitive damages.
4 5
Other commentators suggest that congressional intent was to unify the
standards under all employment actions, so that the framework would be
similar to that under section 1981.146
Regardless of the conclusion reached with regard to legislative pur-
pose, the court's decision with regard to this punitive damages standard
first appears to be friendly to the plaintiff. 14 The plaintiff does not have
to show egregious conduct to be awarded punitive damages. This deci-
sion may place fear in the heatts of some scholars who believe this deci-
sion is contrary to "current trends in punitive damages jurisprudence.'
4
1
The possibility of punitive damage availability is often blamed for the
increase in unnecessary litigation. 49 However, in a recent compilation of
studies done by a variety of organizations and scholars, the conclusion is
140. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *3 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
141. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., No. 97-4154, 1999 WL 617662 at *6-*7
(10th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).
142. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999).
143. See id.
144. See Wise, supra note 5, at 654.
145. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15473 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (memorandum of Senator
Dole stating that punitive damages should only be available in extraordinarily egregious
cases); H.R. Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 72, (1991) (stating plaintiffs must meet
a higher standard than liability for punitive damages).
146. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 60.
147. This statement is without regard to the Kolstad decision about vicarious liability,
which is employer friendly. The vicarious liability holdings of Kolstad will be discussed
infra.
148. See Wise, supra note 5, at 654.
149. See Michael Rustad, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages,
1998 Wis. L. REV. 15, 16 n.5 (1998).
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that there is no nationwide punitive damage crisis.'5 ° One of the studies
examined, done by the Justice Department, found that punitive damages
are only awarded in six percent of cases where the plaintiff won.' The
rate and size of punitive damage awards varied by the field of law.'
52
However, the rate of punitive damage awards for employment actions
was twenty-seven percent, the second highest of the substantive fields
examined.'5 3 Importantly, the highest percentage increase in punitive
damages was against businesses, including sexual harassment and
wrongful discharge claims.'54 Of course, a factor considered in deter-
mining punitive damages is the wealth of the losing party,'55 because the
purpose of punitive damages is to deter and punish the behavior. This
may explain the higher rate of punitive damage awards in employment
actions in comparison to other fields of law, because businesses usually
have more money than individuals.' 6 However, based on recent studies,
there is no tangible punitive damage crisis. '
Despite criticism that the Kolstad decision violates legislative history
and punitive damage jurisprudence, the decision was one desperately
needed by the lower circuits. The circuits now have a consistent standard
that is similar to other employment rights law. Moreover, the decision
does nothing to violate a substantial amount of concern expressed in
legislative history. Nor is it imperative that the decision will open the
floodgates to punitive damages for two reasons. First, jurisdictions that
have been applying a standard like Kolstad prior to the decision are not
complaining of higher damage awards. Second, the other part of the Kol-
stad holding regarding vicarious liability will serve as a major obstacle,
as discussed below.
III. EMPLOYERS' VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
Because some courts require analysis of the employer's state of mind
to award punitive damages, vicarious liability is often a simultaneous
issue. The act of discrimination is usually not carried out by the em-
ployer, but by an agent of the employer, such as a supervisor.'58 Some
courts will impute the liability to the employer for the agent's behavior,
150. See id. at 21. The studies showed that punitive damages are not routinely
awarded, nor given in outrageous amounts. See id.
151. See id. at 25.
152. See id. at 27.
153. See id. The rate of punitive damage awards was higher only on libel and slander
cases. See id.
154. See id. at 37.
155. See id. at 47.
156. See Avon Sergeant, Are the Legal Remedies Available to Sexually Harasses
Women Adequate?, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185, 185 (1999).
157. See id.
158. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 79.
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yet will refuse to do so for punitive damage liability.'"9 The language of
Title VII only provides for "employer liability." '6° However, courts rec-
ognize that an individual employee's actions may subject the employer to
liability.' 6' Recently, the courts are fairly unanimous in holding that the
employer is liable for a supervisor's actions when that supervisor was
involved in tangible employment actions, like hiring and firing. 62 This
was established in response to considerably recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 161
1. Supreme Court Treatment
In 1986, the Supreme Court relied on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) guidelines to establish what law applies to
vicarious liability in federal employment actions.' 64 In Meritor Savings v.
Vinson, 65 the court recognized that the EEOC guidelines suggest that
when a supervisor exercises authority delegated to him by the employer
by making or threatening to make employment decisions, the actions are
properly imputed to the employer.' 66 This analysis, based on basic
agency principles, would lead to an examination of the job functions and
circumstances specific to the case.161
Much more recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue again in
an attempt to clarify its holding in Meritor.68 The Supreme Court de-
cided two opinions on the same day that specifically addressed em-
ployer's vicarious liability in sexual harassment Title VII actions.' 69 In
both decisions, the court modified the Meritor holding relying on the
Restatement of Agency Principles directly.'70 According to the holdings,
the proper question is whether the behavior is within the scope of the
supervisor's employment. 7' However, generally the motivation behind
159. See Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 97 F 3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing
compensatory but not punitive damages to be awarded against the employer). In this case,
the hostile work environment was so blatant that the defendants did not contest the issue.
Id. at 489. Because the sexual harassment policy was never communicated to the plaintiffs
and higher management should have known about the harassment, the court awarded
compensatory damages. However, the court refused to grant punitive damages because the
plaintiffs had not complained to "higher management." Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
161. See Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F. 3d 927, 942 (5th Cir. 1996).
162. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 81.
163. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
164. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 47 U.S. 57 (1986).
165. See Meritor, 47 U.S. at 57.
166. See id. at 70-71.
167. See id. at 71.
168. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
169. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2282; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257 (1998).




sexual harassment is not within the scope of employment.7 2 According to
these decisions, the employer may also be liable for conduct of a super-
visor made possible by abuse of the supervisor's authority. 73 This princi-
ple is based on the public policy that there will generally be fewer ave-
nues available for an employee to report the behavior. 74 The court recog-
nized, however, that it needed to square this decision with Meritor's
holding since Meritor proscribed that the employer was not automati-
cally liable.' 75 In doing so, the Court stated that one reason for continuing
to honor the decision in Meritor was the fact that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 allowed compensatory and punitive damages. 7 6 The court recog-
nized that when passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress chose to
leave the Meritor holding in place. 7 7 Therefore, by passing the Act ex-
panding employer's potential liability, Congress chose to affirm the lim-
its imposed by Meritor.' Burlington also limited employer liability,
thereby reaffirming the Meritor decision that there should not be auto-
matic liability, by stating that the employer specifically aids in commis-
sion of the harassment when the supervisor performs a "tangible em-
ployment action against the subordinate," such as hiring, promoting, or
firing. 79 When there is no tangible action, the employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages. s°
2. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of vicarious liability in rela-
tion to punitive damages in its decision in Kolstad.8' The Court exam-
ined the purposes of Title VII and concluded that it is against the policy
of Title VII to assess employers' punitive damages even when they make
good faith efforts to comply with the law. 82 Assessing punitive damages
may have the effect of discouraging employers from implementing anti-
discrimination policies in the first place. 83 By having a policy established
within the workplace, the employer would obviously be acknowledging
the employee's right to sue. The court felt that this is contrary to Title
172. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
173. See id.
174. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
175. See id. The court's recognition of vicarious liability for misuse of supervisor
authority makes the risk of automatic liability high because it requires analysis of whether
the employer aided the supervisor by granting him the authority in the first place. Giving
the supervisor his job can make the employer liable because it has granted the supervisor
the authority that he is allegedly now misusing. See id.
176. See id. at n.4.
177. See id at 2291.
178. See id.
179. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
180. See id. This affirmative defense consists of two elements: 1) that the employer
used reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior; and 2) the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities
provided. Id.
181. 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2119 (1999).
182. See id. at 2126.
183. See id. at 2129.
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VII's preventive purpose. 8M However, the Court failed to determine what
kind of "good faith" effort the employer would have to make to avoid
liability. Additionally, the court recognized an intent by Congress to
leave the holding in Meritor intact.'
85
The court also questioned what qualified as "managerial capacity.' ' 6
The court stated that the employee need be important but not top man-
agement, officers, and directors. 8 7 Moreover, the court decided it needed
to modify the rules with regard to "scope of employment."'' 8' Within the
context of punitive damages, an employer now cannot be vicariously
liable for "discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good faith efforts
to comply with Title VII."" 89 Therefore, an employer will not be liable
for a manager who discriminates within the scope of his employment if
the employer can show good faith efforts to comply with the statute."
However, as previously stated in Burlington, the employer aided in the
action where the manager performed a "tangible employment action."' 9'
Although in Kolstad the manager was promoting and therefore perform-
ing a tangible employment action, the court did not decide whether he
was acting in managerial capacity.' 92 Therefore, while Kolstad cleared up
the standard for punitive damages liability for the plaintiff, it confused
vicarious liability to the detriment of future plaintiffs.
B. Tenth Circuit
1. Prior to Kolstad
Since Burlington and Faragher, the Tenth Circuit has applied stan-
dards as illustrated in the following cases:1
9 3
a. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.
1. Facts
Ms. Harrison worked as an underground miner as the only female in
a group of about thirty men.' 94 Mr. Brown was the underground shift
foreman and was Harrison's supervisor.'95 On various occasions, Brown
184. See id.
185. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2127 (1999).
186. See id. at 2128.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 2129.
189. See id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
190. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999).
191. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998).
192. See id.
193. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998); Baty v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
194. See Harrison v. Eddie Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1997).
195. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1440. Harrison received her assignments from Brown
and reported to him if she was sick or needed vacation. See id.
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approached Harrison and made sexually suggestive comments and ac-
tions. "'6 Once Brown began assigning her to projects without a partner
and she realized the problem was not going away, she began calling in
sick and taking vacation days.' 97 Harrison then contacted a manager
within the safety office and told him what was happening. '" He con-
tacted the human resources manager, who put her on administrative leave
pending the outcome of the investigation.' 99 As a result of the investiga-
tion, the human resources manager concluded that Brown had done any-
thing illegal based on his view of the relationship, but his behavior was
inappropriate. 200 The report stated that Harrison would be compensated
for any missed work, provided medical treatment, and moved to a new
section of the mine.20 ' Brown was reprimanded, put on probation, and
ordered to have no contact with Harrison other than what was "abso-
lutely necessary. '202 Harrison remained on the payroll but never returned
to work, and was eventually terminated due to a reduction in
workforce.23 During these incidents, Potash had a sexual harassment
policy.2 4 However, Harrison was not aware of it until she happened to be
working in a different section of the mine and noticed it posted on that
shop's bulletin board.0 5
Harrison brought a Title VII hostile work environment sexual har-
assment claim against Brown and Potash and lost with regard to that
claim. 2 6 During first appeal, Harrison claimed that Brown capitalized on
his supervisor authority to force her to suffer through a "prolonged, vio-
lent, and demeaning sexual relationship. 2 7 Because the supervisor
abused his authority, the employer should be liable for the hostile work
environment Brown created.2 ' The court reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court finding because the jury instructions were inadequate.29 After
the Supreme Court's decision in Faragher, the case was remanded again
in light of that decision.
196. See id. Brown would take Harrison to an isolated section of the mine, try to kiss
and touch her breasts and between her legs, and eventually expose himself and masturbate.








204. See id. Harrison did not learn about the policy until after the incidents occurred.
See id.
205. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1997). After
seeing the posted policy, she went home and tried to find the policy in her employment
manual, but it was not in those materials. See id.
206. See id. at 1437.
207. See id. at 1445.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1448-1450.
210. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1371 (10th Cir. 1998).
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2. Decision
On remand, the plaintiff asserted various theories of vicarious liabil-
ity.
21 ' First, she asserted that because the supervisor had significant con-
trol over her conditions of employment, he should be considered the "al-
ter ego" of the employer.22 Second, she asserted that her supervisor was
acting with "apparent authority" when he harassed her.13 The court re-
jected both of these theories because they were not recognized as valid
theories of employer vicarious liability under Faragher and Burlington.2 4
The court also felt that it was correct in dismissing managerial capacity
as a theory. 25 Her final theory, however, rested on misuse of supervisor
authority.2 6  The court relied on this theory in reversing in her favor,
primarily because it was the standard established by Faragher.27 The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Faragher standard for employer liability.2 8
The evidence in this case indicated that Brown "had actual and immedi-
ate supervisory authority to sexually harass her," and reversed the judg-
211ment against Harrison.
b. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc.
1. Facts
In Baty, 22° the plaintiff argued that Willamette was both directly liable
and vicariously liable.22' Baty had suffered various sexual comments
from co-workers.222 She first told a supervisor who said he would take
care of the problem.223 She also complained to other supervisors and was
211. See Harrison, 158 F.3d at 1376.
212. Id. Harrison claimed that Brown had a significant amount of managerial control,




216. See id. at 1377.
217. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998).
218. See id. at 1375. Recall that according to Faragher and Burlington, "an employer
is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile work
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages . . ." See id. The defendant
attempted to argue an affirmative defense, but was denied because it had failed to do so at
the first trial. See id.
219. See id. at 1377.
220. 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). For more discussion of the facts, see above.
221. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1242. An employer is directly liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the behavior and
failed to stop it. See id. Baty argued Willamette "knew or should have known about the
conduct." Id. In response, the defendant claimed its response was adequate. See id. Due to
Baty's failure to meet the EEOC filing requirement in a timely manner, the incidents
considered for damages basically involved coworker harassment. See id at 1242.
Therefore, the Court focused its analysis on vicarious liability. See id.
222. See id. at 1237-1238.
223. See id.
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harassed by one particular supervisor on various occasions.224 In response
to her complaint regarding a supervisor referring to her as "bouncing
Betty," the company told the supervisor to apologize.225 When she com-
plained about explicit graffiti on the walls about her, the company hired a
handwriting expert to analyze the writing.226 Once Baty finally made an
anonymous call to the company's toll-free hotline, an investigation took
place.227 The investigation consisted of interviews, training sessions, and
a reminder of Willamette's no tolerance attitude toward sexual harass-
ment.228 Although Willamette had a written policy against sexual harass-
ment, Baty and other employees testified they never heard of the policy
until the investigation. 2' 9 Additionally, employees received no trainingregarding sexual harassment.23
2. Decision
In Baty v. Willamette, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of vicarious liabil-
ity consisted of examination of whether the defendant took reasonable
action to stop the harassment or in fact stopped it after it had knowledge
of the harassment.2 1' Relying on Burlington, the court noted that em-
ployer vicarious liability was subject to the affirmative defense "that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior., 232 In this case the court felt management
clearly knew about the harassment, so the focus then turned to whether
Willamette's response was adequate.233 Despite the fact that Baty com-
plained to supervisors, the company maintained a "lackadaisical" attitude
toward the harassment. 234 The company's behavior in response to her
complaints, together with the lack of training regarding sexual harass-




225. See id. at 1238.
226. See id. The perpetrators of the graffiti where never identified. See id.
227. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
Willamette's Regional Personnel Manager and his assistant went to the plant and
conducted interviews with Baty, every female at the plant, and every male employee that




231. See id. at 1242.
232. See id. (quoting Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2270).
233. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1242.
234. Id. There was also evidence that there was only a small amount of training given
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2. Post Kolstad
These earlier Tenth Circuit decisions finally came under the light of
Kolstad in EEOC v. Wal-Mart.36 Relying on Kolstad, the court held that
important to vicarious liability is the extent to which the employer has
adopted anti-discrimination policies and educated its employees. In
this particular case, Wal-Mart did have a written policy against discrimi-
nation, but the court felt that the evidence was not convincing that Wal-
Mart had made a good faith effort to educate it's employees.238 Wal-Mart
asserted that it had a generalized policy for equality and respect of indi-
viduals.239 However, the court felt that evidence of the personnel manager
having no employment discrimination training, as well as no handbook,
was proper evidence of lack of effort on behalf of Wal-Mart. 240 The court
did not discuss whether the acting supervisor was acting "within the
scope of employment" as it probably would have according to Burlington
and Faragher analysis. Instead, the decision focused on the good faith
effort made or not made by Wal-Mart.
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits have confronted the idea of vicarious liability in rela-
tion to punitive damages. For example, the Fifth Circuit is fairly active
in this area. In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp. ,24 the Fifth Circuit
held that a court could not award punitive damages against the employer
when the record had no evidence that the employer took part in any dis-
'42criminatory, malicious, or reckless conduct. In Patterson, the conduct
seemed to be limited to one project manager. 243 Despite the fact that the
employer distributed handbooks and complaint procedures to employees,
the plaintiffs did not follow any of the procedures. 244 As a result, the em-
ployer had no reason to know what was occurring. 245 The court also re-
fused to impute vicarious liability because the actor was a "project man-
ager" rather than a "corporate officer. '' 246 In Deffenbaugh-Willaims v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.24 7 the Fifth Circuit recognized that this analysis had
to be modified to meet the Faragher and Burlington standards. This
meant that the actor only need be a supervisor (or higher) to meet vicari-
236. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210 (10th Cir.
Aug. 23, 1999).
237. See EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *5.
238. See id. at *6.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. 90 F. 3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).





247. 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998).
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ous liability.248 Additionally, the employer could still be held liable on a
misuse of authority theory. 49 Other circuits reflect the recognition of
need to conform to the newly established Burlington and Faragher stan-
dards as well. 50 Since the Kolstad decision, no other circuits have spe-
cifically addressed vicarious liability with regard to punitive damage
awards, leaving much to be determined.
D. Analysis
The Kolstad decision focuses more on the acts of the employer than
the standards established by Burlington and Faragher. However, in
mentioning managerial capacity, the Court also confuses the standard. It
is difficult to predict what courts will do as a result of this holding, espe-
cially in the Tenth Circuit since it expressly abandoned the managerial
capacity test in Potash. The one case that has addressed this issue is the
Tenth Circuit case of EEOC v. Wal-mart.25' The analysis used in this case
consisted of a focus on the employer's effort to make a good faith effort
to comply with Title VII, similar to Kolstad. The same analysis was used
in the Baty decision prior to the decision in Kolstad. The Kolstad deci-
sion, therefore, served as an affirmation of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
with regard to vicarious liability.
While the Kolstad decision may have initially appeared to open the
door for the federal employment plaintiff with regard to punitive dam-
ages, the Court's holding with regard to vicarious liability is not so
friendly. It is now unclear whether an employer can be held liable for the
actions of a supervisor even if that supervisor effects tangible employ-
ment decisions. A plaintiff that was previously able to show vicarious
liability using the Burlington standards may now be unable to succeed.
Even if her supervisor controlled her hiring and firing, the employer may
not be liable if it made a "good faith" effort to distinguish discrimination.
Since the Court did not define "good faith," a plaintiff has no way to
gauge the validity of her claim. The courts are free to establish minimal
requirements that may indicate a "good faith effort." This decision, there-
fore, may serve as a barrier to future plaintiffs.
This barrier undermines the purpose of statutes like Title VII. The
purpose of such civil rights legislation is to encourage employers to cre-
ate and install policies that both recognize discrimination as a federal law
violation and teach upper management how not to discriminate. If a
plaintiff is unlikely to be successful at suing the employer, and therefore
248. See 156 F.3d at 593.
249. See id.
250. See Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 130 F. 3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997); Splunge v.
Shoney's, Inc., 97 F. 3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996).
251. See id.
2000] DAMAGES 479
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
most likely will not collect damages of value, 252 employees are less likely
to complain about discrimination in the first place. Title VII is meant to
protect the civil rights of all people as a deterrence mechanism. If em-
ployees are afraid to report what they feel may be a Title VII violation
because they may lose their job and reputation with no recourse, Title
VII will become ineffective.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit decisions prior to the Kolstad decision seemed to pre-
dict the Supreme Court's outcome. When comparing the Baty decision,
prior to Kolstad, and the Kolstad decision itself, the two cases are re-
markably similar. Both cases hold that egregious conduct may show
reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, but is not required. Similarly,
both cases also focus on the behavior of the employer rather than Bur-
lington or Faragher standards when deciding whether the employer
should be liable for those punitive damages. The Tenth Circuit has also
been the only circuit to really address these issues since the Kolstad
holding. This leaves much to be determined regarding the range of puni-
tive damage liability.
The Kolstad decision should serve both to resolve the conflict be-
tween the circuits regarding when to award punitive damages and com-
plicate the seemingly uniform method of determining vicarious liability.
The Court finally established that a showing of egregious conduct is not
required for punitive damages, so circuits that have previously required
this heightened standard should no longer do so. Unfortunately, the
Court also confused the requirements for vicarious liability by not de-
fining what constitutes a good faith effort on behalf of the employer.
The Court migrated away from the "tangible employment action" and
"managerial capacity" standards and immediately focused on the em-
ployers knowledge and response to complaints. This analysis will com-
plicate a plaintiffs case because the burden she must meet is unclear.
Employers will find it more beneficial to avoid establishing clear Title
VII policy and training employees about discrimination because the
savvy plaintiff will use this to argue the employer's knowledge of her
legal rights.
Regardless of whether one feels the legislative purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is to make punitive damages available in only a few
truly exceptional cases, or is to make remedial schemes of civil rights
law more uniform, it is undeniable that the underlying purpose of Title
VII is to deter and prevent discrimination in the workplace. If the courts




make punitive damages almost impossible to win, the remedial scheme
will fail to deter. Indeed, some courts may decide that a "good faith ef-
fort" by the employer means simply not doing anything to enhance or
promote discrimination, rather than truly making an effort to prevent
employees discriminating against and harassing one another, Therefore,
the Kolstad decision is a detriment to civil rights law, even though at first




EMPLOYMENT LAW: DISPARATE TREATMENT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
POST-HICKS ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK AND ITS RECENT
APPLICATION IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Congress responded to the problem of discrimination in the work-
place through the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII").' Under Title VII, an employer may not base its employ-
ment decisions on individual employee characteristics such as race or
gender. This statutory prohibition is intended to eliminate intentional
discrimination by employers, known as disparate treatment discrimina-
tion.3 In order to accommodate the Title VII proscription against intoler-
able discrimination, the Supreme Court of the United States in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green4 implemented a tripartite procedural formula
for the courts to follow in deciding the question of whether an employer
has illegally discriminated.5 This approach is commonly referred to as the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The Court created this
framework, because direct evidence of discrimination rarely exists,
which necessitates that employees rely on circumstantial evidence to
6prove intentional discrimination.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17(1994).
2. Id. § 2000e-2. This section of the Civil Rights Acts describes unlawful practices,
stating:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
anyway which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
3. See Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment under Title VII, 87
CAL. L. REV. 983, 984 (1999).
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01.
6. See Green, supra note 3, at 985.
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The first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the
plaintiff employee to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.7 The
second stage shifts the burden to the defendant-employer to produce a
legitimate reason for it adverse employment decision.8 The third stage
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's prof-
fered reason was a pretext for discrimination.9 There are three approaches
or tests for the third stage of the burden-shifting framework. Each varies
in the amount of evidence a plaintiff must present to show the requisite
pretext. The three tests are called: the pretext-only approach, the permis-
sive pretext-only approach, and the pretext-plus approach.'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued several opinions involving
employment discrimination during the relevant survey period." These
opinions address the three-part McDonnell-Douglas framework in cases
alleging intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. All of these
cases arise under Title V11 2, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA"),'3 or the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA").
4
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's application and analysis of
the McDonnell Douglas framework, specifically the third stage of that
framework. Part I provides a general background of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Included in this background discussion is a descrip-
tion of the three tests that various courts apply at the third stage of the
framework. Part II is broken into two sections. The first section discusses
the Tenth Circuit's decisions that apply the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work at the pre-trial summary judgment stage. The second section dis-
cusses the Tenth Circuit's decisions that apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework during trial. Part III confronts the Tenth Circuit's distinction
between pre-trial and trial application of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
7. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 804-05.
10. See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
11. The survey period covers cases decided by the Tenth Circuit between September 1,
1998 and August 31, 1999.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308, 311 (1996) (stating that "[w]e have never had occasion to decide whether that application
of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that
point, we shall assume it.").
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); see Kevin W. Williams, The Reasonable
Accommodation Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed
Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 98-99 (1997) (examining the




work. Finally, Part IV examines other circuits' application of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Burden Shifting Analysis in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases
The intent of Congress in enacting Title VII was not to "'guarantee a
job to every person regardless of qualifications . . .[but rather the] re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of ra-
cial or other impermissible classification.""' In McDonnell Douglas, the
Court addressed the "proper order and nature of proof' required for cases
arising under Title VII.' 6 The plaintiff was an African-American civil
rights activist who was laid off pursuant to a reduction in workforce. 7
The plaintiff protested his discharge by participating in a "stall-in,"
whereby several people parked their cars to block all of the entrances to
the facility.' 8 Approximately a year after his discharge, the plaintiff re-
sponded to an advertisement by his former employer, but McDonnell
Douglas rejected him because of his participation in the illegal protests.'9
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part
framework allocating the burden of proof in a Title VII trial. 20 First, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a "prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination."2' The Court in McDonnell Douglas suggested a plaintiff
could prove a prima facie case by showing: "(i) that he belongs to a ra-
cial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 22
The plaintiffs establishment of the prima facie case creates a pre-
sumption that the employer discriminated.23 Second, if the plaintiff
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 793-94.
17. See id. at 794.
18. See id. at 794-95. The plaintiff was arrested for his unlawful participation in the
protes. See id. at 795.
19. See id. at 796.
20. See id. at 802-05.
21. Id. at 802. The Court stated that this model is not the exclusive means by which to
prove the prima facie case because varying factual situations will require multifarious
applications of the rule. See id. at 802 n, 13.
22. Id. at 802.
23. See Green, supra note 3, at 988.
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proves the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer
"to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."24 If the defendant carries this burden, the presump-
tion raised by the plaintiff drops and the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff.25
The third and final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework re-
quires that the plaintiff prove that the reason articulated by the defendant
for its action against the plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination.26 Fed-
eral courts continue to struggle with this third part of the analysis.27
After McDonnell Douglas established the proper framework for allo-
cating burdens in a disparate treatment discrimination case based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, s the federal appellate courts struggled with respect
to deciphering the Court's holding at all stages of the McDonnell Doug-
las framework of proof.29 In turn, the Supreme Court decided a number
of cases clarifying its decision in McDonnell Douglas. The Court in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine ° reconsidered what
the Court meant at the second stage of the analysis when the burden
shifts to the defendant. 3' Asserting a violation of Title VII, the Burdine
plaintiff alleged gender discrimination following her failed promotion
and her termination.32 The Supreme Court reiterated the McDonnell
Douglas framework before addressing the issue before it.33 Turning to the
second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court noted that
the employer must produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for its action, even if that reason didn't actually motivate the
employment decision. 4 If the defendant produces such evidence, the em-
ployer has successfully rebutted the presumption raised by the prima
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This burden is only one of production and not
of proof. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (198 1).
25. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
26. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In summarizing its decision, the Court
stated that the plaintiff "must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that petitioner's
assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If
the District Judge so finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy." Id. at 807. This
suggests that a showing of pretext alone is all that the plaintiff must prove in order to succeed
once the first two steps of the analysis have been met.
27. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
28. See Williams, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. See Williams, supra note 14, at 108-09.
30. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
31. See id. at 250 (analyzing the issue of whether the defendant must prove its proffered
reason by a preponderance of the evidence).
32. See id. at 251.
33. See id. at 252-54 (stating that "the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment is not onerous" and that establishment of the prima facie case by the
plaintiff creates a presumption of discrimination by the employer).
34. Id. at 254 (observing that an employer can accomplish this through introduction of
admissible evidence which is simply a burden of production).
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facie case.35 In order to accomplish this, the employer's explanation
"must be clear and reasonably specific. 3 6
Following the decision in Burdine, the federal circuit courts have ap-
plied three different rules to the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. The third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework re-
quires that the plaintiff show the defendant's explanation for the em-
ployment decision is actually pretext for a discriminatory reason. 37 Three
separate tests developed to the meet this third stage requirement: the
pretext-only approach, the permissive pretext-only approach, and the
pretext-plus approach.
The pretext-only approach requires judgment for the plaintiff upon
demonstrating the falsity of the defendant's proffered reason. 38 The per-
missive pretext-only approach allows the plaintiff to prevail by simply
establishing pretext, so long as the evidence of pretext shows discrimi-
natory intent.39 This approach allows a jury to infer discriminatory intent
from the fact that the employer gave a false reason. Hence, the title per-
missive pretext-only applies because the jury is permitted to find for the
plaintiff on a showing of pretext alone, as long as that showing proves
intentional discrimination.
The pretext-plus approach is the most stringent. This approach re-
quires that the plaintiff not only prove the employer's proffered reason
was false but also present direct evidence of the employer's discrimina-
tory intent.
40
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,4' the Supreme Court responded
to the circuit split on how to analyze the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 42 The Court in Hicks attempted to reconcile this
discrepancy in the context of a Title VII race discrimination claim con-
cerning the firing of an African-American man.4 ' The defendants argued
that the African-American employee was fired because of disciplinary
problems and because the employee had threatened his new supervisor."
35. See id. at 255.
36. Id. at 258.
37. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
38. See Gabrielle R. Lamarche, Note, State of Employment Discrimination Cases after
Hicks, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 117-18 (1998).
39. See id. at 116-17.
40. See id. at 118-20.
41. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
42. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512 (1993) (indicating that the
law on how to conduct the pretext stage of Title VI litigation was not settled, contrary to the
suggestion of the dissent); Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
43. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504-05.
44. See id. at 505. The Court ruled that the defendants had met their burden of production
under McDonnell Douglas which placed them in a "better position than if they had remained
silent." Id. at 509 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, no credibility assessment occurs
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The district court declared that the reasons offered by the defendants
for the actions against the plaintiff was false. Nevertheless, the court held
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants' true motivation were
discriminatory and the district court entered judgment for the defendant.
45 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the correct test was the
pretext-only approach, which, when applied here, required judgment for
the plaintiff, as he had established that the proffered reasons were pre-
textual.46
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' application of the
pretext-only test.47 The Hicks Court adopted the permissive pretext-only
approach and held a jury "may infer discrimination from circumstantial
evidence alone., 48 The Court stated that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of
the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is ac-
companied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements
of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." '49 The
Court based its decision on Federal Rule of Evidence 301 and precedent
that the burden of proof never shifts and that plaintiff retains the "'ulti-
mate burden of persuasion." 0 However, the ambiguous language in the
Hicks decision has resulted in some circuits following the permissive
pretext-only approach with others adhering to the pretext-plus
approach."
The dissent in Hicks warned about the ramifications of eliminating
the pretext-only approach. 2 Justice Souter decried the majority opinion
for creating an incentive for employers to lie when defending disparate
treatment claims.53 The dissenting justices noted that the McDonnell
Douglas framework was implemented in order to give the defendant an
opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs offering of proof of discrimina-
tion and to allow the defendant to limit the focus of the investigation as it
saw fit.5 4 Under the new pronouncement, Justice Souter recognized that
when deciding whether the defendant met the burden of production at the second stage of the
analysis. See id.
45. See id. at 508 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
46. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. (declining to require a further showing that the adverse
employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus).
47. See id. at 519; see also Lamarche, supra note 38, at 121 (stating that "[alithough
Hicks contains ambiguities, the Court clearly rejected the strict 'pretext-only' approach").
48. Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
49. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
50. Id. (internal citations omitted).
51. See Lamarche, supra note 38, at 109.
52. See Hicks, 509 U.S at 533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that not requiring
judgment for the plaintiff upon establishing pretext alone will "be unfair to plaintiffs,
unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present false evidence in
court").
53. See id. at 538-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 536-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the courts would be able to "look beyond the employer's lie by assuming
the possible existence of other reasons the employer might have prof-
fered without lying."5
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the pretext-only strand of
analysis, several courts, including the Tenth Circuit, cling to this rejected
approach for assessing whether a plaintiff can survive a defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 6 Most of the circuits, however, apply the
permissive pretext-only approach, which permits, but does not require,
the fact finder to infer discriminatory animus from the plaintiff proving a
prima facie case and successfully rebutting the defendant's reasons for
its action. Nonetheless, a small portion of the circuits rely on the pretext-
plus approach and require a finding of discriminatory intent by the fact
finder in addition to mere falsity of the defendant's stated reason. The
Supreme Court's rejection of the pretext-only approach in Hicks failed to
resolve the circuit split.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Application of the McDonnell Douglas Frame-
work
Prior to Hicks, the Tenth Circuit followed the majority of federal cir-
cuits and applied the pretext-plus approach, whereby the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant-employer's proffered reason was a pretext
for intentional discrimination, not simply that it was false.57 Articulated
another way, the pretext-plus approach utilized by the Tenth Circuit re-
quired the plaintiff to prove not only that the employer's proffered ex-
planations for its action were "not worthy of credence," but also that the
employer's true motive violated Title VII.5' After the Supreme Court
decided Hicks, the Tenth Circuit struggled with whether the pretext-only,
permissive pretext-only, or pretext-plus approach applied at the various
stages of a trial.59
In Randle v. City of Aurora,6° the Tenth Circuit clarified this confu-
sion adhering to the pretext-only approach in the context of summary
55. Id. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The plaintiff
must show not merely that the proffered reasons are pretextual but that they are 'a pretext for
discrimination."' (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981))).
58. See Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on
Furnco Constr. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (decided two months prior to Hicks).
59. See Jones v. Babbitt, 52 F.3d 279, 281 (10th Cir. 1995) (altering the formulation of
the pretext-plus approach slightly to require the plaintiff to prove that the employer's "reason
was merely a pretext for unlawful reprisal and that [the employer] intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff"); see also Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 530 (10th Cir. 1995)
(demanding that the court consider all of the evidence and decide whether the employer
impermissibly and intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff).
60. 69 F.3d 441 (10th Cir. 1995).
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judgment and the permissive pretext-only approach at a full trial.6' The
decision noted that proving pretext permits the jury to infer discrimina-
tory animus, but does not require a finding of discriminatory intent
against the defendant and consequent judgment for the plaintiff.62 The
Randle court altered this generally applicable rule at the summary judg-
ment stage, simply requiring the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case and
pretext to defeat a defendant's summary judgment motion.63 Thus, the
inquiry into pretext at the summary judgment phase requires the plaintiff
to show that the defendant's proffered reason is "unworthy of credence"
in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact and withstand the mo-
tion.64
II. TENTH CIRCUIT CASES:
The Tenth Circuit decided six cases during the survey period that
analyzed the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Most of
these applied the McDonnell Douglas framework at the pre-trial, sum-
mary judgment stage. Only one case came to the Tenth Circuit after a full
trial. Although the standard the Tenth Circuit applied remained consis-
tent with Randle v. City of Aurora, the actual articulation and adherence
to that precedent varies.
A. Cases Decided On Summary Judgment
1. Trujillo v. University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
65
a. Facts
The Hispanic plaintiff in Trujillo charged the defendant-employer
with discrimination arising under Title VII, claiming hostile work envi-
ronment, disparate treatment, and retaliation.66 The district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. 67 The de-
fendant-employer suffered from budgetary difficulties and recommended
the elimination of the plaintiffs position. 68 The employer did not dis-
charge the plaintiff immediately because "his position was funded for the
next year through a one time $30,000 grant .... 69 After that year passed
61. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,453 n.18 (10th Cir. 1995).
62. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 451-52 n. 15.
63. See id. at 451.
64. Id. at 452 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
65. 157 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 1998).
66. See Trujillo v. University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, 157 F.3d 1211, 1213
(10th Cir. 1998).
67. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1213. For the purposes of this survey, the discussion will be
limited to the court's analysis of the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1213-14.
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and the grant ran out, the defendant discharged the plaintiff.0 The district
court found the defendant discharged the plaintiff because of budget
cuts.7 Although the plaintiff proved his initial burden under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework by establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination, the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to showing that the defendant's reason for discharging
him was pretextual
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit relied on Randle and held that summary judgment
must be granted in favor of the defendant unless the plaintiff establishes
that the defendant's legitimate reason for its employment decision was
both illegitimate and false. 3 In upholding the district court's granting of
summary judgment,74 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the employer of-
fered a legitimate reason for the discharge and the plaintiff failed to raise
an issue of fact tending to show that the reason was "pretextual and un-
worthy of belief.,
75
2. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Services76
a. Facts
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the plaintiff's
Title VII racial discrimination claim due to an insufficient showing of
pretext. 77 The plaintiff, an African-American, applied for a promotion to
the position of Fire and Safety Officer.8 The hospital gave the job to a
white applicant.79 The plaintiff filed a claim under Title VII, but eventu-
ally the parties settled.8° As part of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff
was promoted to the position for which he originally applied.8 Soon after
the plaintiffs promotion, the defendant-employer posted a job an-
nouncement for Fire and Safety Officer Supervisor and stated in the an-
nouncement that applicants with supervisory experience would be given
70. See id. at 1214.
71. See id. at 1213-14.
72. See id. at 1215.
73. See id. (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 n.14 (10th Cir. 1995)).
74. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1217.
75. Id. at 1215 (citing Randle, 69 F.3d at 451).
76. 165 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999),
77. See Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff also brought charges of retaliatory
discrimination. See id. at 1325. Analysis of these claims is beyond the scope of this survey.
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preference." The plaintiff applied and interviewed for the position, but
the hospital filled the position with a white employee. 3 The white em-
ployee received the highest scores in the first round of interviews and
had significantly more supervisory experience.84 The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to the
disparate treatment claim. 5
b. Decision
Proceeding through the three-part McDonnell Douglas framework,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the third part. Specifically,
the plaintiff failed to establish that a "reasonable jury [could] conclude
that defendant's proffered reasons for failing to promote [the plaintiff
were] 'unworthy of belief."'8 6 One of the primary attempts by the plain-
tiff to establish pretext included establishing procedural irregularities in
the promotional decision. 7 Although the plaintiff attempted to establish
pretext, his evidence did not sufficiently show that the defendant's rea-
sons were false. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant.8
3. Butler v. City of Prairie Village 9
a. Facts
The plaintiff brought a disparate treatment discrimination suit under
the ADA," which required application of the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting framework. 9' The plaintiff worked as an assistant director for
the city's Public Works Department and became clinically depressed
after working in that position for approximately six years.92 After the
onset of depression, the plaintiff s productivity decreased.93 The plaintiff
subsequently received several poor performance evaluations and had
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. The white employee's supervisory experience was in another field. See id. at
1324. But the court did not consider this a material distinction when evaluating the lesser
experience of the plaintiff. See id. at 1328.
85. See id. at 1325.
86. Id. at 1328-29 (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 (10th Cir. 1995)).
87. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329.
88. See id.
89. 172 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 1999).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213.
91. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 747 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that
claims arising under the ADA, and based on indirect evidence, are evaluated under this
framework).
92. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 740-41.
93. See id. at 741-42. The plaintiffs psychologist indicated that the plaintiff should not
work more than forty hours a week for fear that the added stress would further decrease his
productivity. See id. at 741.
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confrontations with the plaintiffs supervisors.94 Pursuant to a reorgani-
zation plan, the plaintiffs supervisor eliminated his position with the
department.9 After the reorganization, the employer created a new posi-
tion, which had many of the same responsibilities as the plaintiffs old
job.96 The plaintiff failed to overcome defendant's motion for summary
judgment, because he failed to prove a prima facie case, the first part of
the McDonnell Douglas framework.97
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, holding that the plaintiff
successfully proved the prima facie case.9 The court then turned its at-
tention to the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work.9 In order to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must raise
only a genuine issue of fact that the defendant's proffered reason was a
pretext for discriminatory motives.' °° The court indicated that the defen-
dant proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing the plain-
tiff by showing that it reorganized the department in which the plaintiff
worked.' °' However, the court found that the plaintiff successfully coun-
tered this reason, by showing that the reason was pretextual, as evi-
denced by a new position being created shortly after the plaintiff's termi-
nation entailing duties similar to those of the plaintiff's former
position.' 2 Because the plaintiff established an issue of fact concerning
the pretextual nature of the defendant's proffered reason, the court held
summary judgment for the defendant was improper.' 3
94. See id. at 742.
95. See id. at 743.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 748 ("The district court found that Plaintiff 'fail[ed] to point to any
evidence indicating that Defendant ... terminated him due to his alleged disability."' (quoting
Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 974 F. Supp. 1386, 1401 (D. Kan. 1997))).
98. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 749 (finding an inference of discrimination in the facts that
plaintiffs evaluations declined after disclosing his disability and in an increase in comments by
supervisors about the plaintiffs work productivity after the plaintiff asked for accommodation
for his disability).
99. See id. at 750 (assessing whether the defendant offered a reason for the adverse action
and whether the plaintiff established pretext).
100. See id. (observing that the plaintiff does not need to prove that discriminatory animus
actually motivated the decision to terminate in order to avoid summary judgment (citing
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (10th Cir. 1997)).
101. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 750.
102. See id. at 750-51 (discussing how the apparent minimal differences in criteria
between the plaintiffs old position and the newly established Project Coordinator position
create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext).
103. See id. at 751.
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4. Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd.'°"
a. Facts
In Hardy, the plaintiff claimed that his employer violated the ADA
and ADEA by terminating him because of his heart condition and age.'0 5
The employer claimed the termination was prompted by the plaintiff's
sexually harassing conduct.' ° According to the trial record, the plaintiff,
a male and longtime employee of the company, harassed female employ-
ees even after the company instituted diversity training sessions "to ad-
dress issues of women and minorities in the workplace . ,.0' The com-
pany fired the plaintiff after an internal investigation of several reported
incidents.' ° The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove that the employer's reason
for termination was pretextual.' °9
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to de-
termine whether the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence to prove
pretext, thereby reversing the lower court's grant of summary
judgment."0 As proof of the pretextual nature of the employer's proffered
reason for termination, the plaintiff offered evidence that the employer's
explanations were contradictory, the investigation of his harassing con-
duct was poorly conducted, and younger employees were treated more
favorably for similar indiscretions."' The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the
plaintiffs pretextual characterizations," 2 and held that summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant was appropriate."'
104. 185 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. See Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1999). When
the plaintiff was fired, he was sixty years old, had undergone heart bypass surgery, and had
suffered a heart attack. See id. at 1079.
106. See id. at 1078.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1078-79 (the plaintiff received a letter explaining the reason for his
termination; at the time the letter was sent, the company knew the plaintiffs age and heart
condition).
109. See id. at 1080 (basing its decision in part on an assumption that the plaintiff
established a prima facie case of discrimination).
110. See id. at 1079-80 (stating that direct evidence is not necessary to establish pretext
and that a plaintiff withstands summary judgment by showing that the employer's proffered
reason was unworthy of credence).
11l. Seeid. at 1080.
112. See id. at 1081-83 (holding that the employer's explanations were not contradictory
because they centered upon the plaintiffs treatment of female co-workers, the investigation of
the alleged incidents were properly conducted, and a similar allegation against a younger male
employee occurred prior to the allegations against the plaintiff, and had prompted the
company's more serious policy against harassment in the workplace).
113. See id. at 1083.
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5. Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc."4
a. Facts
The final summary judgment case addressed by the Tenth Circuit
during the survey period involved a plaintiff claiming gender discrimi-
nation under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA. Both
accusations were prompted by the defendant's failure to hire the plaintiff
on three separate occasions for the same position."' The plaintiff was a
female over forty years of age who had been denied a position as a pilot
three times."16 The company's application process for pilots placed males
and females in two categories of consideration once candidates met pre-
liminary requirements, and the defendant then selected a proportionate
number of applicants from each category."7 From this pool, the review
board conducted flight simulations and formal interviews which deter-
mined who received conditional offers.' 1 8 Because the plaintiff received
unsatisfactory scores on each of her three interviews, the company re-
fused to promote her to the position of line pilot." 9 The district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's
claim of disparate treatment, because the plaintiff "failed to establish a
prima facie case of age or sex discrimination....2 Thus, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, because she failed




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the decision to grant
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework.' 22 The court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a
genuine issue of fact as to "whether [defendant's] reasons for not hiring
her were pretextual."'23 The court found that the plaintiff's subjective
opinion as to her qualifications for the position was irrelevant to estab-
114. 186F.3d 1301 (10thCir. 1999).
115. See Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999). The
plaintiff also alleged retaliatory discrimination, but this discussion will not address that part of
the opinion. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1308-09 (the company justified the categories based on its belief that
females generally have less aeronautical experience than males).
118. See id. at 1309.
119. See id.
120. Id. (stating that the district court also granted the company's motion to dismiss for the
plaintiff's initial rejection from the position, because they were time barred).
121. Seeid.at 1316.
122. See id. (focusing on the second and third stages of the of the framework, as the court
of appeals found that the plaintiff proved the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework
by presenting a printafacie case).
123. Id. at 1317.
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lishing a dispute of material fact.'24 Furthermore, the plaintiff did not
show that comparison with other applicants demonstrated an over-
whelming discrepancy between their qualifications.'25 The court decided
summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to pro-
duce sufficient evidence that sex or age discrimination motivated the
employer not to hire the plaintiff.' 26
B. Case Decided After A Full Trial
1. Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc. 7
a. Facts
In Anaeme, the plaintiff alleged disparate treatment discrimination
based on race arising under Title VII, because the defendant-employer
refused to hire him after he submitted sixty employment applications.'28
The defendant's asserted that it had no record of the plaintiff ever having
applied for a position.129 In rebuttal, the plaintiff presented four letters
sent to him by the defendant indicating that they had received his appli-
cations.'3° After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, the
district court denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim, which asserted that the




The court of appeals applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework according to the Tenth Circuit's application of that formula.'32
Specifically, first the plaintiff must prove the prima facie case by estab-
lishing that "(1) he applied for an available position; (2) he was qualified
for the position; and (3) he 'was rejected under circumstances which give
124. See id. at 1317 n.13.
125. See id. at 1318-19 ("[P]retext cannot be shown simply by identifying minor
differences between plaintiffs qualifications and those of successful applicants.") (referring to
Sanchez v. Philip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247-48 (10th Cir. 1993)).
126. See Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1320.
127. 164 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).
128. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff
also raised several other discrimination claims aside from the disparate treatment claim. See id.
These claims are not addressed here, as they are beyond the scope of this survey.
129. See id. at 1278.
130. See id. at 1282.
131. Id. at 1277-78.
132. See id. at 1278. The court noted that the plaintiff implemented the framework because
he had no direct evidence of intentional discrimination. See id.
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rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.""33 Second, the defendant
must rebut the prima facie case by proffering a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for not hiring the plaintiff.'34 Finally, the plaintiff must
convince the jury that the proffered reason was pretextual for unlawful
discrimination and that the failure to hire him was actually "motivated by
racial discrimination."'35 Once every step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is fulfilled, the overarching question remains whether the
employer's decision not to hire the plaintiff was discriminatory. This
final question is one of fact for the jury.'
3 6
Applying the framework to the present case, the court explained that
the defendant's burden at the second stage is only one of production and
that the employer need not persuade the trier of fact that the alleged non-
discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff actually motivated the
decision.'37 The court held that the defendant met its burden of produc-
tion by articulating the only possible reason for failing to hire the plain-
tiff, namely a lack of knowledge that the plaintiff had applied for job
with the company.'38 Because the defendant stated it had no recollection
of the plaintiff ever applying for a position, 39 the employer proffered the
only available reason to explain that its decision was not based on unlaw-
ful factors.' 40
The plaintiff attempted to contradict the defendant's proffered reason
by suggesting that four letters he received from the defendant acknowl-
edged his application and therefore constituted pretext.' 4' The court ruled
that "[p]laintiff s attack on the credibility of the proffered explanation
does not mean either that the explanation fails to raise a genuine issue of
fact or that a judgment for him is required."'4 2 Simply because the defen-
dant's explanation "'is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived,
'"1 43
that does not equate to validating the claim that race was the basis for the
133. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)) (noting that establishment of the prima facie case creates a presumption of illegal
discrimination by the employer).
134. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1278 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
135. Id. at 1278-79.
136. See id. at 1279 (quoting Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 530 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 744 (10th Cir. 1991))).
137. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1278.
138. See id. at 1280.
139. See id. ("Defendants surmised that they had no record of Plaintiffs applications
because (1) he never applied, (2) his applications were lost or discarded by the personnel
department, or (3) his applications were rejected because of facial deficiencies.").
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1282.
142. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1282 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504
(1993)).
143. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524).
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failure to hire him.'" On the issue of the credibility of the defendant's
proffered reason, the court held that district court did not err in not
granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, because
the jury was free to determine that race was not the real reason for the
failure to hire.' 45 In sum, the defendant met its burden of producing a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, shifting
the burden back to the plaintiff. '46 Because the plaintiff failed to meet its




The Tenth Circuit applied the pretext-plus approach at the time the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Hicks but struggled with the
proper approach to apply following Hicks.'48 The Circuit steadied itself in
Randle v. City of Aurora, by allowing a plaintiff to survive summary
judgment by demonstrating that the defendant's proffered reason was
false. '4 9 Accordingly, a jury may infer discriminatory intent from a
showing of pretext alone, which equates to the pretext standard known as
permissive pretext-only. Since abandoning the pretext-plus approach,'50
the Tenth Circuit's application of the McDonnell Douglas framework at
the third stage of analysis has remained fairly consistent.
The recent cases involving summary judgment demonstrate that the
Tenth Circuit's analysis of the third stage is not consistent with prece-
dent. Instead, it imposes a more stringent burden on the plaintiff than
precedent warrants. The test applied to the third stage at a full trial re-
mains consistent with precedent but creates perverse incentives for em-
ployers to lie about their motives for firing or failing to hire someone.
Despite the impropriety of such an incentive, reasonable business needs
mitigate in favor of a higher standard for the plaintiff at this final stage.
When deciding a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
Tenth Circuit typically applies the pretext-only approach and requires a
simple showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's proffered reason was
144. See Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1283 (stating that plaintiff must persuade the jury that race
was the actual reason for the adverse employment action).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1279.
147. See id. at 1283.
148. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (abandoning the requirement that, in
order to survive a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must also establish that
discriminatory animus actually motivated the defendant's adverse employment action).
150. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text..
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pretextual or unworthy of belief. 5' Although the Tenth Circuit follows
this rule generally, it retreated from applying a hard-line rule regarding
the establishment of pretext in order to survive the defendant-employer's
motion for summary judgment.'52 This application runs counter to the
Tenth Circuit's established precedent, which allows evidence of pretext
alone to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment.'53
Part of the confusion stems from the procedural posture encountered
in the Supreme Court cases. The McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and
Hicks decisions arose out of a full trial,S4 whereas district courts rou-
tinely grant summary judgment motions, which necessitate that the Tenth
Circuit state some standard for appeal.' S' Despite apparently contradic-
tory application, once a disparate treatment case proceeds to a full trial,
the permissive pretext-only test applies, and the ultimate burden rests
with the plaintiff to prove discriminatory animus, which may or may not
be shown by demonstrating pretext.1
56
Justice Souter's concerns articulated in the Hicks dissent ring true
when the case proceeds to trial, and the court requires the more stringent
permissive pretext-only test. A recent example from the Tenth Circuit
shows how easily a defendant can proffer a "legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason" for its adverse employment action under the Hicks
analysis. 57 In Anaeme, the defendant successfully defended a Title VII
claim by a job applicant. 58 When a defendant-employer is under fire by
an applicant, Anaeme legitimates a proffered reason by the employer that
it has no record of the plaintiff ever applying for the position.,59 In effect,
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anaeme gives employers a license to con-
151. See Trujillo v. University of Colo. Health Science Ctr., 157 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th
Cir. 1998); Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Serv., 165
F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 750 (10th Cir.
1999); Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999).
152. See Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1320 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to
produce sufficient evidence that discrimination actually motivated the employer, not simply by
establishing the falsity of the defendant's proffered reason). But see Butler v. City of Prairie
Village, 172 F.3d 736, 750 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff does not have to show that
the defendant was motivated by discrimination in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment).
153. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
154. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505 (1993); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 797 (1973).
155. See Trujillo, 157 F.3d at 1215; Simms, 165 F.3d at 1328; Butler, 172 F.3d at 750;
Hardy, 185 F.3d at 1080.
156. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Hicks,
509 U.S. at 509); accord, Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 n.15 (10th Cir. 1995).
157. Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1283.
158. See id. (stating that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant was motivated
by discriminatory animus based on race).
159. See id. at 1279-80.
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veniently misplace the paperwork of undesirable applicants and not be
punished for otherwise discriminatory conduct." Such a license allows
employers to lie about their true motivations in order to prevail at trial.
Others have voiced Justice Souter's concerns since the Court an-
nounced its decision in Hicks. 161 One scholar, Stephen Plass, observed
that the Court typically frowns on lying, but that the Hicks approach ac-
tually rewards such behavior.' 62 Plass asserts that Title VII is less effec-
tive because the Court granted employers permission to lie.'63 He analo-
gizes this situation to a criminal setting, wherein defendants may not
rebut the prosecution's prima facie case with lies without risking a per-
jury charge.' 6' Applying criminal perjury jurisprudence to Title VII cases
would be one way to return truthfulness to disparate treatment
litigation.' 65 Minimally, the Court should interject the rules for identify-
ing perjury into Title VII jurisprudence, which would diminish the harm-
ful effects of the defendant's lies.166
Although Anaeme may present an incentive for an employer to lie,
courts have good reasons for allowing such behavior. The Supreme
Court has noted that an employer cannot reasonably be expected to keep
personnel records on applicants who never actually become personnel.'
67
This policy recognizes the need for businesses to maintain certain effi-
ciencies which storing records of each firing and hiring decision would
defeat. Despite this policy, employers have a strong motivation to keep
records of its employment decisions.
One of the more effective means for an employer to avoid problems
with discrimination suits is to maintain a paper trail, detailing employ-
160. This assertion rests on the assumption that the plaintiff will be unable to adduce
evidence to prove discriminatory motivation. See id. at 1283 (producing four letters from the
employer that it had received plaintiffs applications was insufficient to prove unlawful
motivation).
161. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 539-40 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the majority's "scheme" because employers will benefit from lying and,
in some instances, must lie in order to win a discrimination suit); Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost
Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 599-602 (1998) (stating that the
Court's decision in Hicks rewards employers who fabricate a lie in order to rebut a plaintiff's
prima facie case, and, as a result, Title VII has lost its effectiveness at curbing employment
discrimination).
162. See Plass, supra note 161, at 599.
163. See Plass, supra note 161, at 602.
164. See Plass, supra note 161, at 610.
165. See Plass, supra note 161, at 609-10.
166. See Plass, supra note 161, at 614-15.
167. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 n.5 (1993) (observing that
such a notion that employers may maintain such records is "highly fanciful," and that such
practices would be detrimental to businesses).
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ment decisions. 6 8 This paper trail would indicate legitimate reasons why
the employer refused to hire an applicant or fired an employee. In addi-
tion, a paper trail can be "sanitized" which entails removing documents
once state and federal statutes no longer require the employer to maintain
them. 69 Through a properly maintained employment record, an employer
can establish an evidentiary record that shows reliance on permissible
factors in making its employment decisions. This evidence bolsters the
employer's legitimate reason for the adverse employment action and
works against any attempted showing of pretext by the plaintiff.
District courts do not sit to act as "super personnel departments" able
to determine employment criteria which are not based on impermissible
characteristics."' As a result, a certain amount of lying and fabrication
may spring forth because of a policy favoring the autonomy of busi-
nesses to make their own employment decisions.
Another variable to consider is the effect of permitting pretext alone
to wrongfully punish an employer. In a disparate treatment case, a plain-
tiff may be able to produce sufficient evidence that a defendant's em-
ployment decision was false, although discrimination did not motivate
the decision. A decision to fire an employee may be based on a desire to
evade litigation because of other illegal or unsavory conduct.7 2 Because
an employer does not want to reveal illegal or unsavory activity that ac-
tually motivated the employment determination, an inference of dis-
criminatory animus is not warranted simply because a cover-up explana-
tion was proven false. Such a finding actually undermines a claim that




Most of the circuits follow the permissive pretext-only approach,
74
which permits a finding of discrimination after the plaintiff demonstrates
168. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 988-92 (1999).
169. See id. at 993 (quoting GERALD S. HARTMAN ET AL, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
RELATED LITIGATION ISSUES 358 (1994)).
170. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 168, at 992-93. This suggestion does not imply that the
employer should sanitize its records once litigation begins because of a potential contempt
action.
171. Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Ctr., 165 F.3d
1321, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999)).
172. See Widoe v. District No. 111, 147 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Rothmeier v.
Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1338 (8th Cir. 1996)).
173. See Widoe, 147 F.3d at 731.
174. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 452 n.16 (10th Cir. 1995) (indicating that
the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply the
permissive pretext-only approach). However, closer readings of the opinions reveal
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the prima facie case and that the defendant's proffered reason is false.'
Several examples from different circuits illustrate this. The Third Circuit
in Sheridan v. E.L. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 17 6 announced its adherence
to the permissive pretext-only approach.7 7 That Circuit explicitly rejected
the pretext-plus approach,17 1 where additional evidence of the employer's
discriminatory motive beyond mere pretext is required in order for the
plaintiff to prevail. 79 The Eleventh Circuit in Schoenfeld v. Babbitt °
decided a reverse discrimination case where a male plaintiff alleged race
and gender discrimination under Title VII because the employer failed to
hire him.'"' Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant's gender discrimination claim, 82 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit applied the permissive pretext-only approach. 3 Under the Eleventh
Circuit's reading of the pretext-only approach, a plaintiff may withstand
a motion for summary judgment simply by proving that the defendant's
reason for not hiring was false. 84 Several other circuits follow this ap-




Some circuits slightly modify the permissive pretext-only approach,
which distinguishes between the trial stage and the summary judgment
stage of discrimination proceedings. 86 In these circuits, once the burden
contradictions in the Tenth Circuit's rendering of which circuits apply the permissive pretext-
only approach. See infra notes 184-192.
175. See, e.g., Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating
that "once a plaintiff has disproved the reasons offered by the defendant, the factfinder is
permitted to infer discrimination. A plaintiff does not need to introduce additional evidence of
discrimination to prevail on the merits. Once a plaintiff establishes its prima facie case, this,
along with disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons for the negative employment action,
will permit a finding of discrimination by the factfinder").
176. 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996).
177. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPot de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67(3d Cir. 1996)
(interpreting Hicks to mean that a showing of the prima facie case and that the defendant's
proffered explanation was unbelievable permitted the jury to infer intentional discrimination,
although such a finding was not required).
178. See id. at 1067.
179. See id. at 1071 (noting how the district court erred by requiring such additional
evidence).
180. 168 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 1999).
181. See Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11 th Cir. 1999)
182. See id. at 1271.
183. See id. at 1269. The court stated that a plaintiff "may show pretext" by presenting
sufficient evidence of the falsity of the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason. Id.
(emphasis added).
184. See id. (quoting Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir.
1997)).
185. See Keathley v. Ameritech Corp., 187 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 1999); Kline v.
Tennesse Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1997).
186. See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 458 (7th Cir. 1999); Randle v.
City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 (10th Cir. 1995); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1993).
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shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason proffered by the defen-
dant was a pretext for discrimination, evidence of false reasoning, in ad-
dition to the established prima facie case, creates a per se issue of fact
that defeats the defendant's motion for summary judgment.' 7 These cir-
cuits permit a finding of discrimination at the trial stage based on pretext
alone, but the showing of pretext must persuade the fact finder that the
defendant's action was intentionally discriminatory.' 8
Several circuits continue to operate under the rubric of pretext-plus.'8 9
The Fourth Circuit in Gillins v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc.'9°
provides the clearest description of what "pretext-plus" means. Accord-
ing to Gillins, simply showing the falsity of the defendants proffered
reason does not necessarily defeat the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.' 9' The court notes that the plaintiff must present sufficient evi-
dence that would warrant the jury to find discrimination as the defen-
dant's actual motive.' 92 Although the other two circuits retaining this ap-
proach are slightly less explicit than the Fourth Circuit, they articulate
much the same standard at the pretext stage of analysis.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari'9' in an age discrimi-
nation case emanating from the termination of a 57-year-old employee
who worked for the company for 40 years.' 94 The employer terminated
the plaintiff after he failed to accurately report employee absenteeism
and poor production occurring under his supervision. '9' The plaintiff al-
leged that comments made by his superiors about his age established
sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination on the part of the
employer to support his claim.'96 In reversing the district court's denial of
the defendant's post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law, '9'
the Fifth Circuit analyzed the case under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
187. See, e.g., Washington, 10 F.3d at 1433 (stating that "there will always be a question
for the factfinder once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine issue as to
whether the employer's explanation for its action is true. Such a question cannot be resolved on
summary judgment").
188. See id. (requiring no additional evidence of discrimination at trial once pretext is
proven).
189. See, e.g., Kerzer v. Kingley Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1998); Gillins v.
Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1998); Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141
F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1998).
190. See Gillins, 148 F.3d 413.
191 See id. at 417 (explaining the minimal effect of proving mere pretext on a defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
192. See id.
193. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 444 (1999).
194. See Reeves, 197 F.3d at 690.
195. See id. at 690-91.
196. See id. at 691 (claiming that the comments "he 'must have come over on the
Mayflower,' and . . . that he was 'too damn old to do the job"' proved that discrimination
motivated the employer).
197. See id. at 690.
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work."' The appeal centered on whether the plaintiff had established
pretext under the third prong of the framework.'99 The court ruled that the
plaintiff must prove the employer's stated reason was false and that age
discrimination motivated the decision to terminate the plaintiff.2 0 Be-
cause the plaintiff s supervisor did not make the comments in the context
of his termination and multiple individuals recommended firing him, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence of dis-
criminatory intent to support a claim of age discrimination. 20
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the pretext-plus approach at the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework prompted the Supreme
Court to hear the case. After the Court addresses Reeves, a more defini-
tive rule will likely guide the circuits on how to apply the pretext stage. 2
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's approach to pretext analysis may
change once the Supreme Court announces its decision in Reeves.
CONCLUSION
The broad prohibition against employment discrimination under Title
VII and other related Acts gave rise to a mechanism that organizes the
presentation of circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases. The
Supreme Court declared a tripartite framework in McDonnell Douglas,
Inc. v. Green, which was further clarified in Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. The
Hicks decision eliminated the pretext-only approach at the third stage of
the procedural framework, and the Court apparently sided with the per-
missive pretext-only test. The Court did not clearly articulate this mes-
sage, and as a result, the circuits remain divided on which model to fol-
low.
198. See id. at 691-92.
199. See id. at 692.
200. See id. (indicating that age-related comments may show discriminatory intent when
they are: "(1) proximate in time to the termination; (2) made by an individual with authority
over the challenged employment decision; and (3) related to that employment decision"). This
approach resembles the pretext-plus approach to the third part of the procedural framework.
201. See id. at 693-94. The court also noted that twenty of the management personnel were
over fifty years old, implying that those of similar age to the plaintiff could not have
discriminated against him because of his age. See id.
202. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). This case was
decided in the final stages of the publishing process of this article. The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals and held that "[a] plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination . . .
combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability
for intentional discrimination under the ADEA." This decision is noteworthy as it implicates
that the burden of proof is lower than previously interpreted. No additional evidence needs to be
presented to infer from the defendant's false proffered reason for discrimination that said
discrimination was intentional. This decision will undoubtedly affect how the circuits address
pretet in discrimination cases.
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The Tenth Circuit adheres to the majority view of permissive pretext-
only whereby the fact finder is permitted to infer discrimination upon a
showing that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. This estab-
lishment of pretext must persuade the jury that the decision was actually
motivated by discrimination, although a plaintiff will survive summary
judgment by proving only the falsity of the defendants stated reasons.
However, the continued viability of the pretext-only approach at the
summary judgment phase was called into question by the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Bullington v. United Airlines, Inc.
The current state of the McDonnell Douglas framework has been
subjected to harsh criticism. One objection leveled against the Court's
approach to the pretext stage is that it creates perverse incentives that
encourage employers to lie in order to defend against allegations of dis-
crimination. The current application of that standard actually allows an
employer to prevail based on a fabrication of its reason for acting against
a protected person, as long as the plaintiff cannot establish the invalidity
of the fabrication. Although creation of such incentives may not be wise,
other countervailing interests require that such a system remain in place,
specifically: (1) maintaining business efficiencies; (2) allowing busi-
nesses to remain relatively autonomous; and (3) recognizing that other
reasons may exist which an employer would rather keep secret.
James N. Phillips*
The author would like to thank his parents, Nancy and Thomas, and his brother, Jonathan, for their
support and encouragement over the years. The author ;would also like to thank the editors of the
Denver University Law Review for their conscientious efforts on this article and Professor Roberto




DISCRETION OF THE GATEKEEPER TO ADMIT PRIOR
CONVICTIONS AND ACTS
INTRODUCTION
This survey examines evidentiary issues concerning the Federal
Rules of Evidence 404(b), 413, 414, and 403 that the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed during this survey period.' The survey focuses on
the manner in which the Tenth Circuit applied these Federal Rules of
Evidence to admit an array of evidence establishing the previous conduct
of defendants. Part I evaluates the Tenth Circuit's guidelines for district
courts admitting evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, and acts pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Part II outlines recent Tenth Circuit
cases that address the admissibility of evidence of prior child molestation
and sexual assaults pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414.
Part III analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403 if evidence has been offered for admission under Rule 404(b),
413, or 414 and evaluates the wide discretion awarded trial judges in
ultimately admitting or excluding evidence by balancing the probative
value of the evidence with its risk of unfair prejudice.
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)
A. Background
1. Definition
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)2 states that evidence of a defen-
dant's prior crimes, similar acts or wrongs is generally not admissible to
prove the defendant has a bad character or a predilection for committing
a particular act.' Such evidence is admissible, however, in order to prove
1. The Survey period begins August 1, 1998 and ends July 31, 1999.
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Id.
3. See id.
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motive, intent, knowledge, plan, preparation, identity, the absence of
mistake, or accident.4
2. Common Law History Prior to Codification
Rule 404(b) ensures that the prosecution does not introduce evi-
dence of a defendant's prior misconduct merely to demonstrate his pre-
disposition for particular acts or his general bad character. The United
States Supreme Court has discussed the historic prohibition against ad-
mitting evidence of a defendant's character to demonstrate conformity or
predilection.5 In Michelson v. United States,6 the Court stated
[t]he State may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, spe-
cific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such
facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad gen-
eral record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a par-
ticular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, de-
spite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its
disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.'
Although Michelson was decided well before the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Court's statement provides sound policy
reasons for excluding propensity evidence such as prior convictions and
bad acts. The Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the general prohibition
against admitting character evidence in the form of prior bad acts and
convictions; however, Rule 404(b) grants admission to such evidence if
8offered to prove intent, knowledge, and planning by the defendant.
3. Current U.S. Supreme Court Precedent for Rule 404(b)
In Huddleston v. United States,9 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth
four factors lower courts may consider in deciding whether to admit evi-
dence pursuant to Rule 404(b).' ° The Court outlined these factors to
demonstrate the sufficient protection that emanates from the Federal
4. See id.
5. See generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (discussing the
rationale behind the character evidence prohibition); Rule 414 discussion infra Part II (confronting
this historical prohibition and presents a presumption of guilt for defendants based on past acts that
demonstrate an individual's propensity to commit similar acts). Rule 414 effectively overturns the
historical prohibition in favor of public policy. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
6. 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948).
7. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted).
8. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
9. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
10. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,691-92 (1988).
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Rules of Evidence Articles IV and I against the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence." The four sources of such protection are:
first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be of-
fered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of
Rule 402 -- as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assess-
ment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether
the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially out-
weighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, and fourth, from Federal
Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court shall, upon
request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be consid-
ered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted."
Many circuit courts, including the Tenth Circuit, embraced the
Huddleston factors and readily evaluated evidence of prior similar acts
against the same four factors." Prior to Huddleston, the circuit courts
disagreed on "whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding
before 'similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the
"'14jury .... The Second and Sixth Circuits required the court to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the similar
act, while "the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the ad-
mission of similar act evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the
jury to find that the defendant committed the act."' 5 Alternatively, "[t]he
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits require the
government to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant committed the similar act."' 6 Huddleston addressed the
differences among the circuit courts and determined that protection from
unfair prejudice stems from analyzing such prejudicial evidence against
the four factors set forth above, rather than from preliminary findings by
the trial court.1
7
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Dozal
In United States v. Dozal,5 the Tenth Circuit held that although "the
district court should not have admitted testimony about the [defendant's]
1996 arrest," the admission was harmless. '9 A jury convicted Mr. Dozal
of "conspir[acy] to distribute cocaine . . . and possession with intent to
11. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689-9 1.
12. Id. at 691-92 (footnotes and citations omitted).
13. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1998).
14. United States v. Manso-Portes, 867 F.2d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1989).
15. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685 n.2.
16. Id.
17. Seeid. at691.
18. 173 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 1999).
19. United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 795 (10th Cir. 1999).
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distribute."2 ° On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Dozal challenged the
admission of testimony by Michael Plunkett, an Oklahoma Highway
Patrol Officer.2' During trial, Officer Plunkett testified that on a previous
occasion he discovered several bundles of marijuana in a vehicle, in
which Mr. Dozal was a passenger."
The Tenth Circuit reviewed evidentiary issues involving Rule
404(b) for abuse of discretion and asked whether the trial court satisfied
the four requirements established in Huddleston.23 In Dozal, the Tenth
Circuit determined that the evidence of the defendant's prior involve-
ment with hidden contraband existing in a car in which he was just a
passenger was not offered to establish intent, motivation, or knowledge
24as required by Rule 404(b). Thus, the district court erred by not ex-
25
cluding this prior involvement. However, the court concluded that this
constituted harmless error because of other independent facts including
the thirty ounces of cocaine seized at the defendant's apartment.
26
2. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos
In United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos,27 the Tenth Circuit evaluated
whether the district court properly admitted evidence of prior acts pursu-
ant to Rule 404(b) according to the four requirements established in
Huddleston.2 The defendant, Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos, was charged with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine after entering a United States
Border Patrol checkpoint where a Border Patrol Agent received "permis-
sion to walk a narcotics-detecting dog around the car., 29 The narcotics-
detecting dog alerted agents to the car's dash, windshield and fender ar-
20. Dozal, 173 F.3d at 791.
21. See id. at 794.
22. See id.
23. See United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 (10th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the four
Huddleston factors). The four requirements, which must be satisfied by the district court when
deciding whether evidence is admissible pursuant to 404(b), are:
(1) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must be introduced for a proper purpose;
(2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the court must make a Rule 403 determination
whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential
for unfair prejudice; and (4) the court, upon request, must instruct the jury that the
evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the limited purpose for which it was
admitted.
Id. (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)).
24. See Dozal, 173 F.3d at 795.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. 175 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1999).
28. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1999).
29. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 840.
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eas, where the agents subsequently discovered 4,467 grams of cocaine
within a concealed compartment in the car.30
The Tenth Circuit held the district court properly admitted the de-
fendant's prior arrest and guilty plea" for contraband to demonstrate his
knowledge of the concealed contraband of the currently charged crime."
This evidence demonstrated knowledge and intent because the prior ar-
rest for contraband involved marijuana and Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos as
the driver and registered owner of the car containing the concealed drugs
in altered compartments.33 The court upheld the district court's ruling
admitting this evidence because it demonstrated the defendant's knowl-
edge pursuant to Rule 404(b).34
3. United States v. Brooks
In United States v. Brooks,35 the Tenth Circuit again reaffirmed the
Huddleston factors in evaluating whether the district court abused its
discretion by admitting a monitored telephone conversation between the
36defendant and an undercover law enforcement agent. The defendant
contended the district court erred in admitting the testimony of the un-
dercover agent regarding a prior conversation with the defendant for the
37future sale of narcotics.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated the district court's Huddleston analysis
38in admitting the undercover agent's testimony and determined the court
did not abuse its discretion.3 9 The district court correctly concluded that
the testimony established the defendant's identity pursuant to Rule
404(b) and was relevant to lay the foundation for the time and place of
30. See id.
31. See id. at 845 n.8 ("Although the government charged Mr. Lazcano-Villalobos with felony
possession of marijuana, he plead guilty to misdemeanor possession.").
32. See id. at 846.
33. See id. at 845.
34. See id. at 845-46. As discussed in Part II, the Tenth Circuit also noted the district court's
implicit application of Rule 403.
35. 161 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
36. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1241-43 (10th Cir. 1998).
37. See Brooks, 161 F.3d at 1244.
38. See id. at 1243.
39. See id. at 1244; see also United States v. Collins, No. 90-266C, 1999 WL 641872, at *2
(10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of defendant's prior conviction for possession of crack cocaine after detailing the carefully
structured Huddleston analysis conducted by the district court). In Brooks, the Tenth Circuit
approved the admission of the tapes and testimony for the purpose of identity under the plain
language of 404(b) before evaluating and affirming the district court's Huddleston analysis. See
Brooks, 161 F.3d at 1243; see also United States v. Oberle, 136 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th Cir. 1998)
(establishing that testimony of law enforcement agents is properly admitted if offered to prove
identity). Therefore, testimony of law enforcement agents offered for the purpose of identity
pursuant to 404(b) is not necessarily subject to the Huddleston factors.
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the charged activities. 40 Additionally, the court held the trial record suffi-
ciently supported the district court's conclusion that the testimony was
not unfairly prejudicial.4' The Tenth Circuit also recognized the district
court's detailed cautionary instruction to the jury explaining the limited
purpose for admitting the evidence. 4' Thus, the Tenth Circuit evaluated
the district court's decision to admit the agent's testimony step-by-step in
accordance with the Huddleston factors.
C. Other Circuits
1. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit differs slightly in the Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) requirements used to determine whether evidence of prior wrongs
and convictions is properly admitted. The Ninth Circuit originally for-
mulated a four-part test for the admission of evidence pursuant to 404(b)
Rule which required:
(1) proof that the defendant committed the other crime must be clear
and convincing; (2) the prior criminal conduct must not be too remote
in time from the commission of the crime charged; (3) the prior
criminal conduct must, in some cases, be similar to the offense
charged; and (4) the prior criminal conduct must be introduced to
prove an element of the charged offense that is a material issue in the
43
case.
Slightly different from the Huddleston factors, these factors do not
expressly provide for a Rule 40344 balancing test or for limiting instruc-
tions upon party request. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the U.S. Su-
preme Court's holding and four-part test outlined in Huddleston, yet the
Ninth Circuit asserted that Huddleston only altered the court's first origi-
nal requirement stated above.4 ' The court explained that the remaining
three factors of its previous four-part test remained unaffected by Hud-
46
dleston. Therefore, the court continued to use its 404(b) test after
changing the first part and temporarily adding a fifth element.47 The
Ninth Circuit test for 404(b) evidence replaced the above first factor to
state that "the evidence be sufficient 'to support a finding by the jury that
40. See Brooks, 161 F.3dat 1243.
41. Seeid. at 1244.
42. See id.
43. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
44. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. See also discussion infra Part Ill.
45. See United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1989).




the defendant committed the similar act.' 48 It also added a Rule 403
element which stated, "the probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . ,,49Roughly seventeen
months later, however, the Ninth Circuit abandoned this additional 403
element.50
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has criteria similar to those of the Ninth
Circuit"1 for admitting evidence pertaining to prior convictions and simi-
lar acts, 2 and grants the district judge large deference in deciding to ad-
mit 404(b) evidence.53 Although the Seventh Circuit requires the district
court to "'undertake a principled exercise of discretion"' in conducting a
404(b) analysis when applying the circuit's four-part test,54 the court later
interpreted this principled exercise of discretion as granting district
judges wide discretion to admit 404(b) evidence.55 A Seventh Circuit
district judge's decision to admit or exclude prior similar act evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b), however, is analyzed in regards to the judge's
adherence to the circuit's four-part test. In United States v. Johnson," the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its requirement that the charged offense have
characteristics in common with the prior bad act.57 Additionally, the court
stated in Johnson that it is error to merely assume that "other drug of-




50. See United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d 497, 501 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Emenogha, I F.3d 473, 478 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating
how Huddleston altered the original requirements of the Seventh Circuit's 404(b) analysis which
required clear and convincing evidence rather than sufficient evidence).
52. The Seventh Circuit requirements include:
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the
other act is similar enough and close in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the
evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar
act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
United States v. Long, 86 F.3d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1996).
53. See United States v. Johnson, 137 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1998).
54. United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 621
(7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1987)).
55. See Emenogha, I F.3d at 478.
56. 137 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 1998).
57. See Johnson, 137 F.3d at 975.
58. Id. at 974.
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3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit continues to follow the two-part test set forth in
1978 in United States v. Beechum.59 This two-prong test first requires
that the court determine that "the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to
an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the evidence must
possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue
prejudice and must meet the other requirements of [R]ule 403. " 60 The
circuit acknowledged the Huddleston holding that the evidence be suffi-
cient in order for a jury to find the defendant committed the similar act
and interpreted that holding to require the first part of the circuit's test.
6 1
In United States v. Carrillo,6" the Fifth Circuit affirmed this two-part test
and required district courts to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis with a Rule
403 balancing test when deciding to admit evidence of prior offenses or
similar acts.63 In Carrillo, the Fifth Circuit described one of the excep-
tions to Rule 404(b)'s general bar against propensity or character evi-
dence. 64 The exception analyzed, named the "handiwork or signature• ,,65
exception, requires the government to prove the connection between
the defendant's prior similar acts and convictions with the current crime
to sufficiently establish the defendant's signature method of conducting
particular crimes. 66
4. Fourth Circuit
Finally, the Fourth Circuit interprets Rule 404(b) as an "'inclusive
rule" that allows admission of evidence of other acts relevant to an issue
at trial except that which proves only criminal disposition.' 68 The Fourth
Circuit utilized a three-part test in United States v. Rawle69 to evaluate
70
the admissibility of 404(b) evidence. In Rawle, the Fourth Circuit es-
tablished the admissibility of extrinsic acts if the evidence was (1) "rele-
59. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. See United States v. Bailey, Ill F.3d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997).
62. 981 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1993).
63. See United States v. Carrillo, 981 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1993).
64. See Carrillo, 981 F.2d at 775.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Although some commentators hold that all circuit courts follow the inclusionary approach
in interpreting Rule 404(b), many circuits do not clearly state that they follow this approach. See
Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
57, 61 n.23 (1995) (citing Dean Wigmore and Professor Stone). The net effect, however, of broad
judicial discretion and the varied exceptions provided under Rule 404(b) is to include rather than
exclude the majority of evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b).
68. United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990)).
69. 845 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1988).
70. See United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244,1247 (4th Cir. 1988).
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vant to an issue other than character;" 7 (2) "necessary, which means that
it [wa]s an essential part of the crimes on trial, or where it furnished part
of the context of the crime; and [(3)] reliable. 72 The court also mandated
that the evidence be subject to a Rule 403 analysis.73
The Fourth Circuit has not directly contrasted its three-part test with
the Huddleston test; yet the circuit appears to give greater deference to
district courts through its interpretation of Huddleston. In United States
v. McMillon,74 the Fourth Circuit quoted Huddleston in stating that
404(b) excludes evidence of prior acts that demonstrate the character of
the defendant unless the evidence "'bears upon a relevant issue in the
case such as motive, opportunity or knowledge. ' '7 5 Although this sum-
marizes the premise of Rule 404(b), the court interprets Rule 404(b) to
exclude certain prior act evidence only if offered solely to prove "crimi-
nal disposition. 76 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit may grant a district judge
a great deal of discretion in his admission of prior acts pursuant to




Although the circuit courts widely recognize the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Huddleston, many circuits chose to supplement their
existing 404(b) tests with that holding. The Tenth Circuit, in contrast to
the other circuits discussed above, adopted the Huddleston factors di-
rectly. The Huddleston factors represent only a guideline that courts may
choose to use in deciding to exclude certain propensity or character evi-
dence under the detailed exceptions to Rule 404's general prohibition of
such evidence. The net interpretation of Rule 404(b) by many circuits
tends to be inclusionary rather than exclusionary because circuit courts
will only reverse a trial judge's decision to admit certain 404(b) excep-
tion evidence for abuse of discretion.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 in 1994,
had the effect of superseding Rule 404(b)'s general prohibition of char-
acter or propensity evidence and gave district courts favorable legislative
support to rely on when choosing to admit the exact type of propensity
evidence 404(b) seeks to exclude. 7  The legislative history of Rules 413
and 414 offers a presumption in favor of admission of prior sexual mis-
71. Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247.
72. United States v. MeMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 955 (4th Cir. 1994); see Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247.
73. See McMillon, 14 F.3d at 955; see also discussion infra Part I1.
74. 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 954 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)).
76. Id.
77. See discussion infra Part II.
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conduct evidence in cases involving sexual assault or molestation to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to commit these crimes. Al-
though the legislative history also concedes this evidence is subject to
Rule 403 balancing tests,78 a district judge arguably has increased discre-
tion to admit the evidence. In such cases of sexual assault and molesta-
tion, district courts may give superficial weight to the Huddleston factors
for the admission of character or propensity evidence. In fact, the inclu-
sive interpretation of Rule 404(b) joined with a synopsis of the legisla-
tive history for Rules 413 and 414, as well as ample judicial discretion
for Rule 403 balancing tests, may ignite a trend to admit propensity or
character evidence under the veil of motive, plan, intent, knowledge, or
opportunity. A founding proponent of Federal Rules 413 and 414 stated,
"[the vagueness of the standards of Rule 404(b) ensures considerable
variation in [the] application [of current evidence rules] by the courts,
and this tendency is magnified in sex offense cases by the special pres-
sures courts have felt to find some way of getting the evidence in.71
2. Tenth Circuit
The Huddleston factors do not present any new requirements to
practitioners or judges for introducing evidence of prior acts. The factors
merely condense the fundamental requirements that the evidence must
meet within one test. Due to the recent Tenth Circuit precedent of evalu-
ating the district court's Huddleston analysis, prosecuting attorneys
within the Tenth Circuit should attempt to conform to all the Huddleston
factors to ensure success on subsequent appeals.
Similarly, defense attorneys may successfully rebut the introduction
of such propensity evidence by demonstrating the couft or prosecution's
78. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(stating the other standards of the rules of evidence continue to apply to the admission of evidence
pursuant to 413 and 414, including Rule 403); see also United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326,
1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that district courts must continue to weigh the probative value of
413 sexual assault evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice even considering the favorable
purpose of rule 413 towards admitting evidence). In Guardia, the Tenth Circuit provided factors
district courts may consider in weighing the probative value of particular 413 evidence including the
"similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged, the closeness in time of the prior acts to the charged
acts, the frequency of the prior acts, the presence or lack of intervening events, and the need for
evidence beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim." Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit proceeded to affirm the district court's exclusion of witness testimony of the
defendant's former patients of prior sexual abuse by the defendant due to the danger for confusion of
the issues. See id. at 1332.
79. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1994). In this article, Karp cited to numerous state cases
where propensity or character evidence was admitted pursuant to similar state 404(b) evidence rules,
and alleged that the "creative use of the 'intent' exception and other categories has enabled some
courts to approximate a broad rule of admissibility for evidence of other similar crimes." Id. at 32-
35. This inclusive interpretation of 404(b) in conjunction with sexual assault or molestation evidence
may further broaden the interpretations of those state courts that employ evidence rules modeled
from the Federal Rules of Evidence but have yet to adopt the new Rules 413 through 415.
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failure to evaluate the proffered evidence under each of the Huddleston
factors. A failure to conduct a proper Rule 403 balancing test, the Tenth
Circuit's third factor, remains one of the strongest allies for defense at-
torneys in the Tenth Circuit. However, as demonstrated in Lazcano-
Villalobos, as long as the trial record sufficiently supports the 403 bal-
ancing test and outlines the proper purpose for admitting the prior acts
evidence, a district court's 404(b) ruling will likely remain undisturbed.
The Tenth Circuit has not expressed a preference for trial judges to state
on-the-record findings supporting each aspect of their Huddleston analy-
sis, but doing so would certainly minimize any questions regarding such
analysis on appeal.
II. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
A. Background
1. Definition
When accused of sexual assault or molestation, Federal Rules of
Evidence 4138' and 414" admit evidence that the defendant committed
80. See, e.g., Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1332 (noting the importance of "a reasoned, recorded
finding that the prejudicial value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative
value."); see also discussion infra Part II.
81. FED. R. EVID. 413 provides:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time
as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" means a crime
under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United
States Code) that involved...
Id.
82. FED. R. EvID. 414 provides:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time
as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "child" means a person below the age of
fourteen, and "offense of child molestation" means a crime under Federal law or the law
of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved...
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similar assault or molestation acts in the past. Therefore, Rules 413 and
414 are notable exceptions to the general historic rules prohibiting evi-
dence to demonstrate either conformity with the charged conduct or an
individual's propensity to commit the charged act as promulgated by
Rule 404.84
Federal Rule of Evidence 41515 accompanied the adoption of Rules
413 and 414 and together these rules promote the admission of evidence
of any sexual abuse, molestation or misconduct by the defendant for any
relevant purpose." Proponents of the Rules argued such evidence is nec-
essary because sex offenders tend to demonstrate a pattern in committing
such crimes, and these offenders have higher recidivism rates than other
Id.
83. See FED. R. EvID. 413 and 414.
84. FED. R. EVID. 404 provides:
Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of the accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of the victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence
of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Id.
85. FED. R. EVID. 415 provides:
Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party's
alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child
molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule 413
and Rule 414 of these rules.
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall disclose the evidence to
the party against whom it will be offered, including statements of witnesses or a summary
of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days
before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good
cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence
under any other rule.
Id.
86. FED. R. EvID. 413 advisory committee's note; 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
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criminal defendants." The evidence offered under these Rules may take
the form of prior convictions, similar specific instances or even testi-S 88
mony of previous allegations or uncharged actions. The proposal and
adoption of Rules 413 through 415 in 1994 was largely "in response to
the public's desire to put more power into the prosecution of sexual
predators. ' 9 Arguments that propensity evidence in sex crime cases is
necessary to counter the inherent problems posed by such cases also fu-
eled the adoption of these Rules. The problems include witness credibil-
ity, distinguishing sex offenders from upstanding citizens, and the poten-
tial for sex offenders to believe they pose no threat or are victims them-
selves.90
Following the 1994 proposal for these Rules, "Congress bypassed
the usual process by which Federal Rules of Evidence are
promulgated," 9' which requires a "proposal by the Advisory Committee,
a period of public debate and comment, Supreme Court adoption, and
finally, Congressional review and approval. 92 Instead, Congress deter-
mined the Rules "would become effective within 150 days after" the
Judicial Conference made recommendations on changes to the Rules.93 It
is perhaps not surprising Congress chose this procedural route in light of
the numerous committees that opposed the new Rules. The Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules,94 the Advisory Committees on Criminal
and Civil Rules,95 and members of the Standing and Advisory Commit-
tees96 all opposed adoption of Rules 413 through 415. The only remain-
87. See Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and
Child Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415?, 14 J. L. & POL. 153, 163,175-81 (1998) (contrasting the proponents' views with statistical
research and concluding: "the numbers, on the whole, do not indicate that sex offenders are social
deviants continually driven to repeat their crimes. Their recidivism rates are simply not significantly
greater than those of other criminals.").
88. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (stating "evidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible," thus testimony or prior uncharged assaults or
assaults for which the defendant was not convicted are admissible).
89. Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: "Laws are like Medicine;
They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser... Evil," 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1503, 1505 (1999).
90. See Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1729, 1742 (1999).
91. Aluise, supra note 87, at 159.
92. Aluise, supra note 87, at 159-60.
93. Aluise, supra note 87, at 160.
94. This Committee was unanimous in its objection to the new rules except for the dissenting
vote by the representative of the Department of Justice. See FED. R. EViD. 413 advisory committee's
note.
95. These committees also were unanimous in their opposition except for representatives of
the Department of Justice. See id.
96. See id. (noting the while it was an unusual occurrence for members to unanimously agree,
the members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, "composed of over 40 judges, practicing
lawyers, and academicians," all viewed the rules as undesirable).
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ing supporters of Rules 413 through 415 represented the Department of
Justice.97
The Standing Committee and Judicial Conference both opposed the
Rules as drafted and instead proposed amendments to existing Evidence
Rules 404 and 405 to incorporate the proposed policy goals.98 The Com-
mittee proposed an amendment to Rule 404 because it generally "gov-
erns the admissibility of character evidence.' '99 Whereas, Rule 405
amendments were sought "because the authorization of a new form of
character evidence in this rule has an impact on methods of proving
character that were not explicitly addressed by Congress. ' ' However,
Congress adopted the proposed Rules 413 through 415 as originally
drafted rather than amending Rules 404 and 405."°'
2. Opposition to Rules 413 through 415
The abounding opposition to the adoption of the Rules by various
committees underscores the vigorous debates surrounding their adoption
in the congressional arena as well as in academia. 0 2 Some of the oppo-
nents to Rules 413, 414, and 415 argue the Rules violate the due process
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and, so unfairly prejudice de-
fendants in the eyes of jurors, that emotions rather than facts of the
charged offense will render guilty verdicts.' 3
Opponents believe the Rules violate a defendant's constitutional
right to due process because admitting such evidence to demonstrate the
defendant's propensity to commit a crime runs an inherent risk of unfair
prejudice against the defendant.' °4 Hence, blanket acceptance towards
admitting evidence of prior sexual assault may cause a jury to render a
guilty verdict based on the defendant's propensity to commit the crime
rather than on the facts and evidence of the particular charged crime.'
Additionally, opponents argue the admission of this type of highly preju-
dicial evidence will substantially increase the risk "of convicting all




100. Id. (discussing the proposed changes for the new rules under FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(4)).
101. Id.
102. See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (1994); Sheft,
supra note 67; cf. Karp, supra note 79.
103. See Aluise, supra note 87, at 157; see also 139 CONG. REC. S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1993) (statement by Sen. Biden) (opposing the new rules because evidence of prior crime evidence
"tends to . . . blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an independent
judgment...").
104. See Duane, supra note 102, at 107-08.
105. See Duane, supra note 102, at 107-08.
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of sexual offenses in the past--regardless of whether those defendants are
guilty or innocent."'0 6
Opponents also charge that the existing evidence Rule 404(b) is
sufficient to admit evidence of past convictions or prior bad acts to dem-
onstrate pattern, knowledge, motive or intent, thus the Rules specific to
sexual offenses are unnecessary.' °7 Rule 404(b) sets forth numerous ex-
ceptions to the general prohibition to admitting character or propensity to
act, and, together with judicial discretion, these exceptions arguably pro-
vide sufficient opportunity to trial judges to admit evidence of prior sex-
ual offenses or uncharged misconduct.' °8
3. Proponents of the Rules
Proponents of the Rules defend them based upon public policy and
the assumption that it is unlikely a defendant with a rape conviction will
encounter the unfortunate circumstance of a false accusation for rape.109
Proponents argue the Rules help protect the public against repeat rapists
and sexual molesters due to the pattern these perpetrators develop with
each repeated assault on a new victim." ° Thus, evidence establishing the
pattern of a particular assailant and linking that pattern to the charged
defendant will ensure the accuracy of convictions."' Proponents for
Rules 413 and 414 also insist a defendant with "a history of rape or child
molestation stands on a different footing" from other defendants charged
with crimes such as theft or homicide.' A defendant's "past conduct
provides evidence that he has the combination of aggressive and sexual
impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes, that he lacks
106. Duane, supra note 102, at 107; see Sheft, supra note 67, at 76; cf Scott, supra note 90, at
1738-39 (discussing the opponent view to rules 413 and 414 as discrediting "the ability of jurors to
behave reasonably in evaluating evidence.").
107. See Duane, supra note 102, at 98-99; 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, § 190 at 801-803 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) (discussing the current trend for ample admission of evidence of similar prior acts or crimes
by the defendant that demonstrate "the handiwork of the accused" and the signature of the accused);
see generally, FED. R. EVID. 413 advisory committee's note (discussing the Judicial Conference
Committee's and Standing Committee's recommendation to amend rules 404 and 405 to provide the
same protections supported by the proposed rules):
108. See Fed. R. Evid. 404. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the
Debate over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense
Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1136 (1993) (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) precludes only one theory of admissibility, while allowing alternate purposes to admit
evidence of prior acts); Sheft, supra note 67, at 61-63 (noting numerous instances where evidence of
prior rapes or sexual assaults was admitted to demonstrate a "common scheme or plan", "intent", or
"absence of mistake").
109. See Duane, supra note 102, at 108.
110. Seeid.at98.
11. See id.
112. Karp, supra note 79, at 20; see 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari) (relying on the Karp article as an authoritative text discussing the
proposed rules and adopting the text as an authoritative part of the rules' legislative history).
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
effective inhibitions against acting on these impulses, and that the risks
involved do not deter him.""' Additionally, the proponents support the
adoption of the Rules because safeguards remain such as the Rule 403
balancing test 14 to protect defendants from evidence that presents sub-
stantially unfair prejudice." The only substantial change in applying the
Rule 403 balancing test rests with the presumption in favor of admitting
the evidence of prior sexual offenses or allegations."
6
Proponents also believe the Rules are necessary because the existing
rules of evidence preclude juries from hearing evidence about a particu-
lar defendant's background that is "necessary to get rape convictions in
this country."' ' 7 Advocates for the Rules believe the established evidence
Rules 403 and 404(b) deprive juries of critical information necessary to
effectively protect the public from molesters and rapists."'
4. Jurisdictional Arguments
Another argument surrounding the new Rules suggests they dispro-
portionately target Native Americans. Typically state courts have juris-
diction over defendants charged with sex crimes, however, Native
Americans residing on reservation land are subject to federal
jurisdiction."9 Consequently, there currently exist a disproportionate
number of rape and molestation cases involving Native Americans in the
federal courts. Native Americans accused of sexual offenses on reserva-
tions will therefore be subjected to the effect of Rules 413, 414, and 415,
while similar defendants in state courts may only be subjected to Rules
403 and 404(b), unless the state has adopted the new Rules. 20 The Tenth
Circuit recently addressed this jurisdictional objection in United States v.
McHorse.12 The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that
Rule 414 violated his Fifth Amendment equal protection rights22 "be-
113. Karp, supra note 79, at 20.
114. See discussion infra Part inI.
115. See Duane, supra note 102, at 103.
116. See Duane, supra note 102, at 103.
117. 140 CONG. REC. H5439-01, at H5440 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
118. See Duane, supra note 102, at 99-100.
119. See Duane, supra note 102, at 114; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241 and 2242.
120. See Scott, supra note 90, at 1765 (citing three states that have adopted versions of rules
413-415 for their state's rules of evidence. The three states are Arizona, California and Indiana).
Although many states have not adopted versions of the rules, some state courts have "adopted
special common-law rules that admit evidence of prior similar crimes." Scott, supra note 90, at
1770.
121. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 897 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1998).
122. See Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883 (stating "[a]lthough there is no Equal Protection Clause in
the Fifth Amendment, the equal protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment are incorporated
into the Fifth Amendment's promise of due process.").
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cause federal sex crime prosecutions are disproportionately targeted at
Native Americans:', 23 The court held the defendant's objection failed
because the defendant offered no evidence establishing a discriminatory
nature of Rule 414. 
1
4
5. Tenth Circuit Precedent
"The Tenth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to analyze
whether the Rules were constitutional."'25 In United States v. Enjady,1'
discussed in Part III, the Tenth Circuit held Rule 413 did not violate the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. 
2
1
The court in Enjady also affirmed that Rule 413 is subject to a Rule 403
balancing test, and therefore does not subject the defendant to funda-
mental unfairness. 2 In United States v. Castillo,129 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the constitutionality of Rule 414. In Castillo, the court acknowl-
edged that the Rule departed from the general bar to propensity or pro-
clivity evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b); however, the court held this
Rule did not violate a defendant's due process and was constitutional. 30
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the historical precedent of ad-
mitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct evidence, noting rules in
various jurisdictions admitting evidence demonstrating incest and "lust-
ful disposition."'' 3' The court conceded that the historical precedent of
various jurisdictions for admitting evidence of a defendant's sexual pro-
pensity is at best ambiguous. However, the court determined this am-
biguity favored the government.133 The circuit also reaffirmed its holding
in Enjady that the district court must continue to conduct a Rule 403 bal-
ancing test prior to admitting any evidence pursuant to Rule 414.134
123. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 897.
124. See id.
125. Scott, supra note 87, at 1748.
126. 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).
127. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-33 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
202 (1998).
128. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433; see also related discussion infra Part III.
129. 140 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Rule 414 is
constitutional if evidence of previous sexual molestation is subjected to the balancing test
promulgated by Rule 403).
131. Castillo, 140 F.3d at 881.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 884.
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B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. McHorse
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit faced new challenges to
Rule 414 in United States v. McHorse"' In McHorse, the Tenth Circuit
confirmed that Rule 414 superseded all the restrictive aspects of Rule
404(b) in sex offense crimes"' and reaffirmed that its holding in Castillo
foreclosed any argument that Rule 414 "is unconstitutional on its face."'' 37
The defendant in McHorse argued that Rule 414 was a violation of due
process, but was unclear whether he challenged the rule "on its face or as
applied."'38 Therefore, based on the its holding in Castillo, the Tenth
Circuit construed it as an "as applied" challenge, subject to de novo re-
view. "9
A jury convicted the defendant of "four counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child less than twelve years of age .... and one count of abu-
sive sexual contact with a child less than twelve years of age."' 4 On ap-
peal, the defendant asserted that the district court erred in admitting his
niece's testimony accusing him of uncharged sexual molestation on pre-
141
vious occasions.
In addressing the defendant's several assertions of error relating to
the testimony of his nieces, the Tenth Circuit held the defendant's due
process rights were not violated.14 The Tenth Circuit determined the
district court's recurring instructions to the jury that the evidence of un-
charged sexual abuse was insufficient to prove defendant's, guilt and that
defendant was "'not on trial for any act, conduct, or offense not charged
in the indictment," were sufficient to protect the defendant's due process
rights. 1
43
The Tenth Circuit also reaffirmed a three-prong test the circuit es-
tablished to determine whether the district court may exercise its discre-
tion to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 414(a) or Rule 413(a). 44 In
135. 179 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 1999).
136. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir. 1999).
137. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 896. (noting that in Castillo the court held that "'that Rule 414 does
not on its face violate the Due Process Clause"').
138. Id.
139. See id. ("When reviewing a trial courts decision to admit Rule 414 evidence for
constitutional error, the appellate court must engage in a case-specific inquiry only, asking whether
the evidence in the case was so prejudicial in the context of the proceeding as a whole that the
defendant was deprived of the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of due process.").
140. Id. at 894.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 897.
143. Id. at 896-97.
144. See id. at 898 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 414(a)). FED. R. EvID. 413(a) is practically identical
to FED. R. EVID. 414(a) except FED. R. EvID. 413(a) governs sexual assault rather than molestation.
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United States v. Guardia, 145 the court established the three-prong test that
sets forth three requirements that must be satisfied "'before the district
court may exercise its discretion to admit' evidence of prior sexual mis-
conduct."' 46 First, the district court "must determine that the defendant 'is
accused of an offense of child molestation.",147 Second, the district court
must decide the evidence offered is evidence of other sexual molestation
offenses.141 "Third, the court must determine that the proffered evidence
is relevant."' 149 The Tenth Circuit also reaffirmed the Castillo holding
requiring the district court to make an explicit and reasoned determina-
tion of whether the probative value of the 414(a) character evidence is
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice towards the defendant
pursuant to Rule 403."0
2. United States v. Charley
In United States v. Charley,5' the prosecution charged the defendant
for the sexual molestation of his nieces.5 2 The government introduced
several witnesses who discussed the defendant's prior conviction for
sexual molestation, the medical conditions and evaluations of the defen-
dant's two nieces, and many of these witnesses specifically addressed the
sexual molestation of the girls."'
On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's admission
of prior conviction evidence as unconstitutional and "so prejudicial that it
denied him his due process right to a fair trial."' The Tenth Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the defen-
dant's prior sexual abuse conviction pursuant to Rules 403 and 414(a).
The court noted that the district court sufficiently explained its rationale
with on-the-record findings that the strong public interest in admitting
evidence pursuant to Rule 414 was exceptionally probative, and served
145. 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
146. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 897-98.
147. Id. at 898 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 414(a)).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 899.
151. On May 7, 1999, thus during the survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided United States v.
Charley. See 176 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). The defendant-appellant then petitioned the court for
rehearing, "with suggestion for rehearing en banc." United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1255
(10th Cir. 1999). Although the panel that rendered the first decision denied the defendant's petition,
a majority of the panel voted to amend the original opinion. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1255.
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit withdrew the original majority decision, and substituted a new
opinion issued on August 27, 1999. Id. Although the court issued the second opinion after the
present survey period, the following discussion will focus on the later opinion, as the court
substituted the later opinion for the opinion originally issued during the survey period.
152. See Charley at 1255-56.
153. See id. at 1260-70.
154. Id. at 1259.
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the function of corroborating the testimony of witnesses (often child vic-
tims) whose credibility is often sharply attacked on cross-examination.'
The defendant also contended the trial court erred in admitting the
expert testimony by the prosecution's witnesses. 16 The Tenth Circuit
acknowledged the district court erroneously admitted portions of the
testimony; however, the admissions were harmless.57 In its evaluation of
the admission of the contested witness testimony, the court discussed the
Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, and applied
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 702 relating to expert testimony.
159
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court affirmed the various factors de-
veloped in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,16 which dis-
trict courts may use to assess the reliability of particular methodologies
utilized by expert witnesses. 16 The Court's decision in Kumho Tire de-
clared that the basic gate keeping obligation set forth in Daubert applied
to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony as previously inter-
preted. 6' Further, the Court held that when appropriate, as determined on
a case-by-case basis, the specific factors set forth in Daubert may be
applied to expert testimony based upon either scientific foundations or
upon personal knowledge or experience. 16' The Court concluded that "the
trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case
how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reli-
able... [and] should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
155. See id. at 1260; see also United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1434 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the frequency of witnesses to testify effectively during sex offense prosecution due to the
traumatic effect such event have on witnesses); Karp, supra note 79, at 21.
156. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1260.
157. See id. at 1270, 1272 (stating that "the errors in admitting portions of the testimony of Dr.
Omelas, Ms. Baum, and Ms. Carlson did not affect a substantial right of a party .... Any errors in
the admission of evidence committed by the district court were harmless.").
158. 526 U.S. 137 (1999); see Charley, 189 F.3d at 1261 n. Il (noting that the trial court did not
have the benefit of direction from the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) in the analysis used to admit expert testimony relating to sexual
abuse of the defendant's nieces).
159. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1262-70.
160. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
161. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-52 (1999); see also Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593-94 (setting forth the factors as (1) "whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested." (2) "[W]hether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication." (3) The potential or known
rate of error should also be considered. (4) Finally, Frye's general acceptance theory can have some
bearing.).
162. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-50. In its discussion of the potential applicability of the
specific Daubert factors to varying types of expert testimony, the Court stated "[w]e can neither rule
out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, .
Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Id. at 150.
163. See id. at 150.
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where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testi-
mony.,,64
Although the Tenth Circuit discussed the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Kumho Tire, the court ultimately held that the district court
has great latitude in how it determines the reliability of expert testimony
and is not required to rely on the Daubert factors.16 This broad discretion
granted to the trial judge in how it makes its reliability determination
could result in the need for these judges to merely find some reliability in
the evaluation or methodology employed by the expert. 166 Arguably, the
Tenth Circuit implies that the mere indicia of reliability is sufficient to
admit expert testimony either discussing sexual molestation or assault
evidence, or offering conclusory opinions that sexual molestation or as-
sault occurred. 1
67
164. Id. at 152.
165. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261 n.l, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152) (holding "the abuse of discretion standard 'applies as much to the trial
court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion'"); see also Kinser
v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court's omission of an
expert's qualifications from the record is harmless error if the court of appeals can assess the
expert's qualifications from a sufficient trial record); United States v. Nichols 169 F.3d 1255, 1262
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "district courts have broad discretion in determining the competency
of expert witnesses" and that Rule 702 is not limited to scientific evidence but may also extend to
specialized knowledge).
166. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1266-67 (noting the broad discretion granted trial judges "in
evaluating the reliability of expert testimony."). Note however, that in its discussion of the
admissibility of Dr. Orelas' testimony, the court distinguished two types of testimony offered by
the pediatrician and held that: 1) the doctor's "generalized medical opinion" evidence that a history
of sexual abuse was not inconsistent with a normal examination was admissible; and 2) that Dr.
Ornelas' "unqualified opinion" that the girls were in fact sexually abused was inadmissible. Id. at
1267-68. While the basis of this "unqualified opinion" was not evident from the record, the court
held that it was inadmissible regardless of whether it was based on the girls' medical history, or
based upon crediting the girls' account of events. Id. at 1267-68. The court noted although subject
to Rule 702's reliability inquiry, no determination was made on the reliability of this unqualified
opinion, and noted that "if Dr. Ornelas' unqualified opinion was based on the girls' medical history,
there [wa]s insufficient support in this record for the district court's decision to admit it." Id. at
1266-67. Alternatively, if this unqualified opinion "was largely based on crediting the girls'
account .... she was essentially vouching for their truthfulness. In general, expert testimony which
does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and
exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact'
as required by Rule 702." Id. at 1267. The court also noted that if the trial judge had sustained the
defenses' objection to Dr. Ornelas' testimony on foundation grounds, then the government, and
court, could have more appropriately explored, and possibly established, the reliability of the
testimony. Id. at 1266-67. See also discussion infra Part II.D.3.
167. This broad discretion may have vast consequences in a district court's assessment of the
reliability and qualifications of expert testimony relating to prior charged and uncharged sexual
misconduct. Witnesses may be qualified as experts based on specialized knowledge and experience,
yet their methodologies and theories may be untested and inconsistent. Although district courts will
likely scrutinize these methodologies and theories for reliability, the district court may risk admitting
certain expert testimony and rely on the jury to weigh its credibility. Thus, the broad discretion
granted to district courts in admitting expert testimony may further liberalize the admissibility of
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C. Other Circuits
1. Generally
Other circuits have provided even wider discretion to district courts
for admitting evidence pursuant to Rules 413 or 414. In United States v.Z - 68
LeCompte, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
grant the defendant's motion in limine to suppress evidence of prior un-r- 169
charged sexual offenses. The district court granted the motion based on
the unfair prejudice such evidence would produce against the defendant
pursuant to a Rule 403 balancing test.7 ' The Eighth Circuit reversed
stating, "[i]n light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of
prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible, we think the Dis-
trict Court erred in its assessment that the probative value of T.T.'s tes-
timony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.""' Additionally, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the strong pre-
sumption in favor of admissibility of evidence of sexual molestation or
assault, quoting the legislative history of Rules 413 through 415, that
'[t]he new rules will supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).'"
72
The Second Circuit in United States v. Larson,'73 also demonstrates
the broad discretion awarded district courts for admitting evidence pur-
evidence under Rules 413 and 414, thereby possibly creating an automatic presumption of guilt for
the defendant to contest. See also discussion infra Part II.D.3.
Although decided after the survey period, in United States v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit addressed
the admissibility of testimony related to patterns of sexual abuse pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 413.
See United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1143 (10th Cir. 1999). Roberts, a tribal official for the
Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, was charged with several counts of sexually abusive contact. See
Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1128. One of the contentions on appeal concerned the testimony of several
women regarding the defendant's pattern of sexual abuse. Id. at 1141. Most of these women "were
not the victims of [the] charged offenses," yet they testified about abusive sexual contacts that
likewise allegedly occurred during employment with the defendant. Id.
The Tenth Circuit held that pursuant to Rule 404(b), the district court properly admitted the
testimony of six of the seven women to demonstrate a common pattern or "scheme of sexually
abusive behavior committed against female employees" by the defendant. Id. at 1142. Therefore,
even though evidence of prior charged and uncharged sexual misconduct is broadly admissible under
Rule 413, the Tenth Circuit scrutinized the admissibility of the women's testimony under Rules
404(b) and 403 rather than relying solely on Rule 413. See id. at 1141-42. Additionally, the Court
reaffirmed the use of the Huddleston factors to ensure the proper admission of Rule 404(b) evidence.
See id. at 1141-42; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988); Huddleston
factors supra Part I.
168. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
169. See United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997).
170. See LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. 118992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari)).
173. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997); see also infra Part III.
suant to Rules 413 and 414.174 In Larson, the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged the opposition of several committees to the enactment of Rules
413 and 414, including the opposition of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee. 75 This group feared that the Rules would practically mandate the
"admission of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct," thereby admitting
highly prejudicial evidence without a proper Rule 403 balancing test and
potentially denying the defendant his Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights. 6 Although the Second Circuit recognized the potential for Rule
414 to admit evidence automatically, the court did not establish any
precedent requiring a Rule 403 balancing test or limiting the admission
of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct. 77 Rather the court in Larson
acknowledged the district court conducted a Rule 403 test and evaluated
the evidence under both 404(b) and 414, thereby ensuring the prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value.78
D. Analysis
1. Discretion
District courts have great discretion in weighing the probative value
of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. However, when a
Circuit Court of Appeals determines a district court abused its discretion
in excluding evidence pursuant to Rule 413 or 414, such as in United
States v. LeCompte, 179 the message communicated demonstrates the clear
preference for admitting evidence of prior charged and uncharged acts of
sexual molestation and assault.
2. Deference to Congress
It currently appears that courts largely defer to the legislative history
of Rules 413 and 414, which state the importance of admitting prior sex-
ual misconduct evidence, rather than critically evaluating the specific
factual circumstances before the court. District courts may also liberally
admit evidence of prior sexual offenses to conform to the Rules' legisla-
tive intent to supersede the restrictive aspects of Rule 404(b). Due to the
heavy reliance on the policy surrounding the Rules, district courts may
only give a cursory glance to the potential unfair prejudice weighing on
the defendant.
Although case precedent holds that the admission of sexual offense
evidence pursuant to Rules 413 and 414 is subject to all other evidence
rules including Rule 403, courts may weigh the policy behind the Rules
174. See United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
175. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 604.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 604-05.
178. See id.
179. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
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more significantly than the effect suffered by the defendant from the
admission of such evidence. As discussed below, although the Tenth
Circuit has adopted the Enjady8° factors to guide district courts in bal-
ancing sexual assault and molestation evidence, other circuits have yet to
adopt such factors. Therefore, district courts conducting 403 balancing
tests in other circuits may choose to follow the Enjady factors or other
methods to scrutinize 413 and 414 evidence and ensure the defendant's
due process rights are not disregarded. Though the presumption in favor
of admission for sexual misconduct evidence will continue, the adoption
of the Enjady factors or other guidelines will minimize judicial discretion
for admitting particular sexual offense evidence and provide predictable
precedent to practitioners.
3. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit continues to be the most active circuit in ad-
dressing evidentiary appeals for Rules 413 and 414. Defense attorneys
should recognize the overwhelming precedent within the Tenth Circuit
for affirming a district court's decision to admit evidence of prior sexual
offense evidence. There is recent precedent, however, in United States v.
Guardia'18 that may aid a defense attorney attempting to exclude certain
sexual misconduct evidence. In Guardia, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to exclude testimony by several patients of the
defendant regarding prior sexual abuse during gynecological
procedures. The district court excluded such probative evidence after
subjecting the proffered evidence to a Rule 403 analysis and concluding
the evidence would confuse and mislead the jury."' The court analyzed
and affirmed the district court's ruling because it was clear that for each
patient's testimony, expert witnesses would be required to explain the
appropriate medical examinations and procedures.' 4 Therefore, if de-
fense attorneys can successfully demonstrate that admission of prior sex-
ual misconduct by a defendant would necessitate mini-trials for such
evidence, the attorney may succeed in excluding such evidence.
The Tenth Circuit has yet to state whether district judges should
explicitly detail their decisions to admit or exclude 413 and 414 evi-
dence. In Guardia, the district court clearly outlined its Rule 403 bal-
ancing concerns during the defendant's motion in limine, thereby con-
forming to the circuit's preference for explicit 403 balancing tests. s5
Other circuits, however, are unclear on whether or not the district courts
180. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998); see also discussion infra Part
III.
181. 135 F.3d 1326 (l0th Cir. 1998).
182. See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1998).
183. See Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1332.
184. See id. at 1332.
185. See id. at 1331; see also discussion infra Part III.
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must explicitly express reasons for admitting certain sexual misconduct
evidence.
In prosecuting a sexual assault or molestation case, the Tenth Cir-
cuit seems to grant broad deference to expert testimony establishing the
evidentiary factors present in a particular case demonstrating sexual mo-
lestation or assault. Therefore, prosecuting attorneys may succeed in the
introduction of expert testimony offering conclusory opinions that sexual
misconduct occurred. Currently, insufficient reliability may be a proper
objection for defense attorneys to expert testimony demonstrating the
existence of sexual molestation or assault. However, such an objection
may offer the platform to the. prosecution to further establish the reliabil-
ity of such testimony and the particular methodology utilized.
III. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
A. Background
1. Overview of the Policy Behind Rule 403
Federal Rule of Evidence 403186 grants trial judges wide discretion
in determining whether the probative value of certain evidence substan-
tially outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice against the
defendant."' The preliminary draft for Rule 403 was bifurcated between
section (a) that mandated exclusion of certain evidence based on three
dangers and section (b) that provided discretionary exclusion of evidence
based on three considerations. 8 According to this preliminary draft,
judges were required to exclude evidence under section (a) if the proba-
tive value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, . . . confusion of the issues, or . . . misleading the
jury."'8 9 Whereas judges had discretion to exclude evidence when the
probative value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by con-
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."' 9
The early controversy surrounding the adoption of Rule 403 arose
from the fear of granting too much or too little discretion to trial judges.
Members of the Justice Department and the Senate objected to the bifur-
cation of Rule 403 because it would have erased much of the trial court's
186. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
187. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REV. 413, 441-42 (1989).
188. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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discretion to admit or exclude evidence. 9' On the other hand, those who
feared broad discretion believed that if a judge was not bound by rules
then his personal interests and beliefs might influence his decisions. t92
Others believed wide discretion would cause judges to refuse to think
through challenging evidentiary issues and simply exclude the disputed
evidence pursuant to Rule 403. Objection also arose over the proposed
Rule's failure to provide guidance to trial courts, particularly when none
of the dangers enumerated in parts (a) or (b) independently "substantially
outweigh the probative value of proffered evidence but taken together
they do."' 19 4 The Justice Department and the allied members of the Senate
ultimately succeeded in discarding the proposed bifurcated Rule 403 in
favor of the current 403, approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.' 95 The
predominant policy reason for the adoption of the final Rule 403 was to
"regularize and channel the use of discretion in the administration of the
rules of evidence. ,,196
Rule 403, as adopted, eliminated the proposed requirement that
judges must exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues," or "misleading the jury.' Instead, the Rule granted judges
broad discretion to act as gatekeepers, examining the evidence and
weighing its probative value against the dangers listed in section (a) of
the preliminary draft and the considerations listed in section (b) of the
preliminary draft. "9 However, the three dangers, especially the danger of
unfair prejudice, remains more significant to trial judges in exercising
their discretion under Rule 403 because certain evidence has the potential
to invoke emotional or rash responses in jurors that may influence their
decisions regarding a defendant's guilt or innocence. 199
The danger of 'unfair prejudice' under Rule 403 is not simply the
tendency of evidence to undermine a party's position. Rather, the
prejudice that is 'unfair' is prejudice arising from the tendency of
proffered evidence to suggest to the jury that it should render its
191. See id. § 5211, at 245 n.9.
192. See id. § 5212, at 252-54 n.12.
193. See id. at 254.
194. Id. at 245-46 n.9.
195. See id. at 245-47.
196. Id. § 5212, at 250.
197. Id. § 5215, at 273.
198. FED. R. EVID. 403.
199. See id. § 5215, at 273-75; FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (stating "'Unfair
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.").
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findings 'on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.
200
This concern for protecting against substantially unfair prejudice is not
focused solely upon evidence brought against a defendant; a judge must
similarly evaluate any evidence the defendant wishes to introduce incul-
201
pating another individual or in general under Rule 403.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified one aspect of the appli-
cation of Rule 403 in Old Chief v. United States."' In Old Chief, the
Court addressed the issue of whether "a trial court abuses its discretion
when, in a prosecution for possession of a handgun by a felon, it admits
evidence of the name or nature of the defendant's prior conviction de-
spite the defendant's offer to stipulate to his or her felon status."2 3 The
Court determined the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
204prior conviction evidence in lieu of the defendant's stipulation. Al-
though the Court outlined a clear application of Rule 403 in the specific
201circumstances of Old Chief, the Court has repeatedly declined to pro-
vide "detailed guidance as to the proper application of the rule" in gen-
eral .206
2. Tenth Circuit Precedent Employing Rule 403
In the past, the Tenth Circuit has given district courts broad discre-
tion in conducting balancing tests of the probative value and the prejudi-
201cial value of evidence. In March 1998, however, the Tenth Circuit sup-
plemented this ample discretion by setting forth several guiding factors
to aid district courts in balancing the probative and prejudicial worth of
evidence in cases involving sexual assault.2°8 The Tenth Circuit estab-
200. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing the FED. R. EVID.
403 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules)).
201. See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1188-92.
202. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
203. The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REV. 360, 360 (1997).
204. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1996
Term: Leading Cases, supra note 203, at 360.
205. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182, 185-86 (discussing a four-step approach to 403 analysis in
similar cases: step one discusses the prejudice presented by felon in possession charges; step two
sets forth a two-step analysis for weighing unfair prejudice with probative value; step three examines
the prejudice and probative value of the names and nature of particular offenses; and step four
addresses the potential for stipulation to felony status); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading
Cases, supra note 203, at 362-63.
206. • The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 203, at 360.
207. See United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
208. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
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lished these guiding factors in United States v. Enjady2 °9 and courts in the
Tenth Circuit have proceeded to name the factors the "Enjady factors."21
The defendant in Enjady appealed his jury conviction, claiming the
trial judge made a prejudicial error in permitting the admission of testi-
mony regarding a prior rape defendant allegedly committed. 2 " Both the
defendant and the witness testifying about the alleged rape were mem-
212
bers of the Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe. The witness, "A," testified
to drinking throughout the day with the defendant and several other indi-
viduals on the reservation.2 11 "A" asserted that she either fell asleep or
passed out and awoke to find the defendant raping her.1 4 She later re-
ported the rape to the authorities and medical personnel examined her."1 5
After his arrest for rape, the defendant admitted they had sex but argued
it was consensual . 6
The district court determined "that the testimony of the prior rape
was relevant," and admitted the evidence to show the defendant's pro-
pensity towards committing sexual assaults and to rebut the defendant's
claim that he would not perform this type of act."' The Tenth Circuit
determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence because the trial record and facts supported the district court's
ruling. 28 The Tenth Circuit recognized that although the evidence is ad-
missible under Rule 413, the district court must still undertake a 403
balancing test to justify admission of the evidence in conjunction with
Rule 413."' The Enjady factors for conducting 403 balancing tests for
sexual offense evidence are:
1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the
evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seri-
ously disputed the material fact is; and 4) whether the government
209. 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating "[w]e find
that the district court properly applied the Enjady factors and explained adequately the basis for its
decision to admit [the witness's] testimony."); United States v. Castillo, No. 98-2191, 1999 WL
569054, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (stating "[olur review of the record demonstrates that the
court clearly considered and applied the Enjady factors.").
211. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1429. This evidence invokes Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which
admits any prior charged or uncharged sexual assault evidence. For a more detailed analysis of Rule
413, see the discussion supra Part II.




216. See id. (stating that the defendant was only arrested for the rape and not convicted).
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1434.
219. See id. (addressing the particular procedural facts in Enjady, the district judge admitted the
evidence only after defense counsel raised the consent defense and the government introduced
evidence of the defendant's statement that he would never do such at thing).
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can avail itself of any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing the
probative dangers, a court considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence
will contribute to an improperly- based jury verdict; 2) the extent to
which such evidence will distract the jury from the central issues of
the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to prove the prior con-
duct.22 °
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Overview
During the Survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed the Enjady factors as well as the district court's discretionary
authority in balancing the probative value with the risk of prejudice.
Though the district judge retains large discretion in admitting evidence,
the Tenth Circuit also established its preference for district courts to ex-
plicitly outline Rule 403 balancing tests and conclusions."'
2. United States v. McHorse
222
In United States v. McHorse, the Tenth Circuit established that the
Enjady factors provide an on-the-record account of whether the probative
value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice in cases of sexual abuse.22 The defendant in McHorse was
charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child less than twelve years
old and one count for "abusive sexual contact with a child less than
224twelve years" old. On appeal, the defendant asserted the district court
abused its discretion in permitting testimony of prior sexual abuse be-. • 225
cause of its substantial risk for unfair prejudice. The court concluded
that the defendant's assertion that the district court abused its discretion
lacked merit because the district judge made on-the-record determina-
tions explaining his admissions and exclusions of certain testimony.
226
3. United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos
227
In United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, the Enjady factors were
not precisely applicable because the case did not involve a sexual of-
fense; however, the case demonstrated the Tenth's Circuit's preference
for on-the-record Rule 403 balancing tests by district courts. Mr.
Lazcano-Villalobos, the defendant, was charged with transporting co-
220. ld. at 1433.
221. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
222. 179 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 1999).
223. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1999).
224. McHorse, 179 F.3d at 894.
225. See id. at 898.
226. See id. at 899.
227. 175 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1999).
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caine and cash across state borders. Over the defense's 403 objection,
the prosecution introduced a prior arrest of the defendant for hiding
marijuana in his rear bumper to demonstrate the knowledge and intent of
the defendant for the current charge.2 9 Although these facts also invoke a
Rule 404(b) analysis because the prosecution offered the evidence to
establish intent and knowledge,23 ° the Tenth Circuit held a Rule 403 bal-
ancing test is required for all relevant evidence offered pursuant to
404(b)."'
In Lazcano-Villalobos, the district court granted the government's
motion pursuant to Rule 404(b), to admit evidence of the defendant's
prior arrest and guilty plea to the marijuana possession charge. 32 The
admission of this evidence bolstered the government's charge that the
defendant had knowledge of concealed compartments in a car because
the prior arrest for possession also involved concealed car compartments.
The defendant objected to the admission of this prior arrest and guilty
plea evidence because its unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its
233probative value .
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit the
disputed evidence. According to the Tenth Circuit, the district court
must have implicitly balanced the unfair prejudice and probative value
because the court admitted the evidence over the defendant's Rule 403
234objection. The court concluded that the district court's implicit 403
balancing test was sufficiently supported by the trial record. 235 Through
accepting an implicit balancing in this particular case, the Tenth Circuit
court restated its preference for on-the-record, explicit, Rule 403 bal-
236ancing tests.
4. United States v. McVeigh
237In United States v. McVeigh, the Tenth Circuit again reaffirmed its
238
preference for explicit Rule 403 balancing tests. In McVeigh, the Tenth
Circuit expanded this preference and established that if a district court
fails to conduct on-the-record balancing tests, the Tenth Circuit will re-
view the record and conduct a de novo balancing test to uphold the dis-
228. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 840 (10th Cir. 1999).
229. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 844, n.4.
230. See supra Part 1.
231. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 845-46.
232. See id. at 845.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 847.
235. See id.; see also United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding a
district court's evidentiary ruling may be upheld "on any ground supported by the record").
236. See Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d at 847.
237. 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
238. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998).
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triet court's admission of certain evidence. In McVeigh, the Tenth Cir-
cuit instituted de novo review "because the record contain[ed] a colloquy
between the court and counsel that shed[] considerable light on how the
district court viewed the evidence."24 The Tenth Circuit, however, stated
it has yet to find "a per se abuse of discretion simply because a trial court
failed to make" an on-the-record determination for admitting or exclud-
241ing evidence pursuant to Rule 403.
C. Other Circuit Cases
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has not enumerated particular factors district
courts may consider when deciding whether to admit sexual assault or
molestation evidence pursuant to Rule 403. The Second Circuit, how-
ever, demonstrated a preference for admitting such evidence unless the• 242
prejudice against the defendant is substantial. In United States v. Lar-
son,243 the Second Circuit confirmed the broad discretion granted to dis-
trict judges in balancing the probative value and unfair prejudice of evi-
dence. The Court acknowledged this broad discretion when it affirmed
the district court's decision to admit evidence of a sexual molestation• 244
that occurred sixteen to twenty years earlier.
In choosing to affirm the admission of this evidence, the court relied
heavily on the legislative history of Rule 414; however, the court made it
clear that Rule 414 did not eliminate the application of other evidentiary
rules such as Rule 403 or applicable hearsay rules. 245 The court also ac-
knowledged the congressional intent in adopting Rule 414 to provide
flexibility to trial judges faced with deciding what prior charged or un-
charged sexual molestation evidence to admit.2' Therefore, when decid-
ing to admit evidence of sexual assault or molestation, Second Circuit
courts may defer to the legislative history of Rules 413 and 414 when
conducting Rule 403 balancing tests to support their admission of such
probative, yet highly-prejudicial, evidence. Larson was the first case in
the Second Circuit to decide that Rule 414 evidence may be excluded by
the trial court because of a Rule 403 balancing test determining the unfair
prejudice presented by such evidence which substantially outweighs its
239. See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1189.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
243. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
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probative value. The court did not expressly state whether on-the-record
403 balancing tests are required to admit 414 evidence.247
2. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has adopted a variation of the precedent adhered
to by the Tenth Circuit for determining whether evidence was subjected
to a Rule 403 balancing test. The Third Circuit's balancing test com-
pares "the 'genuine need for the challenged evidence and balance[s] that
necessity against the risk that the information will influence the jury to
convict on improper grounds.' 2 49 The Third Circuit also may examine
the trial record and conduct a de novo Rule 403 balancing test where "the
district court fails to explain its grounds for denying a Rule 403 objection
and its reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the
record.
,250
The Third Circuit in United States v. Sriyuth held that if the Rule
403 balancing test determines the danger of unfair prejudice presented by
the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, the trial court
252has discretion to exclude certain evidence. The court also asserted that
the jury is capable of compartmentalizing evidence of sexual assaults and
considering the evidence for the narrow purpose of demonstrating the
defendant's motive or intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)."'
Therefore, the Third Circuit will likely admit sexual misconduct evi-
dence to demonstrate a defendant's motive or intent or for the express
purpose promulgated by Rules 413 and 414. The Third Circuit's prece-
dent also favors the admission of such sexual offense evidence unless the
record fails to support the district court's 403 ruling.
247. See id.; see generally Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174 F.3d 261, 269 n.I I (2d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that district courts are "not required to articulate the relevant considerations on the
record" for a 403 balancing analysis and that a mere "sustained" or "overruled" will suffice); United
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court's 403 analysis will
only be called into question upon a showing that it acted arbitrarily and "[tlo avoid acting arbitrarily,
the district court must make a 'conscientious assessment' of whether unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value").
248. See United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996).
249. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 747-48 (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988)); cf. United States v. Pileggi, No. 97-CR-612-2, 1998 WL
288283, at *I (E.D. Pa., June 3, 1998) (noting that the factors to be considered in balancing test are:
"'the actual need for that evidence in view of the contested issues and the other evidence available to
the [party seeking admission], and the strength of the evidence in proving the issue, against the
danger that the jury will be inflamed ... ' (quoting Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 748).
250. United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994).
251. 98 F.3d 739 (3d Cir. 1996).





The Eighth Circuit relies heavily upon the legislative history of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 when deciding to admit evidence of
254prior sexual misconduct. In United States v. LeCompte, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion in
limine requesting the exclusion of evidence of prior uncharged sexual• 255
molestation accusations. In reversing the district court, the court
stressed Congress' strong legislative intent that evidence of sexual mo-
lestation or assault "should ordinarily be admissible., 256 The court noted
that .by enacting Rules 413 through 415 Congress intended to override
the general inclination of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude evi-
dence demonstrating a defendant's propensity to commit a particular act
or crime. 257 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit explained that evidence of-
fered pursuant to Rule 414 is subject to a Rule 403 balancing test;
"[h]owever, Rule 403 must be applied to allow Rule 414 its intended
effect. In United States v. Gilmore, the Eighth Circuit held that al-
though it is preferable for the district court to explicitly state such a Rule




By establishing a series of factors that a district judge should con-
sider in admitting sexual assault and molestation evidence, the Tenth
Circuit attempted to focus the discretion generally granted district judges
pursuant to Rule 403. The Tenth Circuit, however, continues to vest sub-
stantial discretion with the district court and rarely overturns a lower
court decision for lack of an explicit or evident Rule 403 balancing
254. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
255. See United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir. 1997).
256. LeCompte, 131 F.3d at 769.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. 730 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1984).
260. See United States v. Gilmore, 730 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1984),(holding that under the
circumstances of this case the 403 ruling "carries with it an implicit ruling that the standards have
been met"). The circumstances included the admission of evidence regarding recorded taped
conversations during a drug transaction and testimony of unrecorded yet monitored conversations
and the subsequent unrecorded bench discussion at trial surrounding the admissibility of this
evidence. See also United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988) (following Eighth
Circuit precedent in holding that 403 balancing tests do not require an explicit ruling by the trial
judge); United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1455-56 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (holding that 403 on-
the-record analysis is required for prior convictions admitted for purposes of impeachment pursuant
to rule 609, however, such explicit rulings are not required for admitting 404(b) evidence of prior
similar acts).
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test.26 ' The Tenth Circuit cases during the survey period demonstrate the
circuit's strong preference for explicit Rule 403 findings. Yet, this pref-
erence will not force the reversal of an evidentiary issue for abuse of
discretion merely because the trial court failed to conduct an explicit test.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit may now conduct a de novo balancing
262test based on the trial record.
Recently, sexual assault and molestation cases before the Tenth Cir-
cuit presented numerous pieces of evidence demonstrating a defendant's
prior similar acts, or prior charged and uncharged sexual misconduct
pursuant to Rules 404(b), 413, and 414. Historically, federal courts
barred character or propensity evidence from admission; however, Rules
413 and 414 have altered that precedent. Today, practitioners in Tenth
Circuit courts should raise 403 objections to the introduction of such
evidence with the knowledge that such evidence will likely gain admis-
sion.
However, the Tenth Circuit has excluded such evidence in narrow
261circumstances. In United States v. Guardia, the district court excluded
evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct by the defendant because
the Rule 403 analysis determined that the evidence posed a substantial• 264
risk of confusion for the jurors. Therefore, Tenth Circuit district courts
may exclude evidence of prior sexual misconduct if a defendant success-
fully demonstrates that the confusion of issues or unfair prejudice ex-
ceeds the evidence's probative value. The Enjady factors may also help
practitioners defend accused sexual offenders by providing specific fac-
261. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 should be used infrequently, reflecting Congress'
legislative judgment that the evidence 'normally' should be admitted." See also United States v.
Blanco-Rodriguez, No. 98-2116, 1999 WL 100905, at *6 (10th Cir. March 1, 1999) (holding that
testimony regarding prior acts was sufficiently similar and close enough in time to the charged act,
and that the district court's failure to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test did not so prejudice the
defendant as to require a reversal): United States v. Mixon, No. 98-3004, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
14832, at *12, *15-*16 (10th Cir. June 29, 1999) (holding the testimony of a police lieutenant
regarding his involvement with a prior conviction with the defendant was erroneously admitted into
evidence constituting an abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial court. However this admission was
harmless error because there was "sufficient independent circumstantial evidence of [diefendant's
guilt to overcome the erroneous admission of the prior conviction evidence.").
262. Cf United States v. Castillo, No. 98-2191, 1999 WL 569054, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 4,
1999) (evaluating a previous remand to the district court to explain its reasoning in admitting
evidence pursuant to Rule 403). The Tenth Circuit in Castillo also affirmed the trial court's "'broad
discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential prejudicial effect[ I and
will be reversed only on a showing of abuse of that discretion."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997)). In Castillo, the district court admitted
testimony of three prior uncharged sexual abuses and held that because the testimony was short and
"fleeting in character" the unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value and
confusion would not result nor would passions be inflamed. See id. at *2.
263. 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998).
264. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1327 (10th Cir. 1998).
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tors district courts should consider before admitting evidence of prior
sexual misconduct.
The Tenth Circuit's preference for explicit Rule 403 balancing tests
implies that a district court's 403 ruling will remain undisturbed on ap-
peal if the district court provides an on-the-record rationale. However,
given the wide discretion granted district courts in conducting their Rule
403 balancing tests, it is unlikely a district court's 403 ruling will be re-
versed if there is some basis provided somewhere in the trial record.
2. Other Circuits
Other circuits have been reluctant to adopt enumerated factors such
as those set forth in Enjady, possibly demonstrating a broad consensus in
favor of admission of sexual assault and molestation evidence pursuant
265to Rules 413 and 414 respectively. Although certiorari was denied to
the Enjady case by the U.S. Supreme Court, it would not be surprising if
this issue is considered by the U.S. Supreme Court after more circuits
implement this type of big brother advice and guidance to lower courts.
Circuit courts analyzing cases involving sexual assault or molestation
may begin to encounter a greater number of district courts admitting evi-
dence of prior similar acts in addition to prior sexual misconduct evi-
dence to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to conduct certain crimes.
The reasons for admitting evidence of prior similar acts may be beyond
the exceptions provided in Rule 404(b), such as motive, plan, knowledge,
and intent as district courts may admit the prior act evidence to demon-
strate the defendant's propensity to commit the charged sexual offense.
This potential increase in the number of district courts admitting such
evidence may derive from the increased opportunities district courts will
have to apply Rules 413 and 414, and the fact that most circuits employ
the same Rule 403 balancing standards for both evidence of prior sexual
assault and molestation as for prior bad acts. Therefore, district courts
may blur the contrary legislative purposes behind Rules 413 and 414266
and Rule 404(b).267
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit leads the circuit courts in establishing enumerated
factors that district courts may utilize in conducting Rule 403 balancing
tests for sexual misconduct evidence. The Tenth Circuit district courts,
however, may overwhelmingly choose to defer to the legislative history
265. See generally United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the "strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be
admissible"); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (addressing the presumption
in favor of admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 413 and 414 in connection with the required
balancing test of 403).
266. See supra Part II.
267. See supra Part I.
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supporting Rules 413 and 414 when deciding whether to admit evidence
of prior sexual molestation or assault by the defendant instead of relying
on the enumerated factors for Rule 403. Alternatively, to ensure evidence
of sexual misconduct is properly admitted, district courts may choose to
use the Enjady factors in conjunction with the Huddleston factors. Fur-
thermore, Tenth Circuit courts may extend the precedent established in
United States v. Charley, for the admissibility of expert testimony, and
liberally admit expert testimony addressing the defendant's prior sexual
misconduct following the strong legislative history encouraging courts to
admit such evidence.
Victoria B. Lutz*
Victoria B. Lutz graduated from the University of Denver in May 2001. Thank you to all 1999-
2001 members of the Denver Univerisity Law Review for their support, sweat and editing skills in




In this age of growing technology, the value of proprietary rights
has rapidly increased. Businesses have responded by fiercely protecting
intellectual property rights. Legal counsel advising their corporate clients
must consider the rights, remedies, and appropriate application of intel-
lectual property laws. Further, counsel must consider the substantive
requirements to obtain trade secret, trademark, copyright, and patent
protection and vigilantly prevent or resolve infringement upon the pro-
tections thereby acquired.
Trademarks provide a shortcut for consumers to associate goods
with a specific producer, the trademark owner. The Lanham Trademark
Act ("Lanham Act")' established substantive federal legislation for the
protection of trademarks.2 Through the Lanham Act, Congress protects
against the deceptive or misleading use of trademarks in commerce to
prevent consumer confusion and to protect a trademark owner's invest-
ment in the mark.3 With this statutory protection in place, counsel should
attend to the extent of protection available for business marks, including
the gamut of remedies available for trademark infringement and the
limitations thereupon.
During the survey period,4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit addressed the recovery of compensatory damages for
trademark infringement Part I of this survey addresses the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Lanham Act in the areas of awarding trade-
mark protection and identifying trademark infringement. Part II proceeds
to evaluate recoverable damages of trademark infringement, highlighting
the special limitations on an award of attorney's fees and an accounting
of defendant's profits acquired through the unlawful use of the plaintiff's
trademark. Finally, Part III details the split in the federal circuits regard-
ing recovery for an accounting of profits and specifically addresses the
Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "bad faith" or "willfulness" requirement
for recovery of an accounting of profits.
Patents provide protection for artists and inventors of extraordinary
writings, inventions, and discoveries. The Patent and Copyright Clause
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Trademark Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
2. See George Russell Thill, Note, The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act: Damage Awards
for False Advertising and Consumer Standing under Section 43(A)-Congress Drops the Ball Twice,
6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 361, 361 (1994).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127; see also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (expressing the basic
purposes of trademark legislation).
4. The survey period is from August 31, 1998 through September 1, 1999.
5. See Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998).
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of the Constitution provides a limited period of exclusive control over an
invention to encourage intellectual creativity and invention.6 While re-
viewing regulation of unpatented subject matter, the Supreme Court es-
tablished the broad preemption over state law of this constitutionally
authorized federal patent law.7 However, the Supreme Court has since
carved out several state law exceptions to the doctrine of federal pre-
emption.' These exceptions are crucial to effect the licensing of patent
rights. Therefore, counsel should consider the interplay between state
contract law and federal patent law when drafting licensing agreements
regarding patent rights.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue
of federal patent law preemption of state contract law in the context of
state licensing agreements. Part I of this survey addresses the congres-
sional policies behind patent protection, the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of these policies, and the federal preemption doctrine in the area of
patent law. Part II proceeds to evaluate the Supreme Court's exceptions
to the federal preemption doctrine and specifically addresses exceptions
regarding state contract law. Next, Part III addresses the Tenth Circuit's
approach to the interaction of state licensing agreements and the federal
patent scheme. Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of inapplicability of
federal patent law.
I. RECOVERING DAMAGES FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Trademark regulation is of crucial concern because a word, slogan,
picture, or symbol has become a merchandising short cut inducing a con-
sumer to associate a mark with certain goods and services.' In 1946,
Congress enacted the Lanham Act to provide a federal statutory scheme
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
8. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (permitting state
regulation of unpatented subject matter affecting trade secrets); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (permitting state regulation of unpatented subject matter affecting state
contract laws).
9. See Naimie v. Cytozyme Lab., Inc., 174 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 1999).
10. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a familiar trademark can be invaluable to a producer because
of the psychological function of the symbol. See id. The mark can induce a consumer to purchase:
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of
the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained,
the trade-mark owner has something of value.
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for trademark regulation." Congress intended to provide consistent na-
tional regulation by
regulatfing] commerce within the control of Congress by making ac-
tionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; ... protect[ing] registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; .. .protect[ing] per-
sons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; ... [and]
prevent[ing] fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of re-
productions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks ......
To protect a trademark owner's investment of time, energy, and
money, and to stop the deceptive and misleading use of marks, the Lan-
ham Act outlines the elements of trademark infringement and establishes
remedies for infringement." The federal circuits differ in their interpreta-
tion of the available compensatory damages for infringement. Possible
compensatory damages include awarding an accounting of defendant's
profits, damages sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of the action.'4 Spe-
cifically, the federal circuits have split concerning the availability of an
accounting of profits for trademark infringement. 5 In Bishop v. Equinox
Int'l Corp, 6 the Tenth Circuit considered whether compensatory dam-ages should be awarded in trademark infringement cases.
A. Background
1. Trademark Classification
Congress passed the Lanham Act to protect persons engaged in
commerce against unfair competition by prohibiting the "deceptive or
misleading use of marks."' 7 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used] to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown."'" To register the mark, the
11. See Robyn L. Phillips, Determining if a Trade Dress is Valid, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 457, 464
(1992-1993).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
13. See id. § 1114 (describing infringement and providing for civil action for the infringement
of registered marks); id. § 1125 (describing infringement and providing for civil action for the
infringement of unregistered marks); S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (emphasizing the importance
of protecting the trademark owner from "misappropriation by pirates and cheats").
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
15. See discussion infra Part 1.5.
16. 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998). See discussion infra Part 1.5.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. "The term 'mark' includes any trademark, service mark, collective
mark, or certification mark. The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark." Id.
18. Id. Trademark laws also include "trade name" and "commercial name" protection as
defined by the Lanham Act. Id.
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Lanham Act requires that a mark be capable of distinguishing the appli-
cant's goods from those of others.'9
Generally, trademarks receive protection if the mark is distinctive
and identifies the source of a product. 20 The Supreme Court separates
trademarks into classes of increasing distinctiveness, which afford the
marks increasing levels of protection. 2' The Court classifies trademarks
as (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanci-
ful. 22 A generic mark indicates the "'basic nature of articles or services'
rather than the more individualized characteristics of a particular prod-
UCt. ' 23 A descriptive mark "'identifies a characteristic or quality of an
article or service,' such as its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingre-
dients. 24 A suggestive mark "suggests, rather than describes, some par-
ticular characteristic of the goods or services to which it applies and re-
quires the consumer to exercise the imagination in order to draw a con-
clusion as to the nature of the goods and services. 25 Arbitrary or fanciful
marks "bear no relationship to the products or services to which they ...
appl[y] .26
Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are entitled to protection
because they are inherently distinctive and the nature of the mark identi-
fies the source of the product.27 Generic marks do not receive protection
because they are too general. 28 The Supreme Court has said that "generic
marks-those that 'refe[r] to the genus of which the particular product is
a species,' are not registerable as trademarks., 29 Descriptive marks-
which merely describe a product-are generally not protected because
they are not inherently distinctive and do not identify the source of the
product.30 However, if a descriptive mark "becomes] distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce," the mark acquires "secondary
19. Id. § 1052.
20. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992) (articulating the
various classes of trademarks and their respective levels of protection).
21. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
22. See id.
23. Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)). "A
generic term is 'the name of a particular genus or class of which an individual article or service is
but a member." Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115
(5th Cir. 1979)). For example, the term "aspirin" or "cellophane" is generic. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 115). For example, the term "Alo" referring "to
products containing gel of the aloe vera plant" is descriptive. Id.
25. Id. at 791. For example, "[tihe term 'Coppertone' [is] suggestive in regard to sun tanning
products." Id. (citing Douglas Labs. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir. 1954)).
26. Id. For example, the term "Kodak" is fanciful for photographic supplies. Id. (citing
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 137 Misc. 506, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (1930)).
27. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
28. See id. at 768.
29. Id. (quoting Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
30. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
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cant's goods in commerce," the mark acquires "secondary meaning"3'
and is therefore entitled to protection under the Lanham Act.32 Summa-
rizing this analysis, the Supreme Court has developed the general rule
that "[an identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected
if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning."3
After counsel obtains protection for a client's business marks, coun-
sel must attend to potential infringement of these marks. The Lanham
Act, as followed by the Supreme Court and federal circuits, outlines the
appropriate test to determine trademark infringement.
2. Trademark Infringement
The Lanham Act uses the "likelihood of confusion" test to determine
trademark infringement.34 The Act states:
[a]ny person who.., uses in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device ... which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."
When a trademark is of such a nature to warrant protection, a plain-
tiff has the burden of proving that the mark causes the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion in the market.36 The fundamental inquiry for trademark
infringement cases is whether the consumer is "likely to be deceived or
confused by the similarity of the marks."37
The Tenth Circuit evaluates trademark infringement cases by ap-
plying the "likelihood of confusion" test. 8 The Tenth Circuit has held
31. Park 'n Fly, 469 U.S. at 194. "The concept of secondary meaning recognizes that words
with an ordinary and primary meaning of their own 'may by long use [in connection] with a
particular product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating that product."'
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974)).
32. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (f)).
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
35. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
36. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. See also Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d
1360, 1361 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish defendant's product was likely to
create consumer confusion); Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that defendant did not infringe on plaintiffs trade name because plaintiff failed to
prove consumer confusion).
37. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 780 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194,
1201 (9th Cir. 1979)).
38. See Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir. 1998). See also
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
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that "[c]onfusion occurs when consumers make an incorrect mental asso-
ciation between the involved commercial products or their producers."39
To determine whether confusion exists, the Tenth Circuit has used the
following six factors:
(a) the degree of similarity between the marks, including the marks'
appearance, pronunciation, suggestion, and manner of display;
(b) strength or weakness of the plaintiff's mark;
(c) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark;
(d) similarities and differences of the parties' goods, services and
marketing strategies;
(e) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers of the
goods or services involved; and
40(f) evidence of actual confusion, if any.
Because the relevance of the factors varies with each case, all of the
factors contribute to a final determination.4 ' However, the Tenth Circuit
has noted that the key factor is the likelihood of confusion based on the
marks' similarity.42
that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact that appellate courts will review under a clear error
analysis); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting
that although the federal circuits split regarding the standard of review for likelihood of confusion,
the Tenth Circuit follows a clear error review).
39. Jordache Enters. Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 564 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
40. Heartsprings, 143 F.3d at 554. See also King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the same six factors to determine
trademark infringement); Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 729
(1938)); Prime Media, Inc. v. Primedia, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 932, 937 (D. Kan. 1998) (adopting the
same six factors to determine trademark infringement). But see Libman Co., 69 F.3d at 1364
(Coffey, J., dissenting). In Libman, the Seventh Circuit failed to follow similar factors. Id. at 1364-
65. Judge Coffey, dissenting, criticized the majority's analysis for "depart[ing] from well-established
precedent in [the Seventh] [C]ircuit," which, until Libman, had included analysis of the following
factors:
1. similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion;
2. similarity of the products;
3. area and manner of concurrent use;
4. degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers;
5. strength of complainant's mark;
6. actual confusion; and
7. intent of defendant to 'palm-off his product as that of another.'
Id.
41. • See Heartsprings, 143 F.3d at 554. With a "clear error" standard of review, the appellate
court is faced with a high threshold for reversal. Id. at 553-54. Therefore, although a trial court
incorrectly analyzes one or more factors, a genuine dispute of material fact will probably not exist
with all factors considered together and properly analyzed. Id. at 558.
42. See id. at 554.
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After counsel successfully proves trademark infringement of a cli-
ent's mark, the client is entitled to a variety of remedies. For monetary
recovery, including plaintiffs losses, defendant's profits, and costs of the
action, counsel must plead the requisite provisions outlined by the Lan-
ham Act and interpreted by the federal circuits in order to recover.
3. Recoverable Damages43
The Lanham Act mandates that if a plaintiff establishes trademark
infringement "in any civil action arising under this [Act], the plaintiff
shall be entitled, subject to . . . the principles of equity, to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages [the plaintiff] sustain[s], . . . and (3)
the costs of the action."' Generally, plaintiffs damages can include ac-
tual damages, defendant's profits, equitable adjustments, counterfeit
remedies, attorney's fees, and prejudgment interest in exceptional cases
as appropriate to each case.
To recover for actual damages, defined as "any damages sustained
by the plaintiff," a plaintiff must prove that the trademark infringement
caused actual consumer confusion and that the plaintiff suffered an actual
injury .47 The plaintiffs actual losses often include various injuries to the
business of the trademark owner.4 '8 Accordingly, plaintiffs most com-
monly recover for their sales lost or diverted due to the trademark in-
fringement. 9 If the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove actual lost
or diverted sales, some federal circuits have awarded actual damages
based "on the reasonable royalty rate normally charged for the infringing
use. ' In addition to lost sales, plaintiffs can recover money spent as a
43. Remedies for trademark infringement include preliminary and permanent injunctions as
well as monetary damages. Monetary damages are often subordinate to an injunction because a
plaintiff needs to establish only the likelihood of confusion to get an injunction. An award of
monetary damages requires a greater burden of proof. See Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for
Intellectual Property Invasions:Themes and Variations, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45, 51, 65
(1992). The Tenth Circuit awards monetary damages, including accounting of profits, based on a
split approach of the federal circuits. Therefore, this paper will focus solely on monetary damages.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
45. See Christopher P. Bussert, Monetary Recovery in Intellectual Property Cases, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1998, at 357, 361-89 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 537, 1991).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
47. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 362. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d
513, 525 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff may recover for actual consumer confusion caused
by the trademark infringement).
48. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 362.
49. See id. at 363. See also St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, 893 (11 th Cir.
1983) ("[P]rofits from lost sales ... are sales made by defendants to purchasers who sought to buy
plaintiffs' products and instead received defendants'."); Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 525-26 (examining
the evidentiary characteristics and methods involved in proving lost or diverted sales).
50. Bussert, supra note 45, at 367.
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result of the defendant's infringement.5' For example, in false advertising52 5
cases, plaintiffs may recover for corrective advertising expenses.53 In
franchise cases, plaintiffs can recover interest on lost franchise fees and
money required to entice new licensees. 4
To recover "defendant's profits," the plaintiff must typically prove
that the defendant willfully infringed5 on plaintiff's trademark 6 To cal-
culate defendant's profits, plaintiffs have the simplified burden of estab-
lishing only defendant's gross sales. 7 Courts may give the plaintiff "[tihe
benefit of the doubt. . . where records are inadequate or unavailable to
prove defendant's profits."58 After the plaintiff has proved defendant's
gross profits, the burden shifts to the defendant. 9 The defendant has the
burden of proving expenses, which the court will subtract from defen-
dant's gross revenues in order to calculate the defendant's profit from the
infringement. 6° However, courts do not allow deductions for losses on
infringing sales, federal income taxes on infringement sales, or attorney's
fees for litigation resulting from infringement.
6'
Courts have discretion to make equitable adjustments to plaintiffs
monetary award by either adding or subtracting an amount to or from
damages based on the circumstances of the case.62 The Lanham Act al-
lows the court to adjust the award of profits if the court deems that the
award is excessive or inadequate.6 ' For example, for defendant's willful
51. Bussert, supra note 45, at 368.
52. False advertising cases arise from false representations or descriptions "made in the
advertising context, especially in regard to assurances made about the quality of goods or services."
See Thill, supra note 2, at 363-64.
53. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 368-69. See also Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374-76 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that when the plaintiff has yet to
expend resources on corrective advertising, courts may calculate the amount recoverable by
analyzing the amount spent by the defendant on infringing advertisements).
54. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
55. See discussion of willful infringement infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
56. However, a split has developed among the circuits and some circuits have abandoned the
defendant's bad faith requirement. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
57. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 373.
58. Id. See also Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484,
1488 (1 1th Cir. 1987) ("Although the exact amount of infringing sales cannot be determined from
the [evidence], exactness is not required. [The defendant] is in the best position to ascertain exact
sales and profits, and it bears the burden of doing so in an accounting.").
59. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 374. See also Wesco, 833 F.2d at 1488.
60. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 374-75. See also Wesco, 833 F.2d at 1488. The deduction
of costs must be a specific cost or expense related to the sale of infringing goods or services. See
Bussert, supra note 45, at 375. If defendant fails to prove deductible costs, courts have awarded
defendant's entire gross income to plaintiff. See Id.
61. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 376-78.
62. See Id. at 380.
63. See 15U.S.C.§ 1117(a) (1994).
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infringement, courts have doubled or tripled the damage award and an
accounting of profits.64
The Lanham Act further provides that the "court shall, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for three times
such profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with a reasonable
attorney's fee" in a trademark infringement case.65 Specifically, "[t]he
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party. 66 Punitive damages and prejudgment interest are not
available under the Act. 67 However, because an award of prejudgment
interest is within the discretion of the court, the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits have awarded interest in exceptional cases.'
Two monetary remedies, an accounting of profits and attorney's
fees, have specific recovery requirements. However, the federal circuits
split on the appropriate recovery requirement for an accounting of prof-
its.
4. An Accounting of Profits
Traditionally, courts award an accounting of profits "as a way of
compensating the plaintiff for sales lost to the infringer." 69 Although de-
fendant's profits "are a rough measure of the plaintiff's damages ...
[tihey are probably the best possible measure of damages available."7"
The courts have adopted three rationales justifying the award of an ac-
counting of profits: "(1) as a measure of plaintiff's damages; (2) if the
infringer is unjustly enriched; or (3) if necessary to deter a willful in-
fringer from doing so again."7 An accounting of profits has "historic
roots in equity jurisprudence" and is within the equitable discretion of
the courts. 72 Therefore, a court may refuse to award defendant's profits if
it believes that an injunction is a sufficient remedy .
64. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 380. See, e.g., International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n
v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the court "has
discretion to fashion an alternative remedy, or award only a partial accounting, if the aims of equity
would be better served.")
65. 15U.S.C.§ 1117(b)(1994&Supp. IV 1998).
66. Id. § 1117(a). See attorney's fees discussion infra Part 11.5.
67. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 388-89. See also Brown, supra note 43, at 76.
68. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 389. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp.,
1995 WL 431019, at *1153-54 (6th Cir. July 20, 1995); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-
USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989).
69. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
30:59, at 30-98 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].
70. Id. at 30-99 (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Crafttex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir.
1987)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30-100.
73. Id.
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In 1916, the Supreme Court in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bros. & Co. 7 4 first acknowledged that an accounting of profits was an
acceptable award for a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit.75 In
1947, in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,76 the Supreme Court lim-
ited the Hamilton-Brown decision. The Champion Court held that an
accounting of profits is not automatic; the infringer must be guilty of
"fraud or palming-off."77 Therefore, counsel may cite the Champion de-
cision for the proposition that egregious conduct or intent must be pres-
ent for a court to award an accounting of profits.
Federal judicial circuits disagree on whether an award of a defen-
dant's profits to the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case requires a
finding of bad faith or willfulness by the defendant.7' Differing views of
whether an accounting of profits remedies unjust enrichment or penalizes
bad actions might explain the split among the circuits.79 Some circuits,
including the Tenth Circuit, have held that an award for profits remedies
the defendant's unjust enrichment from willful infringement.0 The Tenth
Circuit adopted the theory of unjust enrichment as the Circuit's recog-
nized rationale for awarding profits to a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate
actual damages as a result of trademark infringement.8 Other circuits,
including the Second Circuit, have awarded defendant's profits where
there was willful infringement but no unjust enrichment.82 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit has awarded an accounting of profits based on "either a
deterrence or unjust enrichment theory" despite the defendant's allegedly
innocent infringement.83
5. Attorney's Fees in Exceptional Cases
In 1975, Congress amended the Lanham Act to include a provision
that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party." 84 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary
74. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
75. Hamilton-Brown, 240 U.S. at 259 (holding that a plaintiff suffering trademark
infringement "is entitled to the profits acquired by defendant from the manifestly infringing sales...
76. 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
77. Champion, 331 U.S. at 131; see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, §
30:61, at 30-100.2.
78. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370-7 1. See discussion infra Part I.C.
79. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 371.
80. See Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954) "[A] trade-
mark infringer is liable as a trustee for profits accruing from his illegal acts . . . . Recovery is
predicated upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, not the legal theory of provable
damages." Id.
81. See Blue Bell, 213 F.2d at 363.
82. See Springs Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1983).
83. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co. Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989).




defined "exceptional cases" as including those in which the "infringe-
ment can be characterized as 'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' or
'willful."'' 5 The use of the word "court" in the aforementioned amend-
ment to the Lanham Act has been held to mean "judge," and that the
jury's role is merely advisorial. 8
After the 1975 amendment, courts have consistently awarded attor-
ney's fees in cases of intentional, deliberate, or willful infringement.
However, because the courts have great discretion in an award of attor-
ney's fees, they "have not elaborated the criteria for an 'exceptional' case
with precision., 8 The Tenth Circuit reversed an award for attorney's fees
when the plaintiff failed to prove defendant's intent to confuse the public
or to willfully infringe on plaintiff's mark.89 Accordingly, the Tenth Cir-
cuit uses "the phrase 'bad faith' to characterize the kind of misconduct
that justifies an award of fees." 9
Courts have held that a defendant's reliance on the advice of coun-
sel may affect the award of attorney's fees. 9' If a party reasonably relies
on advice of counsel, a case might no longer fall within the "exceptional
case" provision for attorney's fees.92 However, the defendant must offer
proof of counsel's advice and evidence of defendant's reasonable reli-
ance on this advice to "defuse" otherwise willful and deliberate
conduct.93 Finally, an award of attorney's fees does not depend on the
availability of other remedies under the Lanham Act and "should not
make a case per se 'unexceptional.' 94 However, the Tenth Circuit con-
85. S. REP. No. 93-1400, at 2 (1974).
86. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:99, at 30-167.
87. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-168 to 30-169. See
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Kooltone, Inc. 649 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a jury
finding of "deliberate and willful" infringement was sufficient for an award of attorney's fees);
Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l., 951 F.2d 684, 696 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
trial court judge has discretion to determine whether a case is "exceptional"); Committee for Idaho's
High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that attorney's fees were
appropriate because the district court found that the appellants "knowingly, intentionally, and
deliberately" infringed).
88 Bussert, supra note 45, at 384.
89. See VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982).
90. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-170. See TakeCare Corp. v.
Takecare of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that the case law that has
developed around an "award of attorney's fees [includes] the implicit recognition that some degree
of bad faith fuels the infringement at issue."); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d
526, 556 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that an award of attorney's fees required a "high degree of
culpability" such as "bad faith or fraud").
91. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 385.
92. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, § 30:100, at 30-171.
93. See TakeCare, 889 F.2d at 957-58 (affirming an award for attorney's fees because
defendant failed to present the advice provided by its counsel or reasonable reliance thereon).
94. Bussert, supra note 45, at 386.
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siders the lack of damages as a factor weighing against the award of at-
torney's fees. 95
B. Tenth Circuit
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit in Bishop v. Equinox
Int'l Corp.,96 examined issues surrounding awards of accounting fees and
of an accounting of profits for trademark infringement. Specifically, the
Bishop court evaluated the Tenth Circuit's adherence to the bad faith
requirement for an award of an accounting of profits.97 The court also
evaluated whether the trademark infringement at issue constituted an
exceptional case for an award of attorney's fees.9
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a trademark infringement case brought
by James S. Bishop ("Bishop") against Equinox International Corpora-
tion ("Equinox").99 Bishop was selling a mineral electrolyte solution
under the name "Essence of Life," which is a registered trademark with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.'"0 Equinox was market-
ing a dietary supplement, "Equinox Master Formula Essence of Life
Liquid Mineral Complex."'0 ' In 1995, Bishop discovered Equinox's
product and informed Equinox that it was infringing on his registered
trademark.' 2 Bishop requested that Equinox discontinue its use of the
mark. ' 3 Subsequently, Equinox's counsel replied in writing that Equinox
would replace the phrase "Essence of Life" on its product. 0
Equinox continued to use the mark and Bishop consequently filed
suit for an injunction, an accounting of profits, and attorney fees.'05 The
district court granted a permanent injunction for the trademark infringe-
ment, but denied monetary awards based on a lack of actual damages.
' 6
However, the district court did award attorney's fees based on Equinox's
disregard of its assurances to Bishop that it would change the name of its
product.0 7
95. See VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982).
96. 154 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998).
97. Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223-24.
98. See id. at 1224.








107. See id. As a threshold matter, Equinox claimed Bishop had not used his mark for three
consecutive years and, therefore, had abandoned his mark. See id. The district court held that




a. An Accounting of Profits
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that, because
he failed to prove actual damages, Bishop was not entitled to defendant's
profits. '08 The court acknowledged that equitable considerations deter-
mine an award of an accounting of profits and that the unavailability of
actual damages does not preclude such an award. '°9 The court embraced
unjust enrichment as the Tenth Circuit's rationale for awarding defen-
dant's profits." ° Consequently, the court recognized that actual damage
is a factor to consider but is not essential in awarding defendant's
profits."' Additionally, the court held that "a showing that defendant's
actions were willful or in bad faith" is essential for an award of an ac-
counting of profits."2 The court reasoned that the bad faith requirement is
reasonable because an accounting of profits might create a windfall
judgment by overcompensating the plaintiff.' '3 The court remanded the
issue because the court could not determine with certainty whether ap-




In Bishop,.the Tenth Circuit held that, under the Lanham Act, the
prevailing party may recover attorney's fees in "exceptional cases.""' 5
The court noted the Senate Committee's definition of an exceptional case
as "'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' or 'willful' " infringement. "6
Finally, the court noted that absence of actual damages does not preclude
See id. at 1221-22. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling that Bishop had
not abandoned his mark. See id.
108. See id. at 1221.
109. See id. at 1222.
110. See id. at 1223. The court recognized the two rationales for awarding an accounting of
defendant's profits- "preventing unjust enrichment and deterring willful infringement"-but
confirmed unjust enrichment as the Tenth Circuit's approach. Id. (citing Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier




114. See id. at 1223-24. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the district court's finding that
Equinox's disregard of its attorney's assurance that it would refrain from infringing on Bishop's
trademark constituted a deliberate or willful infringement. See id. at 1223. Additionally, the court
noted that Bishop's economic weakness might have motivated Equinox's action. See id. at 1224.
However, the court determined that the district court should reconsider these issues using the correct
legal standard. See id.
115. Id. at 1224 (using the abuse of discretion standard of review).
116. Id. (quoting VIP Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982)).
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an award of attorney's fees, but is a factor in determining whether a case
is exceptional.' 
7
Failing to find a clear error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's award of attorney's fees."8 The court found that Equinox deliber-
ately and willfully infringed because it continued to use the "Essence of
Life" mark after its written commitment to cease and desist from using
the mark."9 The court did not question the district court's incredulity
toward Equinox's assertion that it had reasonably believed that Bishop
had abandoned its mark.'2 Instead, the court agreed that Equinox's con-
tinued use of the mark was rooted in its belief that Bishop's relative eco-
nomic weakness would prevent him from further asserting his rights in
the mark' 2' The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court's discretion
to fashion an equitable remedy and affirmed the award of attorney's
fees. 22
C. Other Circuits
As evidenced above, the Tenth Circuit requires a finding of bad faith
and willful infringement for an award of defendant's profits and attor-
ney's fees for trademark infringement. However, not all federal circuits
follow the Tenth Circuit's requirements to award defendant's profits.
Federal judicial circuits split on whether an award of an accounting of
profits to the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case requires a finding
of bad faith or willfulness by the defendant.'23 The D.C., Second, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits require the defendant to have willfully infringed on
the plaintiff's trademark in bad faith for an award of defendant's
profits.' 24 In contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have abandoned
the bad faith requirement for awarding an accounting of profits.'2 The




120. See id. If Bishop had abandoned, or ceased to use, his mark, Equinox could have asserted
abandonment as a viable defense to trademark infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(2) (1994).
121. See Bishop, at 1224.
122. See id.
123. See Bussert, supra note 45, at 370.
124. See International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc., 80 F.3d
749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc. 821 F.2d 800, 807-08
(D.C. Cit. 1987); Nalpac Ltd. v. Coming Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cit. 1986); Blue Bell
Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954).
125. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
Lanham Act provides for an awarding of profits, which is in the discretion and equitable
consideration of the court); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Tlhe
principles of equity referred to in section 1117(a) do not in our view justify withholding all monetary
relief from the victim of a trademark infringement merely because the infringement was innocent.");
Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("Nor is an award of profits based
on either unjust enrichment or deterrence dependent upon a higher showing of culpability on the part
of the defendant, who is purposely using the trademark.").
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be inappropriate in some circumstances. 26 Finally, the Fifth Circuit em-
ploys a compromise approach, evaluating a finding of bad faith or will-
fulness as a factor rather than a requrement.27
For an award of attorney's fees, the Tenth Circuit followed the
common interpretation of the Lanham Act's "exceptional cases" re-
quirement, which allows reasonable attorney's fees when infringement
was "malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.', 28 Although the court
did not articulate precise criteria for "exceptional cases," it seemed to
agree that a showing of bad faith warranted the award of attorney fees.
129
This view affirms past Tenth Circuit decisions and is supported by the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits.'30
D. Analysis
By enforcing the bad faith requirement, the Bishop court consistently
follows previous Tenth Circuit decisions, the majority of federal circuits,
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and the Supreme Court's
guidance.' 3 ' Resolutely adopting the bad faith requirement, the Bishop
court stated that "[riequiring a showing of willfulness before profits are
awarded is an appropriate limitation in light of the equitable considera-
tions underlying the monetary recovery provisions of the Lanham Act."
132
126. See Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1995) ("An instruction that
willful infringement is a prerequisite to an award of defendant's profits may be an error in some
circumstances (as when plaintiff seeks the defendant's profits as a measure of his own damage.)").
127. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998).
128. Bussert, supra note 45, at 383. See also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 69, §
30:99, at 30-166.
129. See Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
district court's finding that Equinox's infringement was "deliberate or willful" because Equinox
continued using the "Essence of Life" mark based on Bishop's economic weakness).
130. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 556 (5th Cir. 1998); Aromatique,
Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 877 (8th Cir. 1994); TakeCare Corp. v. Takecare of Oklahoma,
Inc., 889 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1989).
131. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (refusing to award an
accounting of profits because plaintiff failed to show fraud or palming off); Hamilton-Brown Shoe
Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259-62 (1916) (Although the Supreme Court has not offered
clear-cut authority on the issue, the Court has treated bad faith at least as a factor in awarding
defendant's profits); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954)
("[A] trade-mark infringer is liable as a trustee for profits accruing from his illegal acts ...
Recovery is predicated upon the equitable principle of unjust enrichment, not the legal theory of
provable damages."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37(l)(a) (1995) (An award
of profits is contingent on demonstrating that "the actor engaged in the conduct with the intention of
causing confusion or deception."); Eugene W. Luciani, Does the Bad Faith Requirement in
Accounting of Profits Damages Make Economic Sense?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 69, 69 (1998) ("[A]
majority of the circuits require a finding of bad faith before awarding an accounting of profits.").
132. See Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223 ("[Wle are mindful that an award of profits requires a
showing that defendant's actions were willful or in bad faith.").
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Some scholars criticize the Tenth Circuit's adherence to the bad faith
requirement.' 3  The critics argue that the bad faith requirement will cause
over-deterrence "in the realm of product configuration and descriptive
work marks."' For example, a company that adopts a mark with a "bor-
derline descriptive word" might deter other companies within the market
from using the same word to describe their products, even though that
word "is essential to the marketing of the good.' 35 Consequently, critics
claim that this over-deterrence would effectively grant the trademark
owner a "back door" patent on certain product configurations.1
3 6
One possible response to such concerns is to adopt the analysis ap-
plied by the Fifth Circuit in trademark infringement cases, which evalu-
ates a finding of bad faith or willfulness as a factor rather than as a re-
quired element. The Fifth Circuit balances the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2)
whether sales have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies,
(4) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5)
the public interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6)
whether it is a case of palming off."'
Because the Fifth Circuit's balancing approach retains the infringer's
willfulness as a factor in its analysis, the Circuit's approach is an inter-
mediary step to fully dispensing with the bad faith requirement.
38
In any event, the critics' concerns regarding over-deterrence would
not affect the Bishop decision. Bishop's "Essence of Life" trademark
would probably be characterized as suggestive or arbitrary and fanciful,
not as descriptive.' 39 Therefore, this particular mark would not overly
deter other companies in the electrolyte solution market from marketing
a certain product configuration. Because the danger of over-deterrence
only occurs when a "borderline descriptive mark" is at issue,' 4° the
Bishop Court's adherence to the bad faith requirement does not grant
unwarranted patent protection. Additionally, the bad faith requirement
133. See Luciani, supra note 131, at 93.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. A "back-door" patent refers to protection equivalent to a registered patent but that is
not obtained through a patent filed with the Patent and Trademark Office.
137. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998). "Palm off' is
defined as "the conduct of selling goods as the goods of another or doing business as the business of
another such that the public is misled by the conduct and believes it is purchasing the goods or doing
business with someone other than the actual seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (6th ed.
1990).
138. See Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 554-55.
139. See discussion supra Part I.B.
140. Luciani, supra note 131, at 93.
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provides a threshold for recovery that protects against a windfall judg-
ment that might overcompensate an undeserving plaintiff.
4'
Because the Senate Committee defined an "exceptional case" as
"'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliberate,' and 'willful"' infringement, an
award of attorney's fees is interconnected with the bad faith requirement
of an accounting of profits. 2 By performing one test, whether the in-
fringer acted willfully and in bad faith, the court can determine whether
to award two types of damages: an accounting of profits and attorney's
fees.'43 Consequently, adhering to the willfulness requirement encourages
court consistency and efficiency.
II. THE FEDERAL PATENT SCHEME AND STATE LAW
To protect corporate clients' intellectual property rights further,
counsel must also attend to federal patent laws that provide exclusive
control over an inventor's scientific creativity. These federal patent
rights may conflict with state licensing rights because of broad federal
preemption of state law. However, counsel may use carefully carved out
exemptions to the preemption doctrine to draft competent licensing con-
tracts.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." ' 4 Utilizing this grant of authority, federal
patent laws protect copyrighted works and patented discoveries from
unauthorized copying for a limited period. During this period, "to en-
courage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation,
Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form of
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.' 45 The
public retains a general right to "copy" unpatented subject matter, as well
as previously protected subject matter after the patent expires. 46 The fed-
eral patent scheme protects "free access to copy whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."'
147
Congress intended the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion to provide a federal system of protection. 48 In 1964, the Supreme
Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 149 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
141. See Bishop, 154 F.3d at 1223.
142. Id. at 1224.
143. See id. at 1223-1224.
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
145. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
146. See Todd Wong, Patent Law: The Patchwork Approach of the Supreme Court and its
Interplay with State Law, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581, 590 (1991).
147. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
148. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555-56.
149. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Brite Lighting, Inc.5° established that federal patent law preempts state
laws that regulate unpatented subject matter."' A state law, "whether
common law or statute, will be preempted where it frustrates the under-
lying congressional objectives of. . . the Patent Act . . .. ""' However,
since 1964, the Supreme Court has carved out significant exceptions to
the broad federal preemption doctrine, creating a "patchwork approach"
to federal patent law and its interaction with state law.' 3 Federal courts
have wrestled with this approach in their individual attempts to deter-
mine the viability and reach of state's intellectual property laws. The




In its Sears and Compco decisions, the Supreme Court recognized
three policy objectives for enforcing federal patent laws: "promoting
invention, preserving free competition, and having national uniformity in
patent and copyright laws."' 5 The Supreme Court has explained that "the
question of whether federal law pre-empts state law 'involves a consid-
eration of whether that [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' 56 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.57 and Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co.,'"5 the Court carved out significant exceptions to the
federal patent preemption doctrine. 59 In these cases, the Court permitted
state regulation because the respective laws did not interfere with patent
policy objectives.'6
The Kewanee Oil Court evaluated whether Ohio's trade secret laws
stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of congres-
sional policy objectives.16 The state law in controversy granted protec-
150. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
151. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-33 (holding that an Illinois state law could not prohibit the copying
of an unpatented floor lamp design nor could the law award damages for copying of the lamp);
Compco, 376 U.S. at 239 (holding that Illinois law regulating unpatented subject matter was limited
solely to measures that would prevent consumer confusion).
152. Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 192 (1998).
153. Wong, supra note 146, at 581-82.
154. 174 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 1999).
155. David J. Gutowski, Note, Preemption, Exclusive Jurisdiction, and the Patent Laws, 17
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 137, 145 (1999).
156. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
157. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
158. Aronson, 440 U.S. 257.
159. See Gutowski, supra note 155, at 145-146.
160. See Id.
161. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479.
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tion to an unpatentable manufacturing process. 12 Nevertheless, the Court
held that state trade secret laws do not hinder the incentive to invent,
inhibit full disclosure of inventions, or remove subject matter from the
public domain.163 Finding that state trade secret law does not compromise
congressional policy objectives, the Court held that federal patent law
does not preempt state trade secret laws."
In Aronson, the Supreme Court further limited the Sears-Compco
doctrine with respect to state contract law. In cases of patent infringe-
ment, "the patent owner is entitled to recover the profits he would have
earned on the patented product but for the infringement."'' 65 As a mini-
mum, the patentee is entitled to the calculation of a reasonable royalty' 6
"for the unlawful manufacture, use or sale of the patented product by the
infringer."'
'67
The Aronson Court evaluated whether federal patent law preempted
"a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles em-
bodying [patentable subject matter] ....,, Although the contract related
to intellectual property, the Court reasoned that commercial agreements,
which were traditionally "the domain of state law," could not be dis-
placed merely because of their intellectual property nature.'69 Thus, roy-
alty agreements that do not interfere with federal patent objectives are
enforceable. 70 Although the Supreme Court had previously held that
162. See id. at 473-74. Kewanee Oil was a "manufacturer of a type of synthetic crystal which
is useful in the detection of ionizing radiation." Id. at 473. Because the processes by which it had
manufactured this crystal had been in commercial use for over a year, they were not eligible for
patent protection. See id. at 474.
163. See id. at 490-491.
Even were an inventor to keep his discovery completely to himself, something that
neither the patent nor trade secret laws forbid, there is a high probability that it will be
soon independently developed. If the invention, though still a trade secret, is put into
public use, the competition is alerted to the existence of the inventor's solution to the
problem and may be encouraged to make an extra effort to independently find the
solution thus known to be possible .... We conclude that the extension of trade secret
protection to clehrly patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent policy of
disclosure.
Id.
164. See id. at 493.
165. Peter B. Frank, et al., Economic Damages in Patent Infringement Cases, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1991, at 285, 290 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 321, 1991).
166. See Nancy J. Linck & Barry P. Golob, Patent Damages: The Basics, 34 IDEA 13, 21-27
(1993). Royalties constitute compensatory damages for patent infringement. See id. at 14. A royalty
award correlates to the sales that the infringer generated from the patented product. See id. at 25-26.
Typically, courts determine royalty awards by "multiplying the infringer's total sales of infringing
product by the reasonable royalty rate." Id. at 21.
167. Frank, supra note 165, at 290.
168. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979).
169. Id. at 262.
170. See id. at 262-63. The Court reasoned that the contract was enforceable because
Congressional patent law objectives were not frustrated: (1) "enforceable agreements licensing the
use of [inventor's] inventions in return for royalties provides an additional incentive to invention";
2000]
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enforcing contractual obligations to pay royalties in return for the use of
a patented device may not extend beyond the life of the patent,7 the Ar-
onson Court enforced a contract to pay reduced royalties to a patent ap-
plicant even though the patent grant was pending. 72 The Court reasoned
that enforcing the "contract would not 'withdraw any idea from the pub-
lic domain' because the contract induced the creator to disclose her idea
in the first place."'
73
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 71 the Supreme
Court returned to the Sears-Compco doctrine to clarify the "Court's
patchwork approach to state regulation of intellectual properties."'' 75 The
Court reaffirmed the Sears-Compco preemption doctrine stating that
"state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it
clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws.' 76 The
Court struck down a state statute on unfair competition that effectively
granted patent protection to an unpatentable manufacturing process."'
However, the court distinguished Bonito Boats from Kewanee finding
that the state statute at issue hindered the policy goals of the federal pat-
ent scheme.' 78 Consequently, the Bonito Boats Court said that the Court
would strike down statutes that "restrict the public's ability to exploit
ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use.",179
B. Tenth Circuit
On April 8, 1999, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a breach of contract
case involving a patent royalties licensing agreement in Naimie v. Cyto-
zyme Labs., Inc.'"o The court examined the issue of whether state contract
law or federal patent law governs the parties' rights to license chemical
formulations in exchange for royalties. In this context the court evaluated
(2) the manufacture of the inventions provides disclosure of the inventions; and (3) the manufacture
and sale of the inventions assures the design remains in the public domain for the free use of the
public. Id.
171. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
172. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 267.
173. Wong, supra note 146, at 586 (quoting Aronson, 440 U.S. at 263).
174. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
175. Wong, supra note 146, at 582 (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152).
176. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
177. See id. at 168. The Florida statute prohibited the use of a "direct molding process to
duplicate unpatented boat hulls." Id. at 144. The plaintiff did not file a patent application to protect
utilitarian or design aspects of the boat hulls. See id.
178. See Gutowski, supra note 155, at 146. The Court reasoned that "[t]he Florida statute is
aimed directly at the promotion of intellectual creation by substantially restricting the public's ability
to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use .... The Florida law
substantially restricts the public's ability to exploit an unpatented design in general circulation."
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
179. Gutowski, supra note 155, at 146. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
180. 174 F.3d 1104, 1108(10th Cir. 1999).
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whether the licensing agreement, formed under state law, undermined the
purposes and objectives of the federal patent scheme.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit reviewed an appeal by Cytozyme Laboratories,
Inc., ("Cytozyme") from a judgement awarding Dr. Naimie ("Naimie")
damages for breach of contract.'8 ' Cytozyme, a manufacturer of nutri-
tional plant and animal growth enhancement products, invited Naimie, a
chemical engineer, to develop new formulations for its products.8 2 In
January 1981, Cytozyme offered to pay Naimie "royalties in exchange
for the transfer of 'a new technology base' to be developed by Dr.
Naimie."'8 3 Naimie accepted and on September 28, 1981, Cytozyme
confirmed the agreement to pay royalties to Naimie on Cytozyme's com-
pleted products that used Naimie's formulations.' 84 Naimie continued
developing formulations and began receiving royalty payments in No-
vember 1981.185
The parties formed a second agreement on May 28, 1985 hiring
Naimie as a full-time consultant at $60,000 salary for seven years, plus
travel expenses and royalties on his formulations. 1 6 In October 1990,
Cytozyme terminated Naimie and stopped making royalty payments.'
87
On May 6, 1991, Naimie sent a letter to Cytozyme, terminating its li-
cense to use his formulations.188 Cytozyme continued using Naimie's
formulations and Naimie filed suit for breach of contract and declaratory
judgement.' 9
The district court held that a verbal licensing agreement existed
between the parties giving "Cytozyme the exclusive right to use
[Naimie's] formulations in exchange for royalties on products using
those formulations."''90 Additionally, the court found that a written con-
sulting agreement existed between the parties, employing Naimie as a
full-time consultant at Cytozyme.' 9' Both the licensing agreement and the
written agreement were "in full force and effect" at the time of Naimie's
termination. '9' Therefore, the district court awarded Naimie unpaid fees
for consulting services and unpaid royalties for the period between June
181. See Naimie, 174 F.3d at 1107.
182. See id. at 1107.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1107-08.
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1990 and August 1996.193 Cytozyme appealed, arguing that "the district
court's findings regarding ownership [of contract rights] create state pat-
ent rights-a result the Supreme Court prohibited in Bonito Boats...
,,194
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of royalties, holding that state
contract law, not federal patent law, governed the parties' rights.' 95 The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "states retain the power to 'adopt rules
for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions'
so long as those rules do not impermissibly interfere with the federal
patent scheme." '96 Applying the reasoning of Aronson, the Naimie court
concluded that the parties' state licensing agreement did not undermine
the federal patent scheme. 97 First, the court agreed that enforcing licens-
ing agreements fosters and rewards invention by providing an additional
incentive to create.' 98 Second, the court reasoned that enforcing licensing
agreements promotes disclosure of inventions because it "encourages the
exploitation of an invention that might otherwise remain undeveloped
and therefore inaccessible to the public." '99 Nor does such an agreement
impede the public from discovering "the formulations through reverse
engineering or independent creation."'z Finally, the court reasoned that
enforcing the licensing agreement would not remove ideas from the pub-
lic domain because the formulations were not in the public domain be-
fore the parties formed the agreement.0 ' Therefore, the Naimie Court
held that enforcing the licensing agreement would not conflict with the
federal patent scheme and, therefore, awarded Naimie unpaid royalties.2 2
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's resolution of the conflict between state contract
law and federal patent law is consistent with the Supreme Court and
other federal circuit decisions. The Ninth Circuit has held that federal
copyright and patent laws do not preempt protection of certain property
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1109 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168
(1989)). Cytozyme also challenged the district court's findings that the second written agreement
was not an integrated contract, that insufficient evidence existed to find a verbal licensing
agreement, and that Naimie rescinded any license agreement he might have had. See id. at 1108.
195. See id. at 1110.
196. Id. at 1109 (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165). See also Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[T]he states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual
property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.").








interests under California law. 23 Because the particular property right
encouraged innovation, was available to the public for reproduction, and
was not "patent-like," the Ninth Circuit found that there was no conflict
of law. 20m The Federal Circuit has held that federal patent law does not
preempt state tort law involving intentional interference with actual and
prospective contractual relations. 25 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
"the state law cause of action ... does not present an 'obstacle' to the
execution and accomplishment of the patent laws.",2' Exposing the limits
of state law protection-when confronted with enforcing state contract
law that would extend protection beyond the life of a patent-the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits have held that the federal patent scheme preempts
state law.2 7 Nevertheless, because sufficient ambiguity exists in this area,
Congress should adopt a uniform national standard.
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision follows the Supreme Court's carefully
carved out Aronson exception to the federal patent scheme for state con-
tract law. However, a question arises as states dutifully follow this law:
"[T]o what extent should the states be permitted to intervene in what is
predominantly a federal sphere? ' 208 Arguably, Congress designed patent
law to be strictly reserved to federal regulation in order to achieve a uni-
form national standard.' However, the Supreme Court made the federal
patent scheme vulnerable to inconsistency when it began to carve out
exceptions to this federal power.2' In the1989 Bonito Boats decision,
203. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 903-05
(9th Cir. 1992).
204. See Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 905. The court held that the plaintiff had a property right in
his Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), which was required by anyone who wished to make a
major alteration to an airplane. See id. at 899, 905. The court further held that the property right did
not conflict with federal patent law. See id. at 905. The court reasoned that (1) the STC itself
disclosed the plaintiffs research that would stimulate further innovation in the field of aeronautics,
and (2) the right was not "patent like" because the plaintiff did not claim an "exclusive right to
modify DC-8s as described in his STC." Id.
205. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
206. Dow Chemical, 139 F.3d at 1475. The court indicated that the state's tort law would not
affect "the incentive to invent, the full disclosure of ideas, or the principle that ideas in the public
domain remain in the public domain." Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that the law's purpose
was to protect the integrity of commercial contracts, which, as the Aronson Court noted, were in the
domain of the states. See id. (citing Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262).
207. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
licensing agreement was unlawful because it extended the defendant's monopoly power beyond the
patent period); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
licensing agreement was unenforceable because the terms "constituted an effort to extend payments
for patent rights beyond the patent period."). Both the Seventh Circuit and Eleventh Circuit
decisions comply with the Supreme Court's approach to the same issue in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379
U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964). See discussion supra, Part I.
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coming a decade after the Aronson decision, "the Supreme Court ...
attempted to resolve conflicting decisions ... regarding federal preemp-
tion of state laws regulating unpatented subject matter.2 ' The Court
clearly stated that "the States may not offer patent-like protection to in-
tellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a mat-
ter of federal law., 212 Therefore, patent law should fall exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Following the various contracts
laws of fifty states fosters a piecemeal encroachment on federal law that
will "compromise the uniformity inherent in one national standard and
make notice to potential infringers more difficult., 213 Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's push for change in 1989, the solution to this growing
problem lies in encouraging a uniform body of law through Congress and
the federal judiciary and in preserving the federal patent law scheme.
2 4
CONCLUSION
In the age of fast-paced technological breakthroughs, legal counsel
advising corporate clients must be attentive to current intellectual prop-
erty laws and the federal circuits' application of those laws. For trade-
mark law, counsel should refer to the Lanham Act to determine the ex-
tent of protection available for business marks, the test used to determine
trademark infringement, and the damages available for infringement. In
the Tenth Circuit, counsel should note the limitations on the recovery of
monetary damages for infringement, including those imposed upon an
accounting of profits and attorney's fees. Although the federal circuits
split on the requirements necessary for recovery, the Tenth Circuit re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted willfully or in bad
faith when the defendant infringed on the plaintiff's mark. If the plaintiff
proves the defendant's willful infringement by a preponderance of the
evidence, the Tenth Circuit, pursuant to its equitable discretion may
award defendant's gross profits and attorney's fees. While critics ques-
tion the bad faith requirement, counsel should note that the Tenth Circuit
remains concerned about the defendant's unjust enrichment and believes
the willfulness requirement will act as a deterrent.
Secondly, legal counsel should be attentive to patent protection
granted by the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Gener-
ally, this federal patent protection preempts state laws that obstruct the
federal patent scheme to protect and encourage intellectual creativity and
invention. However, the Supreme Court has carved out significant state
law exceptions to the broad doctrine of federal preemption, creating a
patchwork approach to patent protection. Counsel advising corporate
clients should note that the Tenth Circuit has exempted from the federal
211. Wong, supra note 146, at 581.
212. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
213. See Wong, supra note 146, at 594.
214. See id. at 596.
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patent scheme those state licensing agreements that do not extend the
scope or time limits of federal patent protection. Therefore, when draft-
ing licensing agreements regarding patent rights, counsel should consider
the interplay between state contract law and federal patent law.
Kara L. Rossetti

PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
INTRODUCTION
Developing technology and increased access to information have
had a tremendous impact on daily life, making transactions and activities
quicker, cheaper, and less complicated than before. Instead of going to a
bank and getting cash to make purchases, a simple swipe of a card auto-
matically deducts the amount from your account. Cashiers scan bar codes
into computers that automatically tally the price of an order, and con-
sumers using grocery store "savings cards" automatically receive dis-
counts on specially advertised items.
However, these conveniences and savings come with a hidden price
tag. Computers that make debit and savings cards possible also collect
personal information and provide that information to others.' Opening a
checking account, buying groceries, getting a license, paying taxes, and
using the telephone results in the collection and possible dissemination of
personal information. The sale of this information, ranging from socio-
economic and cultural background to personal preferences and biases,
2has become a major industry in the United States. These bits of infor-
mation are "key marketing tools that permit sellers to direct their adver-
tising and sales efforts toward the proper population segments and to
design future products in conformity with projected buying behaviors."3
In the midst of this highly profitable trade in personal information,
privacy issues have taken on greater significance.4 Technological devel-
opments "have led to the emergence of an 'information society' capable
of gathering, storing, and disseminating increasing amounts of data about
individual citizens."5 Determining whether to restrict access to such in-
formation and how to regulate those restrictions is a "hotly contested"
issue among both legal scholars and the public.6 Although there have
been some efforts at protecting the individual's right to informational
privacy through legislation, those efforts have been isolated and lack
uniformity.7 "Statutory and decisional privacy law alike have developed
1. See generally Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of
Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1,
43, 48, 49 (1998) (discussing how electronic networks will serve as the primary vehicle for the
collection and sale of personal information).





7. See id. at 2.
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in an erratic and haphazard fashion; no single theory of privacy, nor even
a consistent set of theories, has informed this process."8
A major obstacle to creating a uniform policy or rationale for pri-
vacy of personal information is the conflict that arises when an individ-
ual attempts to prevent the release of this information. Privacy is not a
clear-cut, black-and-white issue. Protecting individual privacy threatens
the democratic principles of an open, accessible government and nega-
tively influences the profit margins of powerful commercial interests.
These protections-which often take the form of legislation enacted by
Congress-also raise important constitutional concerns and problems of
inconsistent statutory interpretation.
This paper considers two of the Tenth Circuit's decisions regarding
the interpretation of informational privacy protection over the last year,9
and discusses various social and legal conflicts at the heart of the infor-
mational privacy debate.' ° Part One discusses the constitutional battles
that occur, both when the federal government attempts to regulate pri-
vacy in the states, and when conflict arises between maintaining public
government records and protecting personal privacy. In Reno v.
Condon," the United States Supreme Court affirmed the principles set
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. United States.12 Reno dealt
with privacy matters that implicate the United States Constitution, and
specifically, the Tenth Amendment.
3
Part Two discusses the problems courts face when interpreting pri-
vacy-protection statutes enacted by Congress, and focuses on a federal
statute enacted to protect the privacy of income-tax filings. In Rice v.
United States,'4 the Tenth Circuit joined at least one other circuit that
expanded the plain meaning of a provision of the Internal Revenue Code,
8. Id.
9. The survey period extends from September 1, 1998 through August 31, 1999.
10. The Tenth Circuit also considered informational privacy issues in U.S. West v. FCC. U.S.
West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). In that case, the court considered provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prevent telecommunications carriers from using proprietary
customer information for marketing purposes without prior customer approval. U.S. West, 182 F.2d
at 1228. U.S. West claimed that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") rules created to
implement the 1996 Act violated the First Amendment because they restricted U.S. West from
engaging in commercial speech with customers. Id. at 1230. The court conducted a four-part First
Amendment analysis and determined that the FCC "failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the
customer approval regulations restrict no more speech than necessary to serve the asserted state
interests." Id. at 1239. The court, after finding that the rules violated the First Amendment, vacated
the FCC's Order and the regulations it had adopted. Id. at 1239-40.
11. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). The court's decision was January 12, 2000. See Reno, 120 S.Ct. at
666.
12. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
13. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 670-71. The Tenth Amendment reserves to states all powers not
expressly given to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
14. 166 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
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enacted to protect the confidentiality of tax-return information.' 5 Because
of this judicially created exception to the statute, the Internal Revenue
Service may release confidential tax information from tax-evasion con-
victions to the press.
16
I. PUBLIC RECORDS OR INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN THE DRIVER'S
PRIVACY-PROTECTION ACT 7
A. Background
"There is a long and well recognized public interest in open govern-
ment" and in maintaining public access to government records so that
citizens may directly monitor the functions of government agencies.'8
Yet, in the field of motor vehicles records information, where states his-
torically maintained public records," the interest in open government
directly conflicts with an individual's desire to keep personal information
from the public. 20
This conflict came into the national spotlight in 1989, when an ob-
sessed fan stalked and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer in the actress's
home.2' The fan obtained Schaeffer's address and other personal infor-
mation from a private detective, who obtained the information from
Schaeffer's motor vehicle record.22 Schaeffer's death sparked a flurry of
anti-stalking legislation at the state level.2" By 1993, all 50 states had
enacted some sort of anti-stalking measure. In 1994, Congress enacted
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA")," compelling states to
regulate motor vehicle record disclosures according to a uniform national
policy 6
The DPPA prohibits any State Department of Motor Vehicles from
knowingly disclosing personal information obtained from a motor vehi-
cle record.27 The State may disclose personal information only in matters
15. See Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091 (citing Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir.
1989)).
16. See id. at 1092.
17. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
18. Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal Driver's Privacy
Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudence of Process-Oriented Federalism under
the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 108-09 (1998).
19. See id. at 109.
20. See id. at 76.
21. See id. at 88.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 88-89.
24. See id.
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
26. See id.; see Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 77.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994).
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of motor vehicle safety, theft, emissions, recalls and advisories, court
proceedings, research activities, or if the individual gave express
consent." The State may also release motor vehicle record information to
government agencies, to businesses that want to verify the accuracy of
information provided by a consumer, to insurers, licensed private inves-
tigation agencies, employers seeking information about commercial
driving licenses, and with written consent from the individual. 9 The
DPPA provides a criminal fine of $5,000 for each day a motor vehicle
department refuses to comply with DPPA provisions, and provides civil
remedies against anyone who knowingly violates the statute. °
By enacting the DPPA, Congress asserted authority over an area of
regulation that had traditionally been the domain of state government,
causing conflict between the states and federal government regarding the
Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the states:" Since the early
1900's, state governments "have licensed drivers and registered motor
vehicles," determining the conditions for releasing motor vehicles record
information." Congress, in enacting the DPPA, compelled "States to
regulate disclosure of information from their motor vehicle records in
accordance with a declared uniform national policy."33 A previous at-
tempt to assert federal control over licensing activities failed in 1986,
when Congress sought to enact legislation to create a national licensing
system for commercial drivers.34 Hearings on the bill recognized that
"the licensing of drivers was classified as a traditional State governmen-
tal function," and the legislature aborted the plan.35
The enactment of the DPPA resulted in nationwide litigation and a
split in the circuits over the constitutionality of the statute.36 The United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA,37 thereby
affirming the Tenth Circuit's holding that the DPPA properly regulates
the States' release of an individual's personal information. 3' The Court's
decision further refined the concept of what action results in a Tenth
28. See id. § 2721(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 2723-24 (1994).
31. See Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 99.
32. Id. at 99- 100.
33. See id. at 77.
34. See S. REP. NO. 99-411, at 12 (1986).
35. Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 167.
36. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Travis v.
Reno, 163. F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998);
Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 1999), vacated,
120 S. Ct. 929 (2000).
37. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000).
38. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272-73.
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Amendment violation and reinforced the federal government's right to
directly regulate State activities.39
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Oklahoma v. United States'
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit was one of two Circuits to correctly decide a
DPPA challenge before the Supreme Court announced its January 2000
decision in Reno.4' The Oklahoma case began on September 13, 1997,
when the State of Oklahoma challenged the DPPA in District Court, ar-
guing that the statute directly conflicted with State law and, therefore,
42
was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate state activity.
"Oklahoma law currently provides that motor vehicle records are
public record., 43 The Department of Public Safety must "retain and file
every application for a license it receives ... [and] note whether the ap-
plication is granted or denied; and if denied, the basis thereof."" Further,
Title 47 provides:
The Department of Public Safety or any motor license agent upon
request shall prepare and furnish a summary to any person of the traffic
record of any person subject to the provisions of the motor vehicle laws
of this state. Said summary shall include the enumeration of any motor
vehicle collisions, reference to convictions for violations of motor vehi-
cle laws, and any action taken against the person's privilege to operate a
motor vehicle, as shown by the files of the Department for the three (3)
years preceding the date of the request.45
Oklahoma provides a misdemeanor offense for any public official
who willfully violates the Oklahoma Open Records Act. The state legis-
lature created the act with the express purpose of ensuring "the public's
right of access to and review of government records so they may effi-
ciently and intelligently exercise their inherent political power. 46
While Colorado changed its law to reflect the DPPA's mandate,47
Oklahoma refused, even though Oklahoma's statutes directly conflicted
48with the DPPA. Instead, Oklahoma filed an Application for Preliminary
39. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
40. 161 F.3dat 1266.
41. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 666.
42. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
43. Oklahoma, 994 F.Supp. at 1360.
44. Id.
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-117(H) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
46. OKLA STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
47. The Colorado Legislature declared that its law was "mandated by the provisions of the
[DPPA] and that the state may be subject to penalties if legislation to comply with the federal act is
not enacted .... " H.B. 97-1348 § I (Colo. 1997).
48. See Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 116.
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Injunction in federal district court in September 1997, the same month
the DPPA took effect.49 Oklahoma asked the court to enjoin the United
States government from enforcing the DPPA, and challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute as violating the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments.' ° Oklahoma also argued that Congress exceeded its authority un-
der the Commerce Clause by enacting the statute.
The District Court granted Oklahoma's request and permanently
enjoined the United States from enforcing the DPPA in Oklahoma.52 The
court held that "[t]he power that Congress sought to exercise by dictating
when and how States may disclose personal information from driver's
license records is a power 'not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States . . . .,,,5' According to the
court, the DPPA, "would require Oklahoma to train DPS employees and
the employees in approximately 270 tag agencies across the State on
when and how records may be released. Additionally, the State would be
required to monitor the tag agents to ensure their compliance with the
federal standards. 54
2. Decision
In reversing the District Court and upholding the statute as constitu-
tional, the Tenth Circuit considered:
[W]hether the DPPA is a valid exercise of congressional power to
which contrary state law must yield consistent with constitutional
principals [sic] of federalism and the Tenth Amendment' s reservation
to the States of all 'powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.'
55
The Tenth Circuit based its reasoning on two United States Supreme
Court cases that set aside acts of Congress on Tenth Amendment
56grounds. First, in New York v. United States, the Court considered a
provision that forced state legislatures either to enact laws to regulate the
disposal of the state's nuclear waste, or to take title and possession of the
waste and associated liabilities.57 Failing to "choose" between the two
options resulted "in the state becoming liable for all damages waste gen-
49. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1359 (Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d
1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
50. See Oklahoma, 994 F. Supp. at 1360.
51. See id. -
52. See id. at 1364.
53. Id. at 1363 (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND X).
54. Id. at 1362.
55. Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998).
56. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
57. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-54.
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erators suffered as a result of the state's inaction."" In New York, the
Court held that the provision violated the division of authority between
state and federal governments, because the law "effectively required
states either to legislate pursuant to Congress' direction, or to implement
an administrative solution." '9 The Court emphasized that a state could
not decline to administer the program, and was forced to follow Con-
gress' mandate with either choice. 6° The Court held that Congress
couldn't commandeer "'the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'
6
1
62In the second case, Printz v. United States, the Court declared the
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act un-
constitutional because the provisions required state and local law en-
forcement officials to conduct background checks on gun purchasers.63
The Court held that Congress couldn't circumvent the prohibitions set
out in New York by stating "[t]he Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
64
In Oklahoma, the State argued that the DPPA violates the mandates
set out in New York and Printz because the DPPA directs the state to
specifically regulate the disclosure of motor vehicle information accord-
ing to a federally mandated program. The United States, in contrast,
argued that the Constitution only prohibits Congress from requiring
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program designed to
address problems created by third parties, and does not prohibit Congress
66from regulating state activity directly.
67The United States cited South Carolina v. Baker, where the Court
reasoned that requiring states to enact legislation is "'an inevitable con-
sequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands
compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no con-
stitutional defect."'
68
The Tenth Circuit determined that Oklahoma's arguments against
the DPPA were not as persuasive as those advanced in Printz or New
58. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1269 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77).
59. Id. at 1269.
60. See New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77.
61. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
62. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
63. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34.
64. Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
65. See Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998).
66. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1270.
67. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
68. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1270 (quoting South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
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York. "Unlike the federal statute in New York, the DPPA does not com-
mandeer the state legislative process by requiring states to enact legisla-
tion regulating the disclosure of personal information from motor vehicle
records. Rather, the DPPA directly regulates the disclosure of such in-
formation and preempts contrary state law., 69 Also, the Court reasoned
that, unlike the statute in New York, the DPPA allows Oklahoma an al-
ternative. "If states do not wish to comply with those regulations, they
may stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to the
public." 70
The court also distinguished the DPPA from the statute in Printz,
stating that "the DPPA does not conscript state officials to enforce fed-
eral law. ' 71 "The DPPA neither limits a state's ability to regulate in the
field of automobile licensing and registration, an exercise traditionally
left to the states, nor restricts a state's ability to use motor vehicle infor-
mation in its own regulatory activities.
7 2
The Tenth Circuit also cited Baker, which "rejected the notion that
the federal government may never force a state wishing to engage in
certain activity to take administrative or legislative actions to comply
with federal standards."73 The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
trend toward striking down federal laws that "commandeer" state legis-
lative and administrative processes, but found the logic in Baker to be
controlling. "[A]ny expansion of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence to
invalidate the DPPA is best left to the Supreme Court. At this stage...
we find nothing that requires us to invalidate the DPPA. 74
C. Supreme Court Decision: Reno v. Condon
75
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court upheld the DPPA as a consti-
tutional assertion of Congress' power to regulate the dissemination of
personal information obtained through motor vehicle records,76 thus reaf-
firming the Tenth Circuit's decision in Oklahoma v. United States."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court, first determined
that the DPPA is a valid exercise of Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state commerce under the Commerce Clause, because motor vehicle rec-
ords are "'a thin[g] in interstate commerce.' 78 "[I]nsurers, manufactur-
ers, direct marketers and others engaged in interstate commerce [use this
69. Id. at 1272 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 178).
70. Id. at 1272.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
74. Id. at 1272.
75. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
76. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
77. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
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information] to contact drivers with customized solicitations... [making
the information's] sale or release into the interstate stream of business
sufficient to support congressional regulation."'79
The Court then considered the Tenth Amendment issues raised by
Printz and New York. The Court found those cases do not apply to the
DPPA, because the federal statute in question neither required state leg-
islatures to enact a particular kind of law nor commanded state officers to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.8 0 The controlling
case, according to the Court, is South Carolina v. Baker, which forced
many States to amend state statutes to comply with the federal statute.8 '
However, the Court held that action to be "an inevitable consequence of
regulating a state activity .... That a State wishing to engage in certain
activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to
comply with federal standards ...is a commonplace that presents no
constitutional defect. 82
In Reno, the Court applied similar reasoning to the DPPA, finding
that the statute does not require a State to regulate its own citizens. 3 "The
DPPA regulates the states as the owners of databases. It does not require
the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it
does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal
statutes regulating private individuals.,
84
D. Other Circuits
The DPPA sparked challenges in the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, which split on the issue. Both the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits held the statute unconstitutional, while the Tenth and Seventh
Circuits upheld the statute as a valid exercise of Congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
1. Holding the Statute Unconstitutional: The Fourth Circuit
In Condon v. Reno, the District Court held that the DPPA violated
the Tenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the United States from
enforcing the statute against South Carolina.85 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, rejecting arguments from the United States that the DPPA statute
16
is valid under the Commerce Clause. The Court considered Printz and
79. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
80. See id. at 672.
81. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)).
82. Id. (citing South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
83. See id. at 672.
84. Id.
85. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998),
rev'd, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
86. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000).
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New York and acknowledged that the DPPA is different in several re-
spects from the statutes struck down in those cases.87 The DPPA does not
require states to enact legislation and does not require that state officials
report or arrest violators of the DPPA, but under the statute, state offi-
cials must administer the DPPA.8 8 "The Supreme Court, in both New
York and Printz, has made it perfectly clear that the Federal Government
may not require State officials to administer a federal regulatory pro-
,,89
gram.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the United States' argument that the
Supreme Court holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority90 applied in this case.9' Under Garcia, Congress may only sub-
ject state governments to generally applicable laws.9' The United States
argued that the DPPA is constitutional under Garcia because it "'subjects
the States to the same type of regulation to which a private party could be
subjected."' 93 The Fourth Circuit soundly rejected this argument because
the DPPA in fact only applies to the states. "A law is not generally appli-
cable simply because it could be generally applicable. That Congress
could subject private parties to the same type of regulation is irrelevant to
the Tenth Amendment. Congress may invade the sovereignty of the
States only when it actually enacts a law of general applicability."' 94
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the federal government's con-
tention that Congress enacted the DPPA to protect an individual's Four-
teenth Amendment right to privacy. The Court noted that personal in-
formation on drivers' licenses is accessible from a number of other
sources and is provided by individuals to strangers to cash checks and
purchase alcohol. 95 The Fourth Circuit also stated that pervasive regula-
tion, such as motor vehicle registration, leads to a limited expectation of
privacy. 96 "[N]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a
constitutional right to privacy with respect to the type of information
found in motor vehicle records. 97
87. Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
91. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
92. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
93. Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
94. Id. at 462.
95. See id. at 465.




2. Holding the Statute Unconstitutional: The Eleventh Circuit
Pryor v. Reno,98 decided by the Eleventh Circuit in April 1999, fol-
lowed the Fourth Circuit's rationale in Condon.99 In Pryor, Alabama
sought an injunction to prevent the United States from enforcing the
DPPA, arguing that the statute was an unconstitutional directive requir-
ing it to administer a federal program in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.1°°
The district court held the statute constitutional, but the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that because the statute is not self-administering
and state officers must review requests for information, the DPPA forces
states to administer a Congressionally mandated federal regulatory pro-
gram.' O' "[W]hen Congress requires the States to administer a federal
program, democratic accountability is diminished and for this reason the
Tenth Amendment is offended."'0 2
The Eleventh Circuit also believed the DPPA failed under the
Commerce Clause because "Congress drew its authority to regulate this
activity from its nexus to interstate commerce, and then proceeded to
exempt from the reach of the Act virtually all its interstate
connections. '  Congress enacted the DPPA to protect the public from
criminals, but "[i]n trying to protect legitimate governmental and busi-
ness uses of [personal] information . . . Congress riddled the Act with
more holes than Swiss cheese. Through these holes escaped most of the
interstate commerce activity covered by the Act."' 4
3. Upholding the Statute: The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, like the Tenth, upheld the constitutionality of
the DPPA, but for different reasons. The court in Travis v. Reno °5 rea-
soned that since "[nlothing in the [DPPA] interferes with [a] state's abil-
ity to license drivers and remove dangerous ones from the road,"' 6 the
[DPPA] "affects states as owners of [information] databases; it does not
affect them in their role as governments" regulating driver licensing and
automobile registration.'O° This distinction is crucial, the court found,
because Congress is permitted to regulate states as marketplace partici-
98. 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929(2000).
99. Condon, 155 F.3d at 453.
100. Pryor, 171 F.3dat 1282, 1284.
101. See id. at 1284, 1286.
102. Id. at 1288.
103. Id. at 1284.
104. Id.
105. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
106. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1003.
107. Id. at 1004.
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pants in other arenas through statutes such as the Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act.0 8
There is just no blinking the fact that federal law pervasively regu-
lates states as marketplace participants; the anti-commandeering rule [of
Printz and New York] comes into play only when the federal government
calls on the states to use their sovereign powers as regulators of their
citizens. Because the [DPPA] affects states as owners of data, rather than
as sovereigns, it does not commandeer states in violation of the Consti-
tution. Wisconsin is no more a regulator or law enforcer when it decides
what information to release from its database than is the corner Block-
buster Video outlet.' °9
The United States argued that, because "[s]tatute books teem with
laws regulating the disclosure of information from databases," the DPPA
does not place states at a disadvantage when compared to similarly situ-
ated private entities and is therefore not unconstitutional. 10 "Discrimina-
tion against states is forbidden, but a nondiscriminatory system may take
more than one law to implement. A statute covering all databases would
rival the Internal Revenue Code for complexity without offering states
any real defense from the cost and inconvenience of regulation."'''1
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected news media claims that the
DPPA violates the First Amendment by limiting access to information in
public records, writing, "[p]eering into public records is not part of the
'freedom of speech' that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects.""' 2 Instead,
those protesting the limitation of public information should use the Free-
dom of Information Act to request the information and, if access is de-
nied, should sue the agency that should have disclosed the information.'3
D. Analysis
These constitutional challenges to the DPPA raised the critical ques-
tion of how much control Congress may assert over the states to limit the
disclosure of personal information obtained through state regulatory ac-
tivities. The controversy pitted a national attempt to protect the privacy
rights of individuals against a State's right to regulate its affairs without
interference from the federal government, and centered upon two distinct
lines of cases. The first, concerning the power of Congress to regulate the
108. See id. (citing Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)).
109. Id. at 1004-05.
110. Id. at 1005.
111. Id. at1006.
112. Id. at 1007.
113. See id.
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"'states as states"', 14 is governed by Garcia" ' and Baker,'16 and allows
"Congress to enact laws of general applicability that incidentally apply to
state governments.""' 7 These cases allow Congress to directly regulate
state activity even if States must create legislation to comply, as long as
that regulation "does not commandeer the state legislative and adminis-
trative processes.""' 8 The second line of cases deals with congressional
authority to direct states to implement or administer a federal regulatory
scheme," 9 and is governed by New York' and Printz.2' Under these
cases, "Congress may not enact any law that would direct the functioning
of the States' executives or legislatures."' 22
Condon is distinguishable from Printz primarily because the Printz
statute specifically required state officials to monitor and regulate the
sale of handguns-to take affirmative actions in order to comply with the
federal statute."' The DPPA, in contrast, provides that states "shall not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available" personal information
obtained from motor vehicle records.' 24 Under the DPPA, state officials
are asked not to act-which prevents the statute from "conscripting" state
officials in the same way in which Printz required conscription. 25 In
Condon, the state argued that the DPPA forced officials to implement a
federal statute, because state workers must not release records without
consent.' 26 But, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, "[i]f states do not wish
to comply with those regulations, they may stop disseminating informa-
tion in their motor vehicle records to the public.', 27 The states have a
choice, even if choosing not to disseminate the information results in a
significant loss of revenue."' In New York, unlike Condon, Congress
failed to preserve a state's ability to choose its method of compliance." 9
The statute in New York forced state legislatures to choose between en-
114. Robert C. Lind & Natalie B. Eckhart, The Constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act, 17-SUM COMM. LAW 18, 20 (1999) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
115. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
116. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988).
117. Lind & Eckhart, supra note 114, at 20.
118. Id. at 21.
119. See id.
120. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
121. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
122. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 1998).
123. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 272 1(a) (1994).
125. Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
126. See id.
127. Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cit. 1998).
128. See generally Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation received about eight million dollars each year from the sale
of motor vehicle information).
129. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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acting laws to regulate the disposal of the state's nuclear waste, or taking
title and possession of the waste and its liabilities. 13 Thus, providing a
choice between two equally unacceptable options in New York provided
no choice at all, but the DPPA simply states the federal requirement and
leaves states with the power to decide how they will comply with that
requirement.
The Supreme Court's decision upholding the DPPA and affirming
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning shifted recent Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence away from the broad-based restrictions on federal limitations of
state power laid out in Printz and New York. The decision paves the way
for future congressional legislation regulating state activities, including
privacy legislation, so long as that regulation falls short of actually dic-
tating state legislation or forcing state officials to implement federal pro-
grams. If a state retains a choice in how it will comply with a federal
statute, the Court seems willing to accept that statute as a valid regulation
of state activities.
PART II. Is CONFIDENTIAL TAX RETURN INFORMATION REALLY
CONFIDENTIAL?: STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL PRIVACY
LEGISLATION
A. Background
When the legislature first introduced income tax in 1861, it required
that all tax return information be available for public inspection and re-
view. 3' The legislature abolished the tax in 1872, but then reinstated the
income tax in 1894, this time requiring tax information not be disclosed
to the public. 32 After a Constitutional amendment ensured the ability to
impose and collect taxes on personal income, Congress enacted the
Revenue Act of 1913, which required that tax returns be public records
open to any examination authorized by the President. 3 After 1913,
Presidents generally shared tax return information with governmental
entities as needed, and did not disclose the information to the public.'
34
In the 1970's, Congress grew concerned about governmental abuse
of the tax return information sharing system, because the Nixon Admini-
stration was using tax information obtained from the IRS to "harass and
intimidate political opponents.' ' 35 This concern caused Congress to enact
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 36 which states that tax "[r]eturns and return
130. See id. at 169.
13 1. See Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577,
578 (1998).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 578-79.




information shall be confidential... 3 The Tax Reform Act has always
included a number of statutory exceptions to the general rule that tax
return information is confidential.'3 8 The Tax Reform Act provides for
both civil and criminal penalties against government officials who dis-
close confidential tax information outside of those exceptions.
39
In recent years, however, several Circuit Courts have developed a
judicially created exception to this statute and allow the disclosure of
information in press releases that publicize tax convictions. 4 0 The Tenth
Circuit rejected the concept in one 1983 case" ' and embraced it in a 1999decision. 42
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Rice v. United States 43
1. Facts
A jury convicted Rice of filing false tax refund claims and tax re-
turns in March 1994, and according to standard departmental procedure,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued two press releases publiciz-
ing the criminal proceedings.'" Rice, a certified public accountant, filed a
civil action against the United States claiming that the IRS wrongfully
disclosed confidential tax information in the press releases. "' The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the
United States and the IRS, concluding that the press releases did not dis-
close confidential tax information about Rice, and "that all the informa-
tion contained in the press releases came from public documents and
proceedings. Specifically, the court found that ... an IRS [agent who
had prepared the press releases] had reviewed the indictment against
137. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994 & Supp. HI1997).
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c)-(p) ((1994 & Supp. III 1997) (authorizing the release of tax return
information to state tax officials, people with a material interest, Congressional committees, the
President, White House personnel, heads of federal agencies, the Treasury Department and
Department of Justice and federal agencies for purposes of non tax-law administration).
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (creating a private cause of action for
damages against the United States for improper disclosure of tax information); 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) (imposing criminal punishment for willful disclosures of tax information by
government employees).
140. See generally Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
information recorded in a federal tax lien may be disclosed to the public); Lampert v. United States,
854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that once tax information is made public in court
proceedings, the taxpayer loses the right to privacy of that information); Thomas v. United States,
890 F.2d 18, 21-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that disclosure of tax return information published in a
tax court opinion does not violate confidentiality requirements).
141. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that information
gleaned from public records and public proceedings may be disclosed without violating
confidentiality requirements).
142. See Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that
prior in-court statements stripped that information of its confidentiality).
143. 166F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
144. See id. at 1089.
145. See id.
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Rice, attended his trial and sentencing," and used that information as her
only source for the press releases.'4 6 Rice appealed the decision, arguing
that because the information contained in the press releases was confi-
dential tax return information, the United States violated the confidenti-
ality provisions of the Tax Reform Act.' 7 Rice also argued alternatively
that there were genuine issues of material fact about the source of the
information contained in the press releases and that summary judgment
was inappropriate.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected Rice's claims, refusing to hold that the
IRS press release necessarily constituted an unauthorized disclosure of
tax return information.4 9 The Court distinguished the case from its 1983
decision in Rodgers v. Hyatt,'5° which held that an in-court statement
based on confidential information did not justify an IRS agent's later
discussion of that information with third parties.'5 ' In Rodgers, the Court
found that the IRS agent had obtained information from internal docu-
ments and tax returns, testified about that information in court, and then
later disclosed that information to a third party out of court.'52 On the
other hand, in Rice, the agent obtained her information from public pro-
ceedings and documents; the Court held that "whether information about
a taxpayer may be classified as 'return information' invoking application
of § 6103 turns on the immediate source of the information."'53 The
Tenth Circuit also stated that Rice had not presented sufficient evidence
that the IRS agent obtained the press release information from an imper-
missible source, which would require vacating the district court's grant
of summary judgment.'5
Like it or not, a trial is a public event. The IRS press releases in this
case did not publicize Rice's tax return information; they publicized
public proceedings and documents. While those proceedings and
documents may have revealed 'return information,' that revelation
was proper under the exception to § 6103 allowing such disclosure in
federal court where the taxpayer is a party to the proceedings.'55
146. Id. at 1090.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999).
150. 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).
151. See Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091 (citing Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 905-06 (10th Cir.
1983)).
152. See Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 904-05.
153. Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091-92.





The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that confidential tax
return information that is brought into the public domain through public
proceedings can be publicized without violating the Tax Reform Act's
confidentiality requirements.'56 The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has favored
a strict statutory construction of the Tax Reform Act and held that the
source of the disclosed information determines whether the statute has
been violated.'57
1. Ninth Circuit
In Lampert v. United States,1s the Ninth Circuit held that not al-
lowing the publication of tax return information obtained from public
records would violate the purpose of the Tax Reform Act. 5 9 "We believe
that Congress sought to prohibit only the disclosure of confidential tax
return information. Once tax return information is made part of the pub-
lic domain, the taxpayer may no longer claim a right of privacy in that
information. '" '6 Lampert involved a number of cases consolidated on
appeal in which the government issued press releases publicizing actions




One year after Lampert, the Seventh Circuit decided a similar case
in which the IRS sent a press release detailing losses and damages to the
taxpayer's hometown newspaper. 62 In Thomas v. United States,163 the
court did not consider whether disclosing return information in a judicial
record bars taxpayers from complaining about subsequent disclosures,
because the court found the press release information did not come from
Thomas' tax return, but from the Tax Court's opinion in the case. '64 The
Seventh Circuit "refused to decide whether the tax-court opinion re-
moved the 'protective cloak' from the information, so that the IRS would
156. See Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that information
recorded in a federal tax lien may be disclosed to the public); Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18,
21-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that disclosure of tax return information published in a tax court
opinion does not violate confidentiality requirements); Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338
(9th Cit. 1988) (holding that once tax information is made public in court proceedings, the taxpayer
loses the right to privacy of that information).
157. See Darrell Calvin, How Far Do the Powers of the LR.S. Extend in the Fifth Circuit?:
Johnson v. Sawyer, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 79, 91-92 (1998).
158. 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988).
159. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
160. Id.
161. Seeid. at 336.
162. See Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1989).
163. Thomas, 890 F.2d at 18.
164. See Calvin, supra note 157, at 84.
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not have been in violation of the statute if it had disseminated the infor-
mation directly from its files.' ' 5
3. Sixth Circuit
In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in Rowley v. United States'6 6 considered
taxpayer claims that the government violated the Tax Reform Act by
disclosing tax return information when advertising a public auction of the
taxpayer's property to pay a tax obligation.16' The Government argued
that it did not violate the statute because the tax information in question
was public record due to recording the tax liens.668 The court ruled for the
Government, stating that the recording of federal tax liens "is designed to
provide public notice and is thus qualitatively different from disclosures
made in judicial proceedings, which are only incidentally made
public.' 69
D. Analysis
The statutory requirements of the Tax Reform Act represent "a ten-
sion between two conflicting public policies: (1) a Congressional policy
favoring the confidentiality of [tax] returns and (2) the need of various
governmental institutions to gain access to taxpayer-supplied information
in order to perform their official duties."'170 The Tenth Circuit is correct in
its reasoning that publishing tax information about a convicted tax
evader, when that information is part of a public recording or court tes-
timony, does not breach an existing right of privacy. People accused or
convicted of crimes generally lose any right to privacy relating to their
names, addresses, details of their crimes-even background information
and previous convictions-once criminal charges are brought into open
court. This information becomes part of the public record, and the media
and the public-at-large have access to the information.
Financial information submitted on tax forms during the crime of tax
fraud or tax evasion is no different. By putting false or misleading infor-
mation on his tax forms, Rice opened himself up to investigation by the
IRS and forfeited any right to privacy for that information. Just as an
indictment for assault or murder might necessitate the release of details
of an abusive relationship, false financial information might be essential
to prove a case of tax fraud. Therefore the IRS, like the general media,
can publish details about criminal convictions that have been the subject
of open public court proceedings.
165. Id.
166. 76 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1996).
167. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 797.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 801.
170. Darby, supra note 131, at 578.
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At the same time, the Tenth Circuit makes .an irrelevant distinction
between the IRS agent in Rodgers (who testified in open court and then
provided that information to a third party) t7 ' and the agent in Rice (who
did not testify, but provided information from another agent's testimony
to third parties through a press release).' 72 A person convicted of tax
evasion gives up the right to keep financial records used in a criminal act
from the public once the court proceeding exposes that information.
Consequently, it should not matter whether the investigating agent or a
public relations agent discusses that information because the defendant
no longer has a right to keep that information private.
Critics of the judicially created exception allowing disclosure of tax
information after public proceedings argue that the IRS and the tax dis-
closure requirements are statute-driven, and that a statute must create any
exceptions to those requirements as well.' 73 "If any further life is given
the [IRS], it is for Congress, and not the judiciary to declare. If taxpayers
... are to have their transgressions publicized, it should be with the spe-
cific approval of their elected representatives.""'7 Critics also discredit the
suggestion that material disclosed in public proceedings loses its confi-
dential nature:
Confidentiality is a matter of degree, and simply because material
may be available for public inspection, it should not be implied that the
public already has or ever will obtain knowledge of such information...
• Whether public information is found in a court opinion or a public rec-
ord, the public awareness of such information is generally very limited.' 5
Ensuring the confidentiality of tax return information will help pro-
mote respect for our tax system, encourage truthful disclosures on re-
turns, and limit the abuse of government power, according to supporters
of strict statutory interpretation. Distrustful taxpayers "may be less in-
clined to be faithful to [IRS] mandates when tax day rolls around each
year," but government can foster respect by ensuring "that government
agents are not allowed to abuse power simply because it is there for the
taking."'76 The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and most recently the
Tenth Circuit, appear to be much less concerned with fostering respect or
ensuring confidentiality once information has been released into the
public domain.
CONCLUSION
As technology improves and access to information continues to in-
crease, the courts will likely consider many more informational-privacy
171. See Rogers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983).
172. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1992).
173. See Calvin, supra note 157, at 80.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 96.
176. Id. at 96-97.
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cases. During this survey period alone, the Tenth Circuit decided two
important informational-privacy cases, and the holdings in each of those
cases conflicted with at least one other Circuit. 77 Regarding the issue of
personal information derived from driver's license and motor vehicle
registration records, the Tenth Circuit found, and the U.S. Supreme Court
confirmed, that Congress has power to regulate the disclosure of such
information by the states. 17 The Court's decision to uphold the DPPA
may open the door to future congressional legislation to protect the pri-
vacy rights of individuals, as long as the legislation affects interstate
commerce and does not conscript or commandeer the states. The Tenth
Circuit conflicted with at least one other Circuit in its most recent deci-
sion on permitting disclosure of tax-return information filed with the
IRS. 7 9 This decision favored the Government's need to publicize con-
victions for tax fraud over the protection of confidential information al-
ready in the public record.80 Rice illustrates the problems courts have
when interpreting privacy statutes that do not implicate the
Constitution."'
These differences of opinion among the Circuits indicate the diffi-
culty courts face when trying to balance the privacy rights of an individ-
ual with the Government and business need to collect and distribute per-
sonal information. Balancing will become even more difficult in the fu-
ture as access and availability of information continue to increase. The
need for uniform privacy theory and privacy law to help with that bal-
ancing will become increasingly important as well. "Rather than seeing
privacy as a static, unchanging feature of human existence, theoretical
approaches should regard privacy as a dynamic, adaptive process that
derives full meaning only from its broader cultural context.' ', 2 The need
for a fresh approach to privacy rights is particularly great in the area of
electronic communications and computers. "Only by deciding a priori
what it is that matters about privacy, and by establishing a comprehen-
sive set of policy guidelines will we be able to adapt our privacy laws to
a rapidly changing socioeconomic context.' ' 3
Creating uniform and consistent privacy laws is especially neces-
sary to combat the potential abuse of power that personal information
provides to Government and businesses. "Knowledge is power, and in
any social interaction, an imbalance in the amount and nature of personal
information possessed by each party creates and perpetuates power dis-
177. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Rice v. United
States, 166 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
178. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
179. See, e.g., Rice, 166 F.3d at 1092.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Byford, supra note 1, at 7.
183. Id. at 3.
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parities," according to one proponent of overhauling privacy law. 14 "In a
society where surveillance and the collection of personal information
have become institutionalized, those who control the data collection pro-
cess have potentially immense social power at their disposal."'85
Stephanie Reedy




STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: 10Th
CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS
INTRODUCTION
The American Association of University Women's study of the
prevalence of sexual harassment in schools throughout the United States'
engendered a flood of legal debate regarding the sexual harassment of
students. The study was the first major United States study of sexual
harassment in schools and outlined the prevalence of student-on-student
harassment in the American school system.2 The study reported that four
out of five students said they experienced unwanted and unwelcome sex-
ual behavior at school or during a school-related activity. 3 In addition,
four out of five students reported an incident of sexual harassment by
their classmates, while only eighteen percent reported harassment by an
adult in the school system.4 More than sixty five percent of students re-
ported that the harassment took place in the school hallways and fifty-
five percent reported that the harassment took place in the classroom
itself.'
In addition, the study outlined the effect of sexual harassment on
victims. Sexually harassed students reported that they did not want to
attend school, were less inclined to participate in class, found it hard to
study, stayed home from school or cut class, had lower grades, or had
second thoughts about whether they would graduate from high school.6
In all but one category, the number of girls who reported a negative im-
pact on their education was twice the number of boys.7 In addition, sig-
nificantly higher numbers of girls than boys reported feeling negative
emotions; including embarrassment, self consciousness, loss of confi-
dence, fear and confusion.8
The Tenth Circuit made unique holdings in the law surrounding stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment in elementary, middle and high
1. See Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment In America's Schools,
American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, June 1993.
2. Bryant, Ann, Sexual Harassment in School Takes Its Toll, USA TODAY MAGAZINE,
March 1, 1995, at 40.
3. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 7.
4. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 10-11.
5. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 12.
6. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 15.
7. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1. In the category of "Doubting Whether You Have
What It Takes to Graduate from High School," an almost equal number of males and females
responded that they did doubt whether they would graduate from high school (four percent of girls
and five percent of boys). See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 15 -16.
8. See Hostile Hallways, supra, note 1, at 16.
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schools. In 1999, the Court decided two cases holding school districts
and school officials liable for student-on-student sexual harassment un-
der two separate theories of recovery. 9 Part One of this survey will dis-
cuss the theory of recovery from individual school officials under the
state created danger doctrine. This doctrine allows recovery when a state
actor creates the danger that harms the plaintiff or makes the plaintiff
more vulnerable to a dangerous situation.' ° The state created danger doc-
trine was the basis of recovery in Sutton v. Utah State School for the
Deaf and Blind." Holding individual school officials liable for student-
on-student sexual harassment appears to be unique, as other districts re-
fused to do so under a state created danger theory.
In addition, the Court's decision in Murrell v. School District No. 112
allowed recovery based on a sexual harassment claim from a school dis-
trict under Title IX. 3 Title IX states that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving financial assistance."' 4 The Circuit's decision
was based on a recent Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education '" that authorized recovery against school
districts when student-on-student sexual harassment is so pervasive that
it denies a student access to educational benefits and opportunities." This
decision again, appears to be a unique holding from the Tenth Circuit as
other circuits refused to acknowledge recovery for student-on-student
harassment under Title IX. Recovery under Title IX will be discussed in
Part Two of the survey.
I. STATE CREATED DANGER DOCTRINE
A. Background
The traditional federal method of recovery against state officials is
an action brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983." In order to recoverunder section 1983, a state actor must violate an individual's constitu-
9. Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999); Sutton v. Utah State
School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). This survey only analyzes cases
during the survey period that extends from January 1, 1999 to August 31, 1999.
10. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
11. Sutton, 173 F.3d 1226.
12. Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
14. Id.
15. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
16. See infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
17. Adam Michael Greenfield, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin': The Need for
Constitutional Protection From Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DuKE L.J. 588, 593 (1993)
(stating that "three areas of redress are potentially available ... [however] the section 1983 remedy.
. has attracted the most attention").
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tional right or the state must violate a federal law that specifically abro-
gates the state's sovereign immunity.'8 Section 1983 states that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory or of the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.' 9
Section 1983 provides no substantive right, but instead provides the pro-
cedural basis for recovery when an underlying right is violated. 20
In the area of student-on-student sexual harassment, a student must
show that the school itself violated an underlying federal or constitu-
tional right in order to recover under section 1983.2t When a school offi-
cial deprives a student of his Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily in-
tegrity, that school official can be held liable under section 1983."
The issue that arises in the context of student-on-student sexual har-
assment is whether the failure of a school official to protect a student
from the student-on-student sexual harassment rises to the level of a con-
stitutional violation sufficient for a section 1983 action. The Supreme
Court first addressed the issue of a failure to protect in its 1989 decision
in Deshaney v. Winnebago.23
1. Supreme Court Treatment
In DeShaney, the mother of a four-year-old child sued the Depart-
ment of Social Services after her son was beaten so severely by his father
24
that he suffered traumatic brain injuries. Prior to this final beating, the
local hospital contacted the Department of Social Services several times
21
about the suspected abuse of the child.
18. See Chapman v. Houston Wel-fare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Baker v.
McCollan 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
20. See supra, Greenfield, note 17, at 593 (stating that "the statute creates no substantive
rights of its own but provides a vehicle for enforcement of rights already guaranteed by the
Constitution or by federal law").
21. See supra, Greenfield, note 17, at 596.
22. William W. Watkinson, Jr. Shades of Deshaney: Official Liability Under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES. 1237, 1245 (1995) (stating that a
public official will be held liable under section 1983 for the deprivation of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to bodily integrity).
23. DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
24. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
25. See id. at 192. The Department of Social Services entered into a voluntary agreement with
the father that allowed Joshua to return to his father's custody. See id. Following the return of Joshua
to his father's custody, the Department received two more phone calls from the local emergency
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The lawsuit brought by Joshua's mother alleged that the County, the
Department of Social Services, and various individual employees of the
Department of Social Services violated Joshua's substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene to protect
him against the risk of violence of which they knew or should have
26known. Joshua's mother brought the action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. 27
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that while these
were very tragic circumstances, nothing in the Due Process Clause re-
quires the state to protect the life, liberty, or property of a citizen against
private actors.2 Based on this principal, the Court held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even when
that aid may be necessary to secure life interests if the government itself
did not deprive the individual of that interest .29 However, the Court stated
that an affirmative duty to protect does arise if the state places a limita-
tion on an individual's freedom to act on his own behalf. ° Additionally,
the Court stated that while the state may have been aware of the dangers
facing Joshua, the state did nothing to create the danger or to make him
more vulnerable to the danger.3
2. Lower Court Treatment
The DeShaney decision formed the backbone of the state created
32danger doctrine. The language that "the state did nothing to create the
danger," or make the child more vulnerable to the danger, allowed lower
courts to infer that if the state did create the danger or make the plaintiff
more vulnerable to a situation, the state could be held liable.33 The earli-
est case to employ the state created danger doctrine held that a material
question of fact existed as to whether a state patrol officer acted with
deliberate indifference by leaving the plaintiff on the side of a road in a
high crime area late at night.34 After the patrolman left the woman, she
accepted a ride with a stranger and was subsequently raped. In that
room about suspicious injuries. See id. at 192-93. The final beating left Joshua with lifelong
traumatic brain damage. See id. at 193.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 193; see also supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
28. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
29. See id. at 196.
30. See id. at 200 (citing as an example when a person is placed in an institutional setting).
31. See id. at 201.
32. Ashley Smith, Students Hurting Students: Who Will Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REV. 579, 582
(1997).
33. Id. at 582 n.18.
34. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989).
35. Wood, 879 F.2d at 589-90.
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case, the Ninth Circuit referred to the DeShaney decision and alluded to
16
the creation of the state created danger doctrine.
Just a few years later, the Ninth Circuit, in L.W. v. Grubbs,3 7 more
explicitly used the state created danger doctrine in order to uphold a
claim brought by a registered nurse that worked in an institution for
young male offenders.' Upon employment, the nurse's supervisor
promised that she would not be forced to work alone with violent sex
offenders.39 However, the supervisor selected a resident to work alone
with the nurse. 4° While working alone, the resident kidnapped, robbed,
and raped the nurse. 4' The Court stated that the supervisor was aware of
the resident's propensities, treatment failure, and was aware that the of-
fender was very likely to "commit a violent crime if left alone with a
female., 42 The Court further held that the state's deprivation of the plain-
tiffs freedom or liberty was not a prerequisite to using the state created
danger doctrine.43 Other circuits followed the Grubbs court's lead in
holding that a deprivation of the plaintiffs freedom or liberty is not a
prerequisite to employing the state created danger doctrine.
44
The Tenth Circuit first discussed the state created danger doctrine in
UhIrig v. Harder.4 ' The decision involved a challenge to the termination
of a special unit in a mental hospital that was reserved for the criminally
insane.4 Following termination of the unit, the hospital placed criminally
insane patients in the general population.47 One criminally insane patientS 48
killed an activity therapist. The therapist's husband, on behalf of his
wife's estate, sued the administrators of the hospital under section 1983. 49
The Court stated that in order for the plaintiff to recover he must show
that 1) the killer was a member of a definable group, 2) the administra-
tor's conduct put the deceased at a "substantial risk of serious, immedi-
ate, and proximate harm," 3) the risk was obvious or known, 4) the ad-
ministrators acted recklessly in "conscious disregard of that risk," and 5)
the conduct of the administrators was conscience shocking. 50 The Court
36. See id.
37. L.W. v Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1992).




42. Id. at 120-121.
43. See id. at 122.
44. See Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Highland Lake,
880 F.2d 348, 354 (11 th Cir. 1989).
45. 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995).
46. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 567.
47. See id. at 569.
48. See id. at 570.
49. See id. at 567.
50. Id. at 574.
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ultimately decided that the actions of the administrators were insufficient
to support the state created danger doctrine."
However, the Tenth Circuit took this precedent and applied the state
created danger doctrine in a unique setting-holding school officials
liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. To date, no other circuit
has applied this doctrine to school officials when the actual harasser is a
student. As the next section will demonstrate, the Sutton decision pro-
vides students who have been harassed by a peer one avenue for seeking
relief from individual school officials; however, it does not provide any
foundation for holding liable a school district as a whole.
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and
Blind 2
1. Facts
James Sutton, a minor, was diagnosed with severe cerebral palsy,
mental retardation and total blindness." James was able to communicate
with sign language.54 James attended the Utah State School for the Deaf
and Blind.55 On February 16, 1995 James signed to his mother that a boy
at school had sexually assaulted him while he was in the bathroom.56
James' mother immediately notified the school superintendent, the prin-
cipal and James' teacher." The following morning, James' mother met
with the principal and James' teacher.5" During the meeting, the principal
and teacher assured James' mother that the children were not allowed to
go to the bathroom alone and that it was impossible that the abuse could
have happened. 59 The principal and teacher also promised that James
would be supervised while in the bathroom. 60
On February 23, 1995, James was attacked in the bathroom by the
same perpetrator.6' A teacher's aide took James to the bathroom and
62stood outside the open door waiting for him. However, she left in order
63
to answer a ringing telephone. Three minutes later she returned, found
51. See id. at 576.
52. Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).













the door closed, and heard strange noises.64 She entered the bathroom,
forced open the stall, and found the boy sexually assaulting James. 6' The
complaint alleged that James suffered severe physical and psychological
harm, uncontrollable rages, severe nightmares, compulsive and uncon-
trollable behavior, and severe mental distress as a result of the attacks.66
In February 1996, James' mother filed a claim with the Utah Depart-
ment of Education seeking damages for physical pain and emotional dis-
67 61tress. In May, the claim was denied. James' mother then filed a claim
in state court alleging negligence.69 She named the school and the princi-70
pal, in his individual and official capacity, as defendants. The claim was
then amended to include claims of breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, and a section 1983 claim based on a violation of James' due process
rights." The school sought removal of the claim to federal court based on
the section 1983 claim." The federal district court dismissed the federal
action for failure to state a claim and refused to hear the remaining state
claims.73
2. Decision
On appeal, the Court first addressed the issue of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity that is granted to "arms of the state. 74 The school raised
75the issue of immunity for the first time at the appellate level. The court
applied a four-factor test to determine if the school was an arm of the
76state. In applying the four factors, the Court found that the school was
an arm of the state and therefore was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.77 However, the court held that the school waived its immunity
through an "extraordinarily effective waiver., 78 The school's immunity
64. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1230.
65. See id. at 1230-31.








74. Id. at 1232. The Court explained that whether a political entity was an arm of the state was
based on four factors: 1) the characterization of the unit under state law; 2) the guidance and control
exercised over the entity by the state; 3) the degree of state funding the entity receives; and 4) the
entity's ability to issue bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1233.
78. Id. at 1235.
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was waived by consent to the suit through the removal of the case to fed-
eral court and litigation of the merits of the case."
Second, the Court addressed the viability of the claim as brought
against the school and the principal in his official capacity. The Court
stated that because the school and the principal in his official capacity
were not considered "persons" for purposes of the action; the claims
failed.80
Third, the Court addressed the viability of the claim against the
principal in his individual capacity. The Court held that a state official in
his individual capacity is considered a "person" for purposes of a section
1983 claim."'
Because the claim was viable, the court went on to state the general
rule derived from DeShaney.82 The Court stated the general rule as: "[A]
state does not have a constitutional duty to protect its citizens from pri-
vate violence ...[and] state actors are generally liable under the Due
Process clause only for their own acts. '83 However, the Court also recog-
nized two general exceptions to this rule: 1) the special relationship doc-
trine; and 2) the state created danger doctrine. 84
In order to recover under the state created danger doctrine, the
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or reckless affirmative conduct on
the part of the state official that created the danger." In addition, the de-
gree of "outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm"
must be "conscience shocking."'86 Finally, the actor must be aware of the
known or obvious risk and that serious harm would follow if the actor
acted in disregard of the risk.87 The Court further held that this standard
could be applied to a failure to adopt or implement a training policy to
prevent the deprivation of constitutional rights. 8 Again, this failure must
be with "deliberate indifference., 89 The Court stated that the failure of
the principal to adopt or implement a training policy to prevent sexual
assaults on disabled children was clearly established at the time the as-
79. See id. at 1236.
80. See id. at 1237. The Court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that "neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989).
81. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237.
82. See id.; see also DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
83. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1238.
86. Id. (quoting from Andrews v. Flower, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996)).
87. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238.
88. See id. at 1239.
89. Id. at 1240.
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sault took place.9° Therefore, the decision of the district court was re-
versed and the claim was remanded.9'
C. Other Circuit Decisions
The Third Circuit was one of the earliest Circuits to address the issue
of student-on-student sexual harassment in the context of the state cre-
92
ated danger doctrine. In D.R. v. Middlebucks Area Vocational Techni-
cal School,93 seven male students sexually molested two female high
school students two to four times per week during January through May
of 1990.94 The class was routinely in a state of "pandemonium" and was
supervised only by a student teacher.9 The parents of the two students
brought an action against the school district and the individual teachers
96and school officials on behalf of their daughters. The suit was based on
the constructive knowledge of the student teacher and on the actual
knowledge of the Assistant Director of the school.97
In discussing the state created danger theory, the court stated the
need for an affirmative act that "works to the plaintiff's detriment in
terms of exposure to danger., 98 The Court stated that the official's act in
assigning a student teacher and failing to supervise more closely could
pose a foreseeable risk of physical injury created by the state entity.
99
However, the type of injury suffered by the plaintiffs was not of the kind
foreseeable based on the officials' actions.1l° The Court stated that the
evidence was insufficient to establish a claim under the state created
danger theory.'0'
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of student on stu-
dent harassment as it related to the state created danger doctrine in
Nabozny v. Podlesny.102 A student who attended Ashland Public School
District throughout his middle and high school years brought suit against
several school officials and the District claiming a violation of his equal• - 103
protection and substantive due process rights. The student was con-
tinually sexually harassed and physically abused by fellow students be-
90. See id. at 1241.
91. Id. at 1242.
92. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.
1992).
93. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1364.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. See id. at 1366 &1374.
96. See id. at 1365.
97. See id. at 1366.
98. Id. at 1374.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1375.
102. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
103. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 449.
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cause he was a homosexual.' °4 Even though the school had policies in
place for investigating and punishing student-on-student sexual harass-
ment and school officials were repeatedly made aware of the harassment,
the court denied recovery under the state created danger doctrine. °5 The
Court stated that although the officials intentionally failed to act, no evi-
dence suggested that this failure was an affirmative act that placed the
student in danger or increased any pre-existing danger; a requirement for
recovery under the state created danger doctrine. 106
One year later, the Seventh Circuit followed the same line of rea-
soning as it did in Nabozny.'07 In Stevens v. Umsted,'08 a parent, on behalf
of his blind and developmentally disabled son, sued the school superin-
tendent of the Illinois School for the Visually Impaired for a violation of
his son's substantive due process rights. '0' The suit was based on several
sexual assaults that took place while the boy was a resident student at the
school."0 The complaint alleged that after the superintendent had actual
knowledge of the incidents, the sexual assaults continued."' The District
Court granted a motion to dismiss finding that the superintendent did not
have a constitutional duty to protect the student."' On appeal, the appel-
lants raised the issue of a state created danger for the first time.' The
Seventh Circuit held that in order to maintain an action, the plaintiff must
plead facts showing some affirmative act on the part of the state, not
merely an omission or failure to act, which created the danger or made
him more vulnerable to an already existing danger.' '4 The Court went on
to reference DeShaney,"5 and stated that "the most that [could] be said
was that [the superintendent] stood by and did nothing."
' 6
While few Circuits addressed the issue of student-on-student sexual
harassment under the state created danger theory,"' many Circuits ad-
104. See id.
105. See id. at 460.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
109. Stevens, 131 F.3d at 699.




114. See id. at 705. The Court went on to state that the people of the state may prefer a system
of liability based on failure to act in certain situations, however the Court could not "thrust" this
upon the people by expanding the Due Process Clause. See id.
115. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
116. Stevens, 131 F.3d at 705. The Court further stated that, like DeShaney, the facts in the case
were "sad and troubling," however, the question did not involve the "grievous and deplorable harm
endured" by the plaintiff; only whether the defendant had a constitutional duty to protect the
plaintiff. See id.
117. See supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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dressed the state created danger doctrine under other circumstances in
public school settings. "8 However, no other circuits have held officials
liable under the state created danger doctrine."9
D. Analysis
As the cases in the previous section demonstrate, the Tenth Circuit is
the only Circuit to hold individual school officials accountable for stu-
dent-on-student harassment under the state created danger theory. In ad-
dition, it is among very few Circuits that used the state created danger
theory at all in holding schools accountable in any context under the state
created danger doctrine.
1. Tenth Circuit Analysis
The plaintiff in Sutton overcame a host of hurdles that others have
failed in order to recover under the state created danger doctrine. Among
these hurdles are: a list of offenses to which the school did not respond; 20
an ability to prove an affirmative act on the part of officials," and the
limited applicability of the doctrine."'
First, the plaintiff mother in Sutton was able to list numerous specific
occasions on which her son was sexually assaulted while at the school."'
The plaintiff met the requirement that one commentator, Barbara Hor-
witz, termed a "grocery list of offenses" to which the school did not ade-
quately respond. 124 In contrast, the plaintiff in Middle Bucks was only
118. See infra note 119.
119. See generally Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the state created danger doctrine does not apply to a school that employed a known
felon as a custodian after an elementary student was raped by the custodian); Johnson v. Dallas
Independent School District, 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994) (while not recognizing the state created
danger doctrine in the Fifth Circuit, holding that the state created danger doctrine would not apply
when the plaintiff alleged a generally violent environment after a student was shot and killed on
school grounds); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that while the state created danger doctrine was not recognized in the Fifth Circuit, a school district
would not be liable under the doctrine for sponsoring a dance at which a student was shot in the
parking lot after the event); Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education, 70 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the state did not create that danger that resulted in the death of a child on a school bus
due to inadequate rules, regulations and training); Mitchell v. Duval County School Board, 107 F.3d
837 (1 th Cir. 1997) (holding that a school sponsored function was an insufficient creation of danger
when a student was killed during a robbery following a school sponsored function).
120. Barbara L. Horwitz, The Duty of Schools to Protect Students From Sexual Harassment:
How Much Recovery Will The Court Allow?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1210 (1995).
121. See Watkinson, supra note 22 at 1281.
122. See Watkinson, supra note 22 at 1281.
123. Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (10th Cir.
1999).
124. Horwitz, supra note 101.
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able to show a general state of "pandemonium" which was imputed
through constructive knowledge to the student teacher. 2-
Second, the Sutton plaintiff was able to show that the direct action
(leaving the child unattended in the bathroom stall) of a school official
(the teacher's aide) enhanced the danger to her son. 6 If the teacher's
aide remained with the child while in the bathroom, the perpetrating stu-
dent would be deterred from assaulting the child because of the aide's
supervisory powers over the students. In addition, the lack of policies,
regulations, and supervision of employees in handling student-on-student
sexual harassment amounted to a direct act of deliberate indifference.'27
However, other plaintiffs have been unable to show either a direct action
or an absence of policies and procedures.""
Finally, some courts limited the scope of their inquiry to the period
in which the sexual harassment took place.29 For example, in Nabozny,
the policies and procedures for dealing with student-on-student sexual
harassment were in place prior to the commission of the harassment. 3
While the harassment took place (the scope of the court's inquiry) school
officials only engaged in inaction, therefore the court found the state
created danger doctrine inapplicable.' In addition, in Middle Bucks, the
school district's affirmative acts of assigning the teacher and creating a
unisex bathroom occurred prior to the actual sexual abuse.'32 However,
this narrow scope of inquiry ignores the reality that a school's actions
prior to the sexual harassment can significantly contribute to the resulting
sexual harassment. 133
2. Policy Issues Surrounding Student Sexual Harassment
Even though the prevalence of sexual harassment is high and the ef-
fect grave, many school districts find themselves in a precarious situa-
tion. On one hand, school officials are concerned about the problem of
sexual harassment and its effect on students in the education system.134
125. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1992).
126. Sutton, 173 F.3dat 1231.
127. Id. at 1240.
128. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1992) (finding constructive notice inadequate); Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 460 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
that policies and procedures were in place for dealing with student-on-student sexual harassment).
129. Greenfield, supra note 14, at 613.
130. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 460.
131. See id.
132. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366.
133. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 613.
134. Laura M. Sullivan, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harassment in American
Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than Power Dynamics, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF
WOMEN & L 329 (1997).
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On the other hand, because of the way the law has been written and in-
terpreted, schools feel forced to take a hands-off approach to students'
daily activities in order to avoid civil liability. 35
These requirements encourage school districts to remove themselves
from the daily lives of students. By simply putting policies and proce-
dures in place and then turning a blind eye to the actions of students,
school districts are able to evade the deliberate indifference standard for
recovery under the state created danger doctrine. 3 7 Reporting policies
that thwart notice to high ranking officials place students in greater dan-
ger of experiencing sexual harassment and suffering from the effects of
student-on-student sexual harassment.1
38
If schools follow this course of action, students are provided little, if
any, protection from sexual harassment. For example, if a school creates
a policy that requires notice to be given to the child's home room
teacher, but the harassment is taking place in the hallway or cafeteria, the
teacher may not be able to prevent the harassment. In addition, the school
official who may be able to prevent the harassment has not been "noti-
fied" for purposes of the law and therefore the official would not be li-
able under the current Tenth Circuit decision.
This possible scenario is disturbing considering sixty-six percent of
harassment takes place in the hallway, forty-three percent takes place
outside of school, but on school grounds, thirty-nine percent of students
report harassment in the gym, on the playing field, or in the pool area,
and thirty four percent report harassment in the cafeteria.
In addition, if no recovery is available for plaintiffs from school dis-
tricts, injured students may sue individual teachers who are bound by the
inadequate reporting procedures. 140 Inadequate policies based on a delib-
erate indifference standard may create a hostile environment that affects
the teaching and learning of all students in the classroom.' 4' If a teacher
135. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 619.
136. See Greenfield, supra note 17, at 619 (stating as an example a case in which a school
board was able to avoid liability simply by putting in place policies that did not allow information to
reach the school board, thereby evading liability because no deliberate indifference was
demonstrated.).
137. See Greenfield, supra note 17, at 620.
138. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
139. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 13.
140. One commentator notes:
We come to school holding our children's rights in one hand and our attorney's business
card in the other-all the while demanding that staff protect, nurture, and teach our little
darlings. At the same time, though, we insist that our children enjoy every freedom and
bask in self-esteem. In other words, we want it all.
Audra Pontes, Peer Sexual Harassment: Has Title IX Gone Too Far?, 47 EMORY L.J. 341, 342
(1998).
141. In response to similar concerns, one court noted in dicta that the case
compels us to provide clear warning to the [Board of Education] that in the future a
defense of no liability due to lack of knowledge may no longer apply to a bureaucracy
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is more concerned with personal liability than with teaching, the quality
of education and the students will suffer.
In addition, the requirement of actual notice on the part of individual
officials may encourage teachers to ignore incidents of harassment and
discourage dialogue between students and teachers. If a teacher knows
that he may be held civilly liable for sexual harassment if the student
notifies him and the teacher knows that the reporting policies of the
school are ineffective, he may avoid conversations that lead to the disclo-
sure of the harassment. Again, this leaves harassed students with no as-
sistance in dealing with student-on-student sexual harassment. These
unresponsive and inadequate procedures are evidenced by the alarming
statistic that only seven percent of students report sexual harassment to a
teacher. 4' This is especially alarming for boys because of the mere seven
percent of reports to teachers, girls reported twice as often as boys.
The final question becomes what message does this send to children
and adolescents. Unresponsive teachers and administrators send the mes-
sage that sexual harassment is an ordinary part of life for students. The
message is also sent to harassers that their behavior is acceptable. This
sends the message to those who are being harassed that no help is avail-
able to them. In light of the significant impact that sexual harassment has
on children's self esteem, enthusiasm for learning, and willingness to
even attend school; lack of action in response to sexual harassment ig-
nores a significant problem in the education system and lowers the qual-
ity of education for all children.
II. TITLE IX CLAIMS
A. Background
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving financial assistance."' 44 Based on the language of the statute, it
is difficult to infer Congress' intent regarding sexual harassment. 145 In
addition, Title IX started as a floor amendment; therefore little informa-
tion is available regarding Congress' intent.' 46 However, the floor debates
which continues to block notice of the [Board of Education] of allegations of sexual
abuse of students committed ... during school related activities.
Thelma D. v. Board of Education, 934 F.2d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1991).
142. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 25.
143. See Hostile Hallways, supra note 1, at 25.
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994).
145. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344.
146. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344. A floor amendment is an amendment that is introduced to
the entire chamber instead of to a committee of Congress. United States Senate Definitions, Last
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provide some insight as to the overall purpose of Congress. One such
report included a statement by then Senator Bayh stating that "[Title IX]
is a ... comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and
training for later careers .... , In addition, the judiciary and scholars
often turn to Title VI and Title VII in order to interpret Congress' intent
with regard to Title IX. 141
Although peer sexual harassment in public schools was not discussed
at the inception of Title IX, the judiciary recently applied Title IX in the
public school setting. However, the Supreme Court has been careful to
limit a school's liability to instances when there is notice of the sexual
harassment on the part of an appropriate official and an act of deliberate
indifference on the part of school officials. 149 The earliest case that ad-
dressed student-on-student harassment occurred in June of 1998. In the
case, the United States Supreme Court decided Gebser v. Lago Inde-
pendent School District.'50 The Court held that in order for an action to
lie against a school district for sexual harassment by a teacher, the school
district must have actual notice and show deliberate indifference to the
harassment."'
Next, in August of 1999, the Supreme Court addressed the same
question involving student-on-student sexual harassment. 52 The Supreme
Court held that in instances of student-on-student sexual harassment, a
school district may be held liable if school officials act with deliberate
indifference and the harassment becomes so severe that it, in effect, bars
the student's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.'53 The Su-
preme Court also limited liability for student-on-student sexual harass-
ment to cases when notice is sufficient and the district has substantial
control over both the harassing student and the context in which the har-
assment occurs. 5 4 The Court also stated two caveats: 1) gender based
name calling and teasing are insufficient for a claim under Title IX; 5
and 2) school boards maintain flexibility in developing policies and
dealing with specific instances of sexual harassment.
Updated January 21, 2000, < http://www.senate.gov/learning/leam-glossary-more.html>. Therefore,
there are no committee hearing transcripts available to aid in interpreting Congress' intent.
147. 118 Cong. Rec. 5806-07 at 522 (1972).
148. Pontes, supra note 140, at 344.
149. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
150. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993.
151. See id.
152. See Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
153. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
154. See id. at 1672.
155. See id. at 1675.
156. See id.
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These two Supreme Court cases laid the foundation for school dis-
trict liability for sexual harassment and led to the Tenth Circuit's
groundbreaking decision holding an individual public school district li-
able for peer sexual harassment.
15 7
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1158
1. Facts
The plaintiff, Penelope Jones, was born with spastic cerebral palsy,
developmental disabilities, deafness in her left ear and functioned at the
level of a first grader. "9 Upon high school enrollment, the plaintiff's
mother informed the principal and teachers that Ms. Jones had previously
been sexually assaulted and shared her fear of further sexual assaults.'60
The principal and teachers assured Ms. Jones' mother that she would be
properly supervised. 161
Ms. Jones was placed in the same classroom as "John Doe." '162
School officials knew that John Doe had behavioral problems including
engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct."' Even so, the school ap-
pointed John Doe as the "janitor's assistant" which gave John Doe access
to unsupervised areas of the school.'64
In November of 1993, school officials became aware that John Doe
was engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct towards Ms. Jones.165 In
addition, Ms. Jones' mother told school officials that John Doe had been
calling her house.'66
During this same time period, John Doe sexually assaulted Ms. Jones
on several occasions.16 During one assault, a custodian discovered the
two students and saw blood and vomit. 16 The custodian instructed the
students to clean up, return to class, and informed the teachers. 69 How-
ever, the teachers did not inform Ms. Jones' mother.170 Instead, they tied
157. See Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
158. Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238.













20001 SEXUAL HARASSMENT 607
extra clothing around Ms. Jones' waist to hide the blood. 7 ' Also, after
another incident, Ms. Jones was told not to tell her mother and to try to
forget that the assault happened. On another occasion, after the teach-
ers discovered that Ms. Jones had been sexually and physically assaulted,
they told Ms. Jones' mother only about the physical assault.
73
As a result, Ms. Jones began to engage in self destructive and suici-
dal behavior.7 4 Ms. Jones then entered a psychiatric hospital. "' After she
was in the hospital, Ms. Jones' mother found out about the sexual as-
saults. 76 Ms. Jones' mother immediately contacted the teachers. 77 The
teachers denied any incidents and instructed the mother to return Ms.
Jones to school. 78 Ms. Jones' mother also left a telephone message with
the principal about the assaults. 179 The principal never returned her phone
call and did not investigate.'80
Ms. Jones attempted to return to school following her
hospitalization."' Upon return, she was battered by John Doe and "ridi-
culed" by students."' At a meeting with the principal and teachers, the
principal and teachers were "hostile" to Ms. Jones' parents and suggested
that the sexual activity had been consensual. ' The principal refused any
further investigation. ' In addition, the principal suspended Ms. Jones for
"behavior which is detrimental to the welfare, safety, or morals of other
pupils or school personnel."'8 5 The principal did not, however, inform
law enforcement or discipline John Doe in any way.16
2. Decision
Ms. Jones' mother brought a suit against the district on her behalf
seeking damages under Title IX. In addition, she filed two claims
against the teachers and principal individually under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 for denial of equal protection and a violation of Ms. Jones' due
















187. See id. at 1242.
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process rights. The District Court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim. 19 Following oral arguments, the Court abated the case
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.1 90
In interpreting the Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Appeals
stated a four-factor test for determining recovery under Title IX.' 9' The
four factors are: 1) the district must have actual knowledge of the har-
assment; 2) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment; 3)
the harassment was so "severe, pervasive and objectively offensive" that
it 4) deprived the victim of "access to the educational benefits or oppor-
tunities provided by the school."'92
Because the Davis decision did not specifically define the type of
notice required, the Court of Appeals held that actual notice must be
given to an official who has "requisite control" over the situation in order
to meet the notice prong of the test.1 93 The inquiry as to which school
official may have "requisite control" over a situation is a fact-based in-
quiry. 194 Factors used to determine which official has requisite control
over a situation may include those officials who have the power to trans-
fer the harassing student to a different class, suspend the student, curtail
the student's privileges, or provide additional supervision.'9' The Court
held that Ms. Jones had given sufficient notice to the principal and that
the principal had the requisite amount of control over Ms. Jones.1
9 6
Therefore, the knowledge of the principal could be charged to the school
district.' 97 In support of its determination, the court pointed out that the
school's sexual harassment policy stated that grievances should be filed
with the principal and that the principal had the power to suspend stu-
dents.'"
In addressing whether Ms. Jones teachers had the requisite amount
of control, the court gave no dispositive answer.' 99 However, the court
stated that it is possible for teachers to meet the definition of appropriate
persons if the victim is complaining to a teacher about a fellow student's
action during school hours and on school grounds.29" The court further
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1245.
190. See id.; Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).





196. See id. at 1247.
197. See Murrell, 186 F.3d 1246.





stated that the teachers' actions "plainly" amounted to deliberate indif-
ference. °1
In addition, the court found that the principal acted with deliberate
indifference to Ms. Jones' situation, thereby meeting the second prong of
202the test. The court stated that the principal's complete refusal to inves-
203
tigate, if true, amounted to deliberate indifference.
Third, the sexual assaults took place over the course of a month;
thereby meeting the requirement that the harassment be "severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive. 2 °4
Finally, the court stated that Ms. Jones became a danger to herself
and others following the assaults and required hospitalization; thereby
meeting the fourth prong of the test.2°5 In addition, the principal sus-
pended Ms. Jones and Ms. Jones was housebound as a result.2° These
207actions denied Ms. Jones any educational opportunities or benefits.
Therefore, because Ms. Jones' complaint met all four factors of the
test, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision regard to
208the Title IX claim.
C. Other Circuits
Because Davis was decided very recently, few circuits have inter-.. 209
preted the Supreme Court's decision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals relied partly on Davis when addressing the issue of a professor'sS 210
harassment of a student in a University setting. However, the decision
is of little help because the case involves the sexual harassment of a Uni-
211
versity student by a professor.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in order to
recover under Title IX, a school must have notice of and show deliberate
indifference to the sexual harassment.! '2 In addition, based on Davis, the
Court held that in order to recover a plaintiff must show that the harass-
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See Murrell, 186 F.3d 1248.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1249.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 1251.
209. The Fifth Circuit briefly mentioned the Davis decision. See Wills v. Brown University,
184 F.3d 20 (5th Cir. 1999); See also O'Hare v. Colonial School Dist., 1999 WL 773506 (E.D.Pa.
September 29, 1999).
210. Wills, 184 F.3d at 36-37.
211. See id. at 23.
212. See id. at 35.
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ment resulted in the denial of educational benefits or the "alteration of
conditions" of the educational environment on the basis of sex. '13
The Court found that the student was subjected to a hostile environ-
ment.' 4 In addition, the Court found that the University received actual
notice of the several sexual harassment claims based on the student's
complaint to the provost as well as evidence that revealed that the Uni-
S215
versity knew of other incidents prior to the immediate complaint.
Next, the Court stated that as a matter of law, the trial court took an
"unduly restrictive view" of sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment. 2 6 The Court stated that the factors that should be taken into
account when addressing the indifference of the University should be the
nature of the harassment, its duration, the role and nature of contact of
the harasser and victim before and after the harassment, other harassing
acts known to the school, and the conditions that are altered by the con-
217tinuing presence of the harasser. The Court concluded that a reasonable
fact-finder could be persuaded that the University acted with deliberate
indifference and therefore the trial court erred.1 8
In addition, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Court re-
cently interpreted the Davis decision. The parents of a minor brought an
action against the school district, superintendent, principal, and a teacher
when a student in the school's photography darkroom repeatedly sexu-
ally assaulted their minor daughter.2' 9 The District Court stated that the
claims were brought under Title VII and therefore the Davis decision
was not controlling. However, the Court further stated that the Davis
holding required actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part
of the officials2 and harassment "so severe, persuasive and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the plaintiff of the education op-
portunities and benefits provided by the school., 22 The Court went on to
hold that the plaintiff had not alleged any facts sufficient to make the
Davis holding "analogous or relevant" to the decision. 22 However, it is
difficult to compare the Davis decision and the O'Hare decision because
the District Court decision provides very little information as to the spe-
cific facts of the case.
213. Id. at 36.
214. See id. at 40.
215. See id.
216. See Wills, 184 F.3d at 42.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. O'Hare, 1999 WL 773506 at*1.
220. See id. at *5.
221. See id.





After the decision in Lago Vista, commentators criticized the Su-
preme Court for its failure to address the issue of student-on-student har-
224assment. This criticism is especially relevant considering that the ma-
jority of sexual harassment occurs between students and students and not
between teachers and students . 25
The Davis decision, however, provides an outlet for liability when
student-on-student sexual harassment occurs. However, the parameters
of that liability are strictly defined, making it difficult for a student to
recover. 226 The Tenth Circuit decision provides a good example of the
difficulty of proving liability. For example, even though the Supreme
221Court did not state that actual notice was required, the Tenth Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision to include actual notice, creat-
ing a greater barrier to recovery.228
Proponents of strict liability or agency theories argue that liability
based on actual notice and indifference does not go far enough to en-
courage school districts to aggressively deal with the problem of sexual
harassment." 9 Considering the grave effect of and overwhelming amount
of sexual harassment that takes place in schools, easing the notice and
deliberate indifference requirements may encourage schools to take a
more proactive approach in dealing with student-on-student sexual har-
assment.
However, this creates the problem of sorting out frivolous lawsuits.
Should a school district be held liable for civil damages because a six-
year-old child kisses a female classmate? Most people would probably
say no. What if the child is in sixth grade? A sixth grade teacher re-
sponded to allegations of sexual harassment by some boys of a girl in his
class that "[the student] was so beautiful that the guys would be all over
her in a couple of years."23 Does this rise to the level that schools should
be held civilly liable? Determining these factual questions is difficult.
The safeguards of notice and deliberate indifference provide some meas-
ure of security to school districts that isolated events will not become a
bankrupting lawsuit. If a school district is bankrupt due to unlimited
224. Amy K. Graham, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: The Supreme
Determination That Children Deserve Less Protection Than Adults From Sexual Harassment, 30
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 599 (1999).
225. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
227. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675 (1999).
228. Murrell v. School District No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Sullivan,
supra note 134, at 29.
229. Richard A. Weller, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: School District
Remains Afloat in Title IX Litigation Floodwater, 50 MERCER L. REV. 781,789 (1999).
230. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. School Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 167 (N.D.N.Y 1996).
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damages awards, all students' educational opportunities are impaired.23'
Furthermore, some advocates argue that holding districts liable for stu-
dent-on student harassment will impact the educational system as a
whole by frustrating current educators and discouraging others from be-
coming members of the educational system."' At the same time, when a
school district is aware of and ignores pervasive harassment, an outlet for
liability exists for the injured student.
The adherence to a policy of requiring actual notice is very different
from claims brought under Title VII, which requires only constructive
notice. 23' Title VII is often the basis of sexual harassment lawsuits
brought by employees against employers. Proponents of a stricter notice
requirement argue that the stricter requirement of notice is appropriate
because of the population of children and adolescents with which schools
234are dealing. Children and adolescents are developing and experiment-
231
ing with behavior that would be considered inappropriate for an adult.
A stricter requirement of notice provides some allowance to school dis-
tricts that are trying to regulate the experimental behavior of children and
adolescents.
However, proponents of a constructive notice standard argue that the
requirement of actual notice leaves more children at risk of suffering the
effects of sexual harassment. 2" An advocate for the National Organiza-
tion for Women said "[w]e'll just keep litigating the issue. If women in
the workplace should not have to endure sexual harassment, why should
young girls have to endure it at school? ' 23 7 Because the requirements of
Title IX are stricter than Title VII, child victims are given fewer protec-
tions from sexual harassment in order to allow more flexibility for har-
assers. The actual notice standard ignores the' immense harm suffered by
victims of sexual harassment. The standard also ignores the long-term
impact that may be suffered by victims of sexual harassment.
In addition, the actual notice standard does little to prepare harassers
for the workplace. Schools are charged with the responsibility of edu-
cating and preparing young people for the workforce. If a student is al-
lowed to harass fellow students in a school setting because of looser
standards placed on the school district; as an adult, that student may be
unprepared to deal with the current culture of the American workforce.
231. Richard Fossey, Let The Master Answer: Holding Schools Vicariously Liable When
Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575, 593-96 (1996).
232. Pontes, supra note 140, at 376.
233. Julie C. Doss, Peer to Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX: A Discussion of Liability
Standards from Doe v. Londonderry, 34 TULSA L.J. 443,462 (1999).
234. Doss, supra note 233, at 461.
235. See Doss, supra note 233, at 462 (stating that "in addition to the curriculum, students learn
about many different aspects of human life and interaction from school").
236. Doss, supra note 233, at 456.
237. Doss, supra note 233, at 458.
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Sexual harassment is not tolerated in today's working society. By ignor-
ing harassing behavior as a child, the school and the judiciary provide a
disservice to children as they mature into adults and join the workforce.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has taken strong steps to establish liability of
school officials and school districts for student-on-student sexual har-
assment. The Sutton decision provided for individual liability of school
officials under the state created danger doctrine. This decision allowed
a student recovery based on the demonstration of knowing and reckless
affirmative conduct of the principal by not enforcing appropriate sexual
harassment policies, "9 the degree of which was outrageous and "con-
science shocking."24
The Tenth Circuit's decision to hold the principal accountable was a
unique one. No other district has held a school official liable for student-_ - 241
on-student harassment under the state created danger doctrine. In ad-
dition, the Tenth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to find a school
district liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment.
While both of these decisions provide an outlet for recovery for student
victims of sexual harassment, the question remains as to whether these
decision, which both require actual notice and indifference, are appropri-
ate for addressing the problem of student-on-student sexual harassment.
Advocates for more liability on the part of schools argue that the
standards increase the danger to students by encouraging schools and
officials to take a hands-off approach to the problem. Advocates on the
other side insist that schools must retain some flexibility in dealing with
children before being bankrupted by frivolous lawsuits.
There are no easy answers. The problem of sexual harassment is
complex and requires a careful balancing of the interests of the victims of
sexual harassment and the school officials forced to deal with this perva-
sive problem. However, one issue remains clear. Sexual harassment is
pervasive in the American school system and the effect on victims is
severe. While the Tenth Circuit's decisions may not be ideal, the deci-
sion is a first step in dealing with this pressing issue facing America's
school children.
Amy E. Richards
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